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Three Essays on the Role of Political Connections in Corporate Finance 
 
 
Aoran Zhang, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2019 
 
 
    This dissertation investigates the influence of political connections on corporate financing 
activities in China. The thesis consists of three chapters. In the first essay, we explore whether and 
how political connections affect the likelihood of completing a cross-border M&A deal for Chinese 
publicly listed, but privately-owned enterprises (POEs) and the resulting firm performance. In line 
with the proposed political connection trade-off theory, we demonstrate that POEs with politically 
connected top managers are more likely to complete a cross-border M&A deal than POEs with no 
such connections, but that this comes at the cost of negative announcement returns and subsequent 
lower accounting performance. These findings support the idea that politically connected top 
managers engage in empire building behavior at the cost of shareholders’ wealth. 
     In the second essay, we examine how political connections influence the likelihood of 
corporate bond issuance for POEs in China. Using a sample of Chinese POEs from 2007 to 2016, 
the research shows that politically-connected POEs are more likely to issue corporate bonds as a 
debt-financing instrument than their non-connected counterparts, and that they achieve lower 
coupon rates (i.e., lower refinancing costs). On the other hand, this research indicates that corporate 
bond-issuing POEs in China have weaker corporate governance and a surprisingly higher default 
probability. Overall, the results show that the corporate bond market in China is strongly distorted 
by political factors. 
     In the third essay, we study how implicit government guarantees affect the yield spreads of 
Chinese corporate bonds. We presume that quasi-municipal corporate bonds (so called “Chengtou” 
bonds), issued by local government financing vehicles (LGFVs), carry an implicit government 
guarantee. Using a sample of publicly traded corporate bonds between 2010 and 2017, we find 
that bond investors are significantly less sensitive to bond-specific risks for corporate bonds with 
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an implicit government guarantee: the yield spreads of Chengtou bonds are significantly lower 
than those of corporate bonds issued by POEs in China. We also find that corporate bonds from 
Northeast China are riskier than those issued by firms elsewhere in the country. Furthermore, we 
discover that policy changes introduced by the central government, which were intended to 
regulate local debt financing activities, significantly reduced the gap in yield spreads between 
Chengtou bonds and bonds issued by POEs. Overall, the empirical results suggest that implicit 
government guarantees play a crucial role in corporate debt market and that China's recent policy 
changes reduce the effectiveness of implicit government guarantees, making corporate bond 
market more market-oriented. 
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Many studies have demonstrated that political connections can influence the corporate financing 
activities of listed firms (see Roberts, 1990; Fisman, 2001; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Adhikari, 
Derashid, and Zhang, 2006; Charumilind et al., 2006; Faccio, 2006; Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven, 
2008; and Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang, 2009). The benefits of political connections are 
experienced not only by firms in developed countries, but also by those in emerging markets, due 
to concentrated control structures and inefficient legal systems (La Porta et al., 1998, 2000). As an 
emerging market, China is not with exception. The thesis studies the impact of political connections 
at either management level or ownership level on Chinese corporations’ financing activities.  
In the first essay, we investigate how political connections can affect Chinese POEs’ cross-
border acquisitions.  
Outbound foreign direct investments (FDI) by multinational corporations play a vital role in the 
world economy. According to the 2016 World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2016), a strong FDI 
rally occurred in 2015. Global FDI increased by 38% to $1.8 trillion, a record high since the 2008 
financial crisis. The surge in cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBMA) is the principal 
contributor to the recovery of FDI. The value of cross-border deals soared to $721 billion in 2015, 
almost double the amount in 2014 ($432 billion).  
After the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) launched its “go global” initiative in 2001, Chinese 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) became increasingly active in the world. In fact, the outbound FDI 
of Chinese SOEs increased more than threefold between 2009 and 2015 to $128 billion. This helped 
China become the world’s third largest foreign investor after the U.S. and Japan. Moreover, China 
is the only developing economy among the top ten foreign investors. In contrast to other major 
developing economies whose outbound FDIs typically take the form of reinvested earnings, 
China’s FDI mainly consists of new equity investments (UNCTAD, 2016).  
In 2006, the Chinese government also incorporated privately owned enterprises (POEs) in its go 
global strategy by starting to offer tax rebates and access to long-term financing at favorable terms 
to POEs (Cheng and Ma, 2010). Despite these efforts, however, there is (anecdotal) evidence that 
POEs continue to face severe limitations when conducting overseas investments today.  
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According to Cheng and Ma (2010), the Chinese government may have technically lifted many 
of the restrictions for POEs, but adequate assistance remains out of reach for several reasons. Some 
POEs find the approval procedure for going global to be tedious and overly time-consuming. To 
address this problem, Cheng and Ma suggest that a “one-stop-shop” approach to obtaining 
approvals would be more efficient. In addition, many POEs feel that they are at a serious 
disadvantage when attempting to obtain credit for international business transactions because the 
quotas for long-term loans are allocated exclusively to SOEs (Poncet, Steingress, and 
Vandenbussche, 2010; Guariglia, Liu, and Song, 2011).1  Furthermore, most of the major Chinese 
commercial banks are owned and controlled by the Chinese government and their primary function 
is to support SOEs’ economic activities (Morck, Yeung, and Zhao, 2008). These banks tend to 
screen out POEs from their lending activities because they are considered high risk. Consequently, 
many Chinese POEs must turn to other sources, from employing their own capital (Liu and Tan, 
2004) to raising capital overseas (Sutherland and Ning, 2011), or even allying with private equity 
(Financial Times, 2012).  
Despite the ongoing restrictions faced by Chinese POEs, they have been challenging the 
dominance of SOEs in the area of cross-border acquisitions in recent years. As China Daily (2016) 
reports, in September 2016, China’s privately-owned enterprises (POEs) overtook SOEs for the 
first time in outbound FDI. Specifically, POEs now lead in terms of both value and number of 
cross-border M&A transactions, accounting for 65.3% of all deals. This development seems 
puzzling, given that the Chinese government has traditionally favoured SOEs for which it could 
effectively exercise its control rights. This raises the following question: Why have the cross-border 
investments of SOEs slowed down and how did POEs come to replace SOEs as the leaders of 
Chinese cross-border deals? 
Some recent examples of SOEs experiencing setbacks in the global M&A market illustrate the 
potential reasons for the recent dominance of Chinese POEs in cross-border acquisitions. First, 
Tsinghua Unigroup, an SOE, attempted to acquire West Digital Corporation (a data storage group 
                                                     
1 There are three policy banks in China coordinating government-directed spending: The Agricultural Development 
Bank of China, the China Development Bank, and the Export-Import Bank of China. They were established in 1994 
and are responsible for financing economic and trade development as well as state-controlled projects. 
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in the U.S.) in 2015. However, Tsinghua withdrew the $3.8 billion offer after the deal was flagged 
for investigation by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) (see 
Financial Times, 2016). Similarly, the CFIUS challenged Philips’ attempt to sell its lighting 
business to a Chinese consortium. Similar interventions have also occurred in other countries. In 
Germany, for example, the Federal Ministry of Economics and Energy withdrew its clearance 
certificate for the takeover of Aixtron, a semiconductor producer, by Fujian Grand Chip Investment 
Group (a Chinese state-owned bidder), indicating Berlin’s reluctance to transfer Aixtron’s cutting-
edge technology and revealing security-related technologies through the acquisition (see New York 
Times, 2016). President Obama even issued an executive order prohibiting the acquisition of 
Aixtron’s U.S.-based business. Presumably in response to the previously described case, as well as 
similar cases that took place around the same time in Germany, the German government initiated 
a regulation review at the EU-level for takeovers by investors from outside the EU and proposed 
the following changes: a) doubling the time for reviewing takeovers, b) restricting indirect 
takeovers, and c) re-defining a “threat to public order” to include a diverse array of new sectors 
that are considered critical (see The Telegraph, 2017).  
These events clearly suggest increasing headwinds for Chinese SEOs that wish to complete 
cross-border acquisitions, as foreign governments fear the indirect transfer of cutting-edge 
technology or the loss of ownership of businesses with national security or strategic importance to 
Chinese government-controlled firms. Similar trends are identified by Linklaters (2017) who notes 
that in 2016, up to one-third of Chinese outbound M&A deals were blocked by the host 
governments – the vast majority of these deals involving Chinese SOEs. For POEs, ties to the 
Chinese government are less direct and support is offered in the form of tax rebates as well as 
subsidies and favorable financing terms if the firm completes the cross-border acquisition. This is 
neatly summarized by a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC) who suggests that “Given the fact that SOEs often experience setbacks when acquiring 
foreign companies in advanced economies, POEs are encouraged to acquire the high technology 
for the growth of China’s economy. Because POEs rarely have Chinese government background, 
they can avoid the scrutiny from foreign governments targeting Chinese SOEs. The government 
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should provide financing to POEs for their cross-border deals and even state-owned companies 
could provide funding in the background to POEs” (see Sina Finance, 2010). 
The above analysis suggests that using politically (well-) connected POEs as government agents 
appears to be the best solution because politically connected top managers tend to actively respond 
to the government’s suggestion to proceed with cross-border acquisitions and are better equipped 
to overcome market discrimination against POEs with regard to, for example, securing sufficient 
long-term financing from state-owned commercial banks (see Li et al., 2008). However, the fact 
that politically connected POEs have the incentives and means to carry out cross-border 
acquisitions does not necessarily imply that these acquisitions constitute sound business practice 
nor that they will be financially successful. This somewhat contradictory state of affairs is a key 
theme of the current paper and is illustrated by the following examples. The Anbang Insurance 
Group, a Chinese POE whose CEO and chairman has working experience in a governmental 
department (the Administration for Industry and Commerce), was aggressively bidding for 
Starwood. This raised concerns that the acquisition was motivated not entirely by commercial 
interests, but also by political ones, including the desire to acquire technology and expertise in 
strategic sectors (see Bloomberg, 2016). Similarly, in mid-2017, Hytera Communications, a 
Chinese POE telecom giant, successfully acquired Norsat, a Vancouver-based Canadian satellite 
communications company, thereby gaining access to “sensitive Western satellite technology.” This 
deal was heavily criticized because of the chairman’s close ties to the Chinese Ministry of Public 
Security, which oversees China’s security agencies. In response to the acquisition, the U.S Defense 
Department initiated a review of all existing contracts with Norsat because the same satellite 
communications technology would presumably now also be used by the Chinese (see The Globe 
and Mail, 2017). These examples suggest that one of the primary motivations for cross-border 
acquisitions by Chinese POEs is strategic asset seeking (see Deng, 2009; Huang and Chi, 2014).  
Further evidence of the fact that cross-border acquisitions completed by politically connected 
POEs may not be motivated purely by commercial interests comes from a report by the Ministry 
of Commerce of China, which revealed that only 13% of the cross-border deals made by Chinese 
companies are profitable (see Sina Finance, 2016). As mentioned above, a possible explanation is 
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that politically connected top management of POEs aims to acquire strategic assets largely for 
political motives, trying to complete the acquisition at all costs and thereby sometimes overpaying. 
This behaviour was clearly evident in the previously described case of Anbang Insurance Group 
which started a bidding competition for Starwood and ended up in a high-risk financial model (see 
Bloomberg, 2016). According to analysts, Landbridge Group, a Chinese privately-owned company, 
recently bought the Australian port of Darwin for more than twice its true value (see ABC, 2015). 
Another example of politically connected top management attempting to “flatter” the government 
by blindly following its recommendations is the recent trend for Chinese firms to buy foreign 
football clubs. They rush into these deals not because they are particularly good investments, but 
because President Xi Jinping has expressed hopes that China will become a soccer powerhouse 
(see South China Morning Post, 2017).  
A further possible explanation for the failure of outbound investments is that after deal 
completion, Chinese POEs often find that competition in the host country is much tougher and that 
some business practices commonly accepted in China, such as relaxing health and safety standards, 
cannot be mirrored abroad (see Bloomberg, 2017). A similar argument was also invoked by 
Antkiewicz and Whalley (2006) in discussing why most of the cross-border M&A transactions 
attempted by Chinese SOEs are unsuccessful in Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries.  
We use the term political connection trade-off theory to refer to the oppositional situation 
whereby politically connected POEs are better positioned (than their unconnected counterparts) to 
manage the necessary logistics of a cross-border M&A, but the deals often come at the cost of poor 
financial performance. If productivity and profitability were frequently to matter less than political 
goals, politically connected POEs would subject themselves to moral hazard and create a 
“principal-principal” conflict between the state and the firm’s shareholders (see Young et al., 2008)2.  
Specifically, the “political empire building” behavior of politically connected top managers would 
have a negative effect on shareholders’ wealth.  
                                                     
2 The hypothesized principal-principal problem conflict leans on the well documented principal-agent problem. For 
Chinese POEs with politically connected managers, it describes the behavior of politically active managers who pursue 
state interests and their own political careers at the detriment of the firm’s shareholders. 
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To test the political connection trade-off theory, i.e. that politically connected top managers of 
POEs are more likely to complete a cross-border M&A transaction than their unconnected 
counterparts, but at the cost of poorer performance, we conduct several analyses. First, based on a 
sample of 1,782 Chinese POEs listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, we 
analyze the POEs’ likelihood of completing a cross-border M&A deal. Consistent with our 
argumentation, we find that politically connected POEs have a greater likelihood of successfully 
completing a cross-border merger or acquisition than their unconnected counterparts. Our results 
remain robust after invoking a variety of robustness checks. 
In a second set of analyses, we examine stock price returns and the return on equity after the 
announcement of a cross-border M&A to test for the market reaction and the impact on firm 
performance. We expect both the short- and long-term post-M&A performance to be lower for 
politically connected POEs than for non-politically connected POEs. We show that this is indeed 
the case; POEs with a politically connected chairman or CEO show significantly lower 
announcement returns (to the tune of about 1.5 to 2 percent) and are less profitable than their non-
connected counterparts within the first three years after deal completion.  
Overall, our study supports the political connection trade-off theory and makes the following 
contributions to the existing literature. First, to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to 
deliver a theoretical framework and empirical analysis of how political connections influence a 
Chinese POE’s decision to engage in cross-border M&A activities and what the related costs of 
these connections are. Second, our study contributes to the literature on how governmental 
influence in emerging markets can affect the decisions of domestic firms to expand internationally 
through cross-border M&A deals (see Xiao and Sun, 2005; Rui and Yip, 2008; Peng, Wang, and 
Jiang, 2008; Luo, Xue, and Han, 2010; and Du and Boateng, 2015). Finally, our study contributes 
to the research methodology typically used in studies in this area.  
In the second essay, we examine the link between political connections and POEs’ public debt 
financing.  
In 2007, the Chinese government recognized that the absence of a well-developed corporate 
bond market was hindering the overall health of the economy. Henceforth, the government 
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undertook pivotal reforms and, as a result, China’s corporate bond market experienced tremendous 
expansion. By the end of 2015, the market had transformed from being in a “deep coma” to being 
the largest corporate bond market in East Asia and the second largest (after that of the U.S.) in the 
world.3 Despite these developments, the Chinese corporate bond market has drawn little attention 
from the finance literature. Thus, the factors that motivate Chinese firms to obtain financing from 
this market are unclear. Our research aims to elucidate this issue.  
Over 90% of Chinese corporate bonds are issued by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), suggesting 
that political connections seem to play a large role in bond issuance (see Chicago Booth Review, 
2015). Political connections have been well documented to impact firms’ financing activities, 
particularly in emerging markets. Emerging economies do not typically have solid institutional 
environments. Thus, they frequently experience irregular activities, such as corruption, which are 
at odds with free market forces but are often part of doing business, particularly for financing. 
Even though several studies have shown empirically that in several countries around the world 
(particularly in emerging markets), politically-connected firms are able to receive preferential 
financing treatment (see, e.g., Roberts, 1990; Fisman, 2001; Dinç, 2005; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; 
Faccio, 2006; Faccio, Masulis, and Mcconnell, 2006; Charumilind, Kali, and Wiwattanakantang, 
2006; Fraser, Zhang, and Derashid, 2006; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Claessens, Feijen, and 
Laeven, 2008; Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang, 2009; Borisova and Megginson, 2011; 
Bliss and Gul, 2012; Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar, 2012; Boubakri et al., 2012; Chen, Shen, and 
Lin, 2014; Houstion et al., 2014; Kim and Zhang, 2015, and Ferris, Houston, and Javakhadze, 
2016), and several studies have investigated the the impact of political connections on China’s 
corporate finance (see, e.g., Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 2007; Li et al. 2008; Chen et al., 2011; Wu et 
al., 2012; Liu, Tang, and Tian, 2013; Piotroski and Zhang, 2014; Li and Zhou, 2015; Cao et al., 
2017; Pan and Tian, 2017; and Cao et al., 2018), no study has yet investigated how political 
connections could influence the public debt market (existing literature on political connections and 
debt only limit to private bank debt). In China, the second largest public debt market some unique 
                                                     
3 As of 2015, the size of the Chinese corporate bond market had surged to 12.9 trillion Chinese yuan, equivalent to 
approximately USD $2 trillion (Asian Development Bank, 2015). 
 8 
 
features that does not exist in other emerging markets and therefore provides us a fertile laboratory 
for academic research to examine the political influence on the bond market. The public debt 
market in China is only around ten years old. As an immature market, it have some traits and 
relationships that due to increased regulation tend to disappear in more mature markets. The 
interplay between political connections and debt financing activities that are examined in existing 
literature are based on emerging economies that are largely considered market-oriented and feature 
market mechanisms. Although those economies are defined as emerging markets, they are 
comparable to the free markets of most developed countries. Conversely, China’s unique political 
system with its highly concentrated political power tends to intervene in the market to a much larger 
extent. A surprising phenomenon in China’s public debt market is a so called “zero default” myth. 
That is, corporate bond issuers cannot default on their debt, no matter what happens. We believe 
that the so called “zero default” myth substantially distorted the market forces of China’s bond 
market. Specifically, the “zero default” myth could create room for corruption via political 
connections to influence the bond issuance. Through political connections, many issuers who did 
not actually qualify the bond market can collude with the authority and placed their bonds by 
corruption. Specifically, many issuers do not have satisfactory finance performance and sound 
corporate governance to protect bondholders’ rights.  
The anecdotal evidence from the media news supports our expectation. In recent years, China’s 
central government has made concerted efforts to de-leverage its economy, tighten financial 
regulations and reform its debt market to become more market oriented. In the process, the “zero 
default” myth had to be broken. In 2014, Shanghai Chaori Solar Energy Science & Technology 
Co., Ltd (a politically connected POE) was the first Chinese firm ever to default on its onshore 
corporate bonds. As always, the firm’s investors had assumed that the Chinese government would 
bail out any Chinese corporation in danger of defaulting (Financial Times, 2016). Chaori’s retail 
bondholders pondered lawsuits after the default alleging defective information disclosure in the 
bond prospectus (which caused the bonds to be rated AA by China’s rating agency). According to 
the minimum requirements for bond issuance, a bond issuer should exhibit positive net income for 
at least three consecutive years before the year of bond issuance. In contrast, Chaori surprisingly 
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had negative net income for the two years before the issuing year. Thus, Chaori even did not qualify 
the minimum requirements. Retail investors cannot understand how such a firm can place their 
bond issuance smoothly (Sina, 2014). 
After the “zero default” myth vanished, more and more bond defaults occurred. In the first half 
of 2016, 17 corporate bonds defaulted, up from 6 in 2015, and at least 188 firms deferred or 
cancelled their debt issues (Bloomberg, 2016). According to lending data from the People’s Bank 
of China, these emerging solvency risks triggered a sudden shrinkage in the corporate bond market, 
to the tune of 40 billion yuan in the first half of 2016. In 2018, China’s corporate bond market 
deteriorated even further. During the first half of 2018, 31 corporate bonds issued by 16 issuers 
defaulted (Hexun, 2018) and 454 companies cancelled or postponed their originally planned bond 
issues. Specifically, among the corporate bond defaults in 2018, POEs were the “major players”: 
Among the 16 defaulters, 11 were POEs. According to a recent article in the Financial Times 
(Financial Times, 2019), the negative situation continues in 2019. The article states that Chinese 
POEs are likely to face an even more difficult time in the corporate bond market and an even bigger 
wave of defaults could happen in 2019. 
 Based on the media news, we investigate whether the bond issuers are indeed good and 
qualified issuers. We strongly suspect a collusion exists between the political connected POEs and 
corrupted officials and that brought many bad issuers. Thus, this study aims to reveal whether 
political connections can assist POEs get access to corporate bond market and are helpful in 
alleviating their financing costs. In addition, given the large number of bond default from POEs, 
we investigate that whether bond issuers have sound finance performance and corporate 
governance to protect debtholders’ rights. Using a sample of 1,546 Chinese-listed POEs over the 
2007 to 2016 period, we find evidence that the likelihood of issuing corporate bonds is significantly 
higher for POEs with political connections. This result is robust, and holds after we control for the 
possibly endogenous relationship between political connections and corporate bond issuance. 
Moreover, we show that politically-connected POEs are more likely than non-connected POEs to 
choose public debt over private bank debt. In addition, we examine the link between political 
connections and the financing costs of corporate bond-issuing POEs and demonstrate that Chinese 
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POEs with political connections are able to place their corporate bonds with lower coupon rates. 
Finally, we examine the market reactions to POEs’ corporate bond issuing announcements. Our 
results indicate that, overall, the stock returns of bond issuing POEs around the announcements are 
not statistically significantly different from zero. However, investors tend to react favorably to 
announcements by politically-connected POEs. Thus, the cumulative abnormal returns over the 
event window of (0, 1) are 1.2% higher for politically-connected corporate bond issuers than for 
non-connected. As our results illustrate, POEs generally experience great difficulty obtaining 
external financing, an issue that is well-documented by the Chinese media. Therefore, investors 
often view political connections as an implicit guarantee of additional debt financing and of 
reduced refinancing costs.  
Furthermore, we find some surprising and counterintuitive results, namely that POEs issuing 
corporate bonds have poorer corporate governance and  higher default probabilities (measured by 
the Altman Z-score), specifically the politically connected POEs. This empirical evidence echoes 
the anecdotal evidence from a large number of corporate bond defaults. We interpret this to mean 
that political connections somehow distort China’s nascent corporate bond market by facilitating 
the entry of unqualified issuers into the market.  
In the third essay, we delve into the relationship between government connections at ownership 
level and corporate bond yield spreads.  
Government guarantees have not been directly identified in the debt covenants of corporate 
bonds: that is, there is no legal obligation for governments to guarantee corporate bonds in most 
countries around the world. However, there may be situations in which corporate bonds carry 
implicit government guarantees, meaning that the market expects the government to assume 
responsibility if the bond faces default. Implicit government guarantees may exist because of the 
close relationship between the bond issuer and the government, the importance of the bond issuer, 
or the main use of the raised funds. Research on implicit government guarantees has aimed to 
improve the understanding of a variety of topics in debt financing, including the too-big-to-fail 
(TBTF) phenomenon in banks (Balasubramnian and Cyree 2011; Acharya, Anginer, and Warburton, 
2016; Gao, Liao, and Wang, 2018), the role of state shareholdings in bond pricing for state-owned 
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enterprises (Borisova et al., 2015), and sub-national government bond pricing in the presence of 
implicit support from the central government (Sola and Palomba, 2016; Beck et al., 2017; Feld et 
al., 2017). 
Investors’ expectations of government guarantees can often be observed by a bond’s yield 
spread, which generally provides an indication of the risk carried by a bond. China’s quasi-
municipal corporate bond market offers a fertile laboratory for academic research regarding the 
effects of an implicit government guarantee on a bond’s yield spread. Quasi-municipal bonds, 
which are called “Chengtou” bonds in China, are officially issued by Local Government Financing 
Vehicles (LGFVs). An LGFV is a state-owned enterprise (SOE) in which the corresponding local 
government is the dominant or the only shareholder. In China, the 1994 Budget Law forbids local 
governments from borrowing directly from the capital markets on their own (Chen, He, and Liu, 
2017). Hence, the purpose of establishing LGFVs is to provide a financing platform for local 
governments to raise funds for local infrastructure and urban development projects. On one hand, 
Chengtou bonds are part of the corporate bond family, since the bond issuers are state-owned 
corporations (LGFVs). On the other hand, because local governments are the main or sole 
shareholders of LGFVs, Chengtou bonds are also considered municipal bonds. 
It is controversial whether quasi-municipal bonds are supported by implicit government 
guarantees. On May 24, 2017, Moody's Investors Service downgraded China’s sovereign debt 
rating, for the first time in nearly 30 years, from A3 to A1 (Moody’s, 2017). The rationale for the 
downgrade was the expectation of an increase in the number of bonds issued by LGFVs, and the 
associated fear that the debt owed by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) might lead to a rise in 
contingent liabilities for the central government. China's Finance Ministry responded to Moody's 
downgrade by noting that it was based on "inappropriate methodology" and that it demonstrated 
the agency's lack of knowledge regarding Chinese laws and regulations. The ministry further 
claimed that “according to China's laws on guarantees and budgets, local government contingent 
liabilities include no more than the guaranteed debt they issue using loans from foreign 
governments or international organizations” (People.cn, 2017). Thus, according to Chinese 
corporate laws, the debt owed by local or central SOEs is only incurred by the enterprises 
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themselves, not by the government. In line with this rationale, as local SOEs, LGFVs are supposed 
to assume full responsibility for their debt, instead of receiving guarantees from local governments. 
On the other hand, given that Chengtou bonds share features with municipal bonds, investors of 
Chengtou bonds have certain “bail out” expectations. Indeed, academic studies frequently argue 
that Chengtou bonds, although they are issued by LGFVs, nevertheless carry an implicit 
government guarantee (Chen and Wang, 2015; Ang, Bai, and Zhou, 2016). 
Both Chen and Wang (2015) and Ang, Bai, and Zhou (2016) empirically show that Chengtou 
bonds carry an implicit government guarantee. However, their results are based on data up to the 
year 2014. Since then, several important regulations have been enacted. Specifically, the State 
Council of China issued three pivotal documents (Document 43 in 2014, Document 88 in 2016, 
and Document 50 in 2017) that (a) attempted to curtail the rapid growth of local governments’ 
borrowing activities through LGFVs and (b) sought to limit the role of local governments in 
insuring the debts (mainly Chengtou bonds) issued by LGFVs. In a nutshell, these documents 
reflect the Chinese government’s desire to turn Chengtou bonds into market-oriented corporate 
bonds with no implicit government guarantee. These policy changes, which were largely invoked 
to address the budget constraints of local governments, are echoed by anecdotal evidence. In light 
of the government reforms, Fitch Ratings in 2017 noted that China is highly likely to witness its 
first quasi-municipal bond defaults in 2018, although the specific time is not certain. Fitch stated 
that China’s central government is ready to instill greater market discipline on LGFVs’ public debt 
by allowing lower quality LGFV-issued bonds to fail (CNBC, 2017). Meanwhile, Standard & 
Poor’s (S&P) made similar predictions as Fitch Ratings, indicating that China was likely to see the 
first Chengtou bond default in 2018. S&P reasoned that local governments’ burgeoning debt levels 
have become a major concern for China’s central government and that the central government was 
striving to remove expectations of implicit guarantees for LGFVs. In particular, S&P noted that 
allowing defaults could be a way to attenuate LGFVs’ debt risk and thereby involve a repricing of 
the Chengtou debt market (Reuters, 2018a). These predictions became reality in August 2018. At 
the time, a LGFV, Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) Sixth Division State-
Owned Asset Management Co Ltd, was unable to make the principal and interest repayments 
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(521.8 million Chinese Yuan, equivalent to $75.53 million) on their Chengtou bonds in a timely 
fashion, invalidating the myth of the “zero default” quasi-municipal bond (Reuters, 2018b). Reuters 
(2018b) further cites a financial practitioner’s words that “It adds a lot of spread to LGFV bonds. 
It’s very bad for refinancing. Traders are losing trust in LGFV bonds.”  
Our research aims to provide the following contributions to understanding China’s quasi-
municipal debt market. First, ours is the first study to investigate the implicit government 
guarantees carried by Chengtou bonds by comparing the yield spreads between Chengtou bonds 
and corporate bonds issued by more market-oriented issuers (privately-owned enterprises). 
Moreover, to study the market’s perception of implicit government guarantees for the same bonds 
over time and around the government’s recent policy changes, we specifically focus on the bonds’ 
trading yield spreads in the secondary market, rather than issuing yield spreads or coupon rates. 
Finally, on a related note, our study is the first to explore the validity of a common saying among 
Chinese investors that one should “never invest beyond Shanhaiguan” (i.e., never invest in 
Northeast China) and to examine the effectiveness of implicit government guarantees carried by 
LGFV bonds issued by different administrative levels of local government. 
Through a panel regression analysis, we show that the yield spreads of quasi-municipal 
corporate bonds (Chengtou bonds) are significantly lower than the yield spreads of corporate bonds 
issued by privately-owned Chinese enterprises (POEs), even after the recent reforms. This suggests 
that implicit government guarantees are still a potent tool for mitigating corporate debt risk in China. 
In addition, we demonstrate that implicit government guarantees are more effective for issuers who 
are more likely to experience financial distress. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the risk of 
Chinese bonds is influenced by regional financial conditions. Specifically, bond yield spreads are 
significantly higher in provinces that are well recognized for their poor business environment (such 
as the Northeast of China). Moreover, our results demonstrate that the expected government 
support is most valuable for bonds issued in the lowest administrative level cities because such 
issuers have the highest expectation of financial distress. Conversely, for issuers in Chinese 
municipalities (the highest administrative level) with the lowest likelihood of bond defaults, the 
value of expected government bail-outs turns out to be the lowest. Finally, we employ difference-
 14 
 
in-differences (DID) regressions to study the individual impact of the three policy changes on bond 
yield spreads. Our results reveal that Document 43 was not effective in reducing the gap in yield 
spreads between quasi-municipal corporate bonds and POE bonds. However, the gap in yield 
spreads between the two types of bonds significantly decreased after the issuance of Documents 
88 and 50, implying that these policy changes were successful in attenuating (although not fully 
eliminating) Chengtou bond investors’ expectations of implicit government guarantees.  
2. Cross-border Acquisitions by Chinese Enterprises: The Benefits and Disadvantages of  
Political Connections 
2.1. Hypotheses Development  
2.1.1. Political Connections and Cross-border M&A Deals 
Political connections can be valuable to firms’ financing activities in both developed and 
developing countries, as many empirical studies have shown.4  However, the benefits are generally 
more pronounced in emerging markets because of their relatively inferior institutional 
environments, more concentrated ownership structures, and less efficient legal systems (La Porta 
et al., 1998, 2000). In the case of China, we argue that the political connections of top management 
team members are more beneficial for POEs than SOEs simply because Chinese POEs face a 
different institutional environment. SOEs in China are the pillars of the national economy, while 
POEs must seek ways to overcome the discrimination they face in the capital market. One method 
is to build political ties with the government by hiring top managers with specific political 
backgrounds (Chen et al., 2011). Positive influences of political connections on various economic 
activities of Chinese POEs are documented in many empirical studies. Li et al. (2008) find that 
POE founders are more likely to obtain financing from state-controlled institutions if they have 
political party membership. Politically connected Chinese firms are also more likely to obtain loans 
with longer terms and lower interest rates when borrowing from state-owned banks (see Luo and 
                                                     
4 See, for example, Roberts (1990), Fisman (2001), Khwaja and Mian (2005), Adhikari, Derashid, and Zhang (2006), 
Charumilind, Kali, and Wiwattanakantang (2006), Faccio (2006), Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven (2008), 
Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2009), and Schweizer, Walker, and Zhang (2016). 
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Zhen, 2008; Yu and Pan, 2008; and Yuan, Jing, and Liao, 2010). Luo and Liu (2009) note that it is 
easier for politically connected POEs in China to enter industries with high entry barriers, such as 
banking and telecommunications. Similarly, Li and Zhou (2015) find that politically connected 
POEs are more likely to get IPO requests approved and that such POEs are less likely to be 
subjected to on-site auditing from regulatory authorities.  
Based on the arguments above, we expect that POEs whose top managers have political ties to 
the Chinese government are both more willing and more able to complete cross-border M&A 
transactions. Thus, we postulate Hypothesis 1 as follows:  
Hypothesis 1: Politically connected POEs are more likely to complete cross-border M&A deals                                                                        
than unconnected POEs. 
2.1.2. Corporate Governance and Cross-border M&A Deals  
In the previous subsection, our argument for the value of political connections is based on the 
institutional environment of a POE’s home country. Nevertheless, when POEs enter the global 
market, they are also affected by the institutional environment of the host countries (see Kostova, 
1999; Lu et al., 2014; and Regner and Edman, 2014). Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that when 
companies enter a foreign market, they are likely to adapt to the prevalent organizational practices 
and structures in the host country with the goal of enhancing their overall sense of legitimacy.  
This issue is more prominent when companies from emerging economies, with relatively poorer 
institutional environments, enter more advanced economies that typically feature higher-level 
institutional environments (as is mostly the case in the present study). Therefore, we expect that 
some Chinese POEs will endeavor to ameliorate their corporate governance to ensure that they 
meet local governance standards before attempting to conduct cross-border deals. This would give 
them a greater chance of being successful. Therefore, in Hypothesis 2, we posit the following 
relationship between corporate governance and POEs’ cross-border deals: 
Hypothesis 2: POEs with better corporate governance are more likely to complete a cross-
border M&A deal.  
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2.1.3. The Performance of Acquiring POEs 
It is commonly known that the Chinese government intervenes with SOEs’ business activities 
by appointing managers that have strong political ties. These politically connected managers can 
assist the government in achieving political and social objectives, which may be prioritized over 
commercial goals (see Wu, Wu and Rui, 2012). By following the government’s recommendations, 
the managers can increase their political capital, which is vital to their political career. However, 
decision making based on a manager’s political agenda may come at the expense of shareholders’ 
wealth, creating a principal-principal conflict between the intervening government and non-state 
shareholders (see Young et al., 2008). This conjecture is supported by empirical analysis. For 
example, Wu, Wu, and Rui (2012) show that SOEs with politically connected top managers have 
lower accounting performance (measured by ROA) and fewer growth options (measured by 
Tobin’s q). Similarly, Fan et al. (2007) examine the performance of Chinese IPO firms using a 
sample of 790 partially privatized SOEs. Their empirical analysis shows that IPO firms whose CEO 
is politically connected to the Chinese government have lower initial returns and lower accounting 
performance in the three years after going public. They argue that the political rent seeking 
behavior of politically connected CEOs expropriates the wealth of minority shareholders, which in 
turn harms firm performance. Evidence of the principal-principal conflict is also found by Sun, 
Vinig, and Hosman (2017) who show that SOEs have significantly lower stock performance around 
outbound M&A announcements than POEs, for which political connections are arguably less 
present. They reason that although SOEs enjoy patronage in obtaining bank loans with a lower cost 
of borrowing to finance their cross-border deals, this advantage is often misused in the sense that 
SOEs are more likely to invest in risky cross-border deals or to overpay for the target. 
Although the above evidence pertains to SOEs, we conjecture that if politically connected POEs 
are politically motivated to conduct cross-border M&A transactions (e.g. for political empire 
building), then instead of maximizing shareholder wealth, a similar principal-principal conflict may 
occur, resulting in adverse firm performance. In contrast, non-connected POEs, being unaffected 
by this conflict, are more likely to pursue a cross-border M&A for commercial reasons, which is 
in line with shareholder interests. Based on these arguments, we formulate Hypothesis 3 as follows:  
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Hypothesis 3: Acquiring POEs with political connections have lower stock returns around the 
time of a cross-border M&A announcement and lower post-merger financial performance than 
non-politically connected POEs.  
2.2. Data 
2.2.1. Financial and Corporate Governance Data 
We identify listed Chinese POEs by using the China Listed Private Enterprise Research 
Database, provided by China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR), which includes 
all Chinese POEs listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. In contrast to Chinese 
SOEs, POEs are defined as enterprises directly controlled by individuals, families, other non-state 
entities, or foreign enterprises. Financial data for the Chinese POEs in our sample comes from 
CSMAR’s China Stock Market Financial Statement Database and the corporate governance data 
comes from CSMAR’s China Listed Firms’ Corporate Governance Research Database. We found 
that some POEs are missing information on corporate governance-related data. We therefore 
manually collect the missing data from the Stockstar website (www.stockstar.com), which provides 
detailed information about the top management of firms traded on both exchanges. Our sample 
begins in 2007 after the Chinese government issued a call for stronger financing support for POEs 
wishing to go global and ends in 2016. We winsorize all the financial data at the 1% and 99% levels 
to minimize the influence of potential outliers. Our final sample consists of 1,782 POEs and 9,946 
firm-year observations. 
2.2.2. Identification of Cross-border M&A Transactions by Chinese POEs 
We define a POE as acquisitive if a cross-border M&A deal was completed during the 
observation period. We obtain the cross-border deals of Chinese POEs from CSMAR’s China 
Listed Firms’ Merger & Acquisition, Asset Restructuring Research Database. We exclude any 
cases where the cross-border M&A occurred in tax havens or offshore financial centers because 
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firms acquired in this way are not “real” or “producing” foreign companies, but rather Chinese 
“shell companies.”5  
We find that 290 Chinese POEs completed 385 cross-border M&A deals between 2007 to 2016. 
We exclude two POEs that engaged in cross-border M&A activities before that time period, 
because these acquisitions might follow a different rationale. We consider the remaining 288 firms 
completing 385 cross-border M&A transactions as acquiring POEs (see Table 1). CSMAR’s China 
Listed Firms’ Merger & Acquisition, Asset Restructuring Research Database also provides the 
country of origin of each overseas target that is acquired. In total, the cross-border deals completed 
by Chinese POEs span forty countries (see Table 2 for an overview).  
2.2.3. Identification of Political Connections 
We proxy for political connections by following the recent literature by Faccio (2006), Fan, 
Wong, and Zhang (2007), Li and Zhou (2015), and Schweizer, Walker, and Zhang (2016). The 
present study only considers the political background of the Chinese POE’s board chairman and 
CEO. We hand-collect the information for each company in our sample from Stockstar, which 
provides detailed past and current work experience for the top management of each listed company.  
We define a POE’s chairman or CEO as politically connected if he or she is or was a 
representative in the People’s Congress (PC), the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC), an officer in local or central government, or an officer in the military. We 
code the political connection dummy variable (Connection) as 1 for each year since the chairman 
or CEO is politically connected, and 0 otherwise (see Li and Zhou, 2015; Schweizer, Walker, and 
Zhang, 2016). In addition, we measure the strength of the political connections of each firm’s 
chairman or CEO by creating a political connection index (PC Index). The value of this index 
ranges from 1 to 3 depending on the strength of the political ties (where 3 represents the strongest 
political connection).6  
                                                     
5 Our sample excludes the following tax havens and offshore financial centers: American Samoa, the Bahamas, 
Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Mauritius, Panama, and Samoa. 
6 According to a research report by Harvard University’s Kennedy School, the PC, in conjunction with the CPPCC, 
act as the legislative arm of the government and thus as the highest political entity in China (see Saich, 2015). The 
PC’s functions include: overseeing the work of government departments and electing major officials; amending the 
constitution; supervising the enforcement of constitutional and legal enactments; and examining and approving the 
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2.2.4. Measuring Corporate Governance 
To examine the impact of corporate governance on Chinese POEs becoming acquisitive overseas, 
we construct a comprehensive index that measures the overall corporate governance level of 
Chinese POEs. Our index aims to reflect a company’s overall governance quality more accurately 
than single governance factors. It also eliminates multicollinearity that may arise in multivariate 
regressions when using single governance factors (Brown, Beekes, and Verhoeven, 2011). The 
advantages of a corporate governance index have been elaborated upon quite extensively in the 
extant literature (see Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Dutordoir, 
Strong, and Ziegan, 2014; and Shan, 2015).  
We follow Shan (2015) and construct an equally weighted corporate governance index for 
Chinese listed firms according to China’s two-tier board system, but modify where necessary to 
account for the fact that our sample includes only POEs and no SOEs. Thus, we exclude the factor 
differentiating SOEs and POEs. We also exclude a factor for cross-listings. 7  We obtain the 
corporate governance data from CSMAR’s China Listed Firms’ Corporate Governance Research 
Database and construct the final index (Gov Index) using nine equally weighted corporate 
governance factors. Detailed information on the construction of the index is provided in Panel B 
of Table 1. 
2.2.5. Measuring Financial Performance 
To examine how cross-border M&A deals affect a POE’s performance, we calculate short-term 
stock returns in response to the announcement of a cross-border M&A deal. We collect all stock 
returns for acquiring POEs and the value-weighted Shanghai and Shenzhen Composite Index from 
                                                     
state budget and the economic plan. Members serving on the standing committee of the PC and CPPCC command 
particular power, as they work actively on law-making. In addition, Saich (2015) notes that the PC and CPPCC play 
more than a ceremonial role in China. Therefore, we assign the highest PC Index value of 3 to POEs in which the top 
managers are (or were) members of the standing committee of the PC and CPPCC, as well as to POEs whose top 
manager is the head of the central or provincial government. If the top managers of a POE are ordinary members of 
the PC or CPPCC, we assign a value of 2 to the PC Index. Finally, if the chairman or CEO is only an officer of a 
specific governmental department, or was an officer in the army, his or her political connections are considered more 
limited; hence, we assign a value of 1 to the PC Index. 
7 In our sample, four POEs are cross-listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Because Hong Kong is a self-governing 
special administrative region of the People's Republic of China, those four POEs cannot be considered real cross-listed 
firms. We also checked whether these POEs completed cross-border deals within our sample period and they did not. 
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CSMAR’s China Stock Market Trading Database. To examine the accounting based performance 
of acquiring POEs, we measure each firm’s return on equity (ROE) three years after deal 
completion. 
2.2.6. Control Variables 
We include an array of control variables that could potentially affect the likelihood of a Chinese 
POE carrying out a cross-border deal: profitability (ROA), leverage (Leverage), firm size (Firm 
Size), growth opportunities (Tobin’s q), and a tangible asset ratio (Tangibility). We also use those 
variables to conduct a propensity score matching (PSM) technique. Detailed information for the 
control variables is provided in Panel A of Table 14poss.  
To study the market reaction to the cross-border announcement, we include the following deal 
characteristics: the cultural difference between China and the country in which the target firm is 
located (Hofstede and Culture Distance), a frequent acquirer dummy (Multi Acquirer), deal value 
(Deal Size), a public listed target dummy (Public Target), method of payment dummies (All Cash 
Deal and All Stock Deal), and a legal origin dummy (Common Law). We obtain deal specific 
characteristics from CSMAR’s Merger & Acquisition, Asset Restructuring Research Database. 
2.3. Methodology 
2.3.1. Political Connections and Cross-border M&A 
To examine how political connections can affect the likelihood of becoming an acquisitive POE, 
we carry out the following panel logit regressions which take account of the fact that some 
acquisitive POEs complete more than one cross-border M&A deal:  
𝐶𝐵𝑀𝐴(1/0)𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝝂𝒏 ∙ 𝜨𝒊,𝒏,𝒕 +
𝜑𝑘 + 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,               (1) 
where 𝐶𝐵𝑀𝐴 is a binary variable that equals 1 if Chinese POE i completes a cross-border deal in 
year t, and 0 otherwise; Political Connections are measured by either the independent variable 
Connection or PC Index; Gov Index captures the potential influence of overall corporate 
governance quality on the likelihood of completing a cross-border deal; 𝚴𝒏 is a vector of firm-
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specific characteristics (ROA, Leverage, Firm Size, Tobin’s q, Tangibility); 𝜑𝑘 are industry fixed 
effects8; and 𝜋𝑡 are year fixed effects. If political connections increase a Chinese POE’s likelihood 
of acquiring overseas targets, we expect the coefficients on Connection or the PC Index (𝛽1) to be 
positive. Similarly, if Chinese POEs with better corporate governance have a greater chance of 
entering the global market, we expect the coefficient on the Gov Index (𝛽2) to be positive.  
We next describe the robustness checks pertinent to this part of the study (i.e. the effect of 
political connections). Firstly, we describe the steps taken to address any concerns about a self-
selection bias, i.e. that politically connected top managers may not be randomly distributed across 
POEs. For example, larger and more profitable POEs may be more capable of building political 
connections by hiring a chairman or CEO with a political background. To overcome such a bias, 
we use the propensity score matching (PSM) technique to study the pure effect of political 
connections on cross-border M&A activity. The treatment variable is cross-border M&A (CBMA). 
We use the nearest neighbor matching method to match acquiring firms in the year before 
completing a cross-border M&A with non-acquiring POEs on the vector of control variables (ROA, 
Leverage, Firm Size, Tobin’s q, Tangibility). This results in two subsamples: 1) 770 (= 385 
acquiring plus 385 control) firm-years when considering all cross-border M&A deals and 2) 576 
(= 288 acquiring plus 288 control) firm-years when only considering deals which were the first 
cross-border M&A transactions carried out by the POE in question. For each subsample, we re-run 
equation (1), but instead of a panel regression we use a cross sectional logistic regression.  
A further robustness check is carried out to examine whether political connections identified via 
a firm’s ownership structure (i.e. the presence of politically connected blockholders9) influence a 
POE’s decision to engage in cross-border M&A activities. To measure the blockholder effect we 
create two additional variables: the ownership percentage of the largest politically connected 
blockholder (LBH Connection) and a dummy variable that is set equal to 1 if more than one 
blockholder is politically connected and 0 otherwise (Multi BH Connections). We consider a 
blockholder to be politically connected if he or she has political ties to the government (as in the 
                                                     
8 We use fifteen industry dummy variables based on CSMAR’s industry classifications. 
9 A blockholder holds at least 10% of the voting rights (see, Thomsen, Pedersen, and Kvist, 2006).  
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definition of political connections for top managers) or if the blockholder is the state. We obtain 
information about blockholders’ backgrounds from the Stockstar website. To isolate the effect of 
ownership-level political connections from management-level political connections, we only 
include politically-connected blockholders who are not top managers at the same time.  
A third robustness check determines whether the results are primarily driven by “active” 
acquisitive POEs, i.e. POEs that complete more than one acquisition during our sample period. To 
this end, we employ both panel Poisson regressions and post-matching cross-sectional Poisson 
regressions (and using the same PSM technique as in the logit model). The baseline model follows 
the logic of equation (1), but the dependent variable is now a count variable that measures the 
number of overseas targets acquired by a POE over our sample period: 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝐶𝐵𝑀𝐴)𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝝂𝒏 ∙ 𝜨𝒊,𝒏,𝒕 +
+𝜑𝑘 + 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,              (2) 
2.3.2. Endogeneity Concerns 
We note that the potentially endogenous nature of political connections may impede the 
robustness of the proposed causal relationship between political connections and the likelihood of 
acquiring overseas targets for Chinese POEs. We conduct a quasi-natural experiment to cope with 
this problem. Specifically, we examine whether chairman/CEO turnovers that result in an increase 
in the PC Index (i.e. that cause firms to be more politically connected) increase the likelihood of 
POEs engaging in cross-border M&A transactions. Our first step is to apply a similar PSM routine 
to that used in our previous analysis. We include the PC Index as an additional matching variable 
and match in the year before the POE completed its first cross-border M&A deal (288 firm-year 
observations) with POEs that did not acquire any overseas companies during the observation period. 
This ensures that acquiring and non-acquiring POEs have “identical” company characteristics just 
before their first cross-border M&A. If political connections facilitate cross-border deal 
completions, we expect that companies replacing their top management with more politically 
connected successors will be more likely to engage in cross-border M&A activities.  
To measure this effect, we create a dummy variable (Political Turnover) that equals 1 if the CEO 
or chairman is replaced in the five years before the firm completed the first cross-border M&A deal 
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with a CEO/chairman with a higher PC Index (stronger political ties), and 0 if there is no turnover 
or a turnover that does not result in a higher PC Index.10 Our model reads as follows: 
𝐶𝐵𝑀𝐴(1/0)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∙
𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝝂𝒏 ∙ 𝜨𝒊,𝒏,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜑𝑘 + 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,           (3) 
The variable of interest in equation (3) is the coefficient on Political Turnover (𝛽1). If political 
connections indeed increase the likelihood of a Chinese POE going global, we expect 𝛽1 to be 
positive. We also perform a robustness check in which we replace Political Turnover with a 
variable that indicates the change in the political connections of the blockholders within the five 
years before the firm’s first cross-border M&A (PBH Turnover). 
2.3.3. The Financial Performance of Chinese POEs after Cross-border M&A 
Announcements 
We begin our analysis of how the market reacts to cross-border M&A announcements by 
Chinese POEs by using a standard event study approach. Following Du and Boateng (2015), we 
use an event window of (-1, 1) and an estimation period of (-240, -21) relative to the first 
announcement date of an acquisition (𝑡 =  0). The cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) 
are calculated using a one-factor market model (employing the value-weighted Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Composite Index as a market index). For robustness, we also consider the event windows 
(0, 1), (-2, 2), and (-3, 3).  
To examine the link between political connections and the market reaction to cross-border deal 
announcements, we estimate the following multivariate regression:  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗 ∙ ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑘 ∙
∑ 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑘,𝑖𝑘 +  𝝂𝒏 ∙ 𝜨𝒊,𝒏 + 𝜑𝑘 + 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,          (4) 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 is the cumulative abnormal return of the acquiring POE 𝑖 during the period starting 
one day before and ending one day after the cross-border deal announcement. The independent 
variables are the same as in equation (1) with the addition of 𝑗 Distance measures, which represents 
                                                     
10  First, we retrieve the chairman/CEO turnover information from CSMAR’s China Listed Firms Corporate 
Governance Research Database. Next, we manually check the background information in the top managers’ profiles 




differences in the two cultural dimension measures (Hofstede and Culture Distance), and 𝑘 Deal 
Characteristics, which include the target size (Deal Size), the method of payment (All Cash Deal 
and All Stock Deal), the listing status of the target company (Public Target), and the legal system 
of the target’s home country (Common Law). According to our hypothesis, if the politically 
connected top managers of POEs tend to build their political capital at the expense of shareholder 
interests, we expect the coefficients on the political connection variables Connection and PC Index 
(𝛽1) to be negative. 
To complete the picture, we also examine the accounting performance of POEs, measured by 
ROE, after completing a cross-border M&A transaction. However, the decisions to hire politically 
connected top executives and to become active in acquiring foreign companies are likely to be 
made simultaneously in an equilibrium setting. This raises a potential endogeneity concern, which 
ideally would be overcome by finding a suitable instrument. Unfortunately, we were not successful 
in finding or constructing a convincing instrument. Consequently, the coefficients can be 
interpreted as indicating correlation only.  
We compare the financial performance of (politically connected) acquiring companies during 
the three-year period after completion of the cross-border M&A deal with the performance of non-
acquiring POEs. The model is specified as follows: 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝐵𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝐵𝑀𝐴 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4 ∙ 𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∙ 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝝂𝒊,𝒕 ∙ 𝚴𝒊,𝒏,,𝒕 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜋𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,        (5) 
where the dependent variable is the 𝑅𝑂𝐸 of firm 𝑖 and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝐵𝑀𝐴 is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if POE 𝑖 completed a cross-border M&A between years 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 3 , and 0 otherwise. 
Multi Acquirer is a dummy variable that equals 1 if firm 𝑖 acquires more than one overseas target 
starting in year 𝑡 when the second acquisition is completed until the end of the observation period, 
and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as defined in equation (1). Our main coefficient of interest 
is that for the interaction term, 𝛽3 . If politically connected POEs tend to incur moral hazard 
problems by engaging in political empire building, we expect 𝛽3 to be negative and statistically 
significant. In other words, we expect the effect of political connections on firm performance to 
decrease for POEs that have completed a cross-border M&A transaction. 
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2.4. Empirical Results 
2.4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 shows the annual number of Chinese POEs entering the global market via a 
cross-border M&A transaction for the first time between 2007 and 2016. In total, there are 288 
Chinese POEs that complete foreign acquisitions during our sample period. The annual percentage 
of newly acquiring POEs during our sample period increased substantially in 2011 and peaked at 
21.53% in 2015, with sixty-two POEs entering the international market. However, 2016 saw a 
significant drop in that number, presumably because of the economic slowdown in China during 
that year. Panel B of Table 1 displays the number of cross-border deals completed by Chinese POEs 
and shows that the vast majority (about three-quarters) of POEs completed only one deal, about 18 
percent two deals and only about five percent engaged in more than two acquisitions. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 specifies the countries of origin of the target companies acquired by Chinese POEs. The 
targets are geographically spread around the world. However, the majority are from major world 
economies such as Australia, Canada, Japan, Germany, the U.K., and the U.S. Interestingly, most 
POEs in China seem to extend their business to countries that are not politically “close” to the 
Chinese government. This is in contrast to the situation for SOEs which, according to the findings 
of Ramasamy, Yeung, and Laforet (2012), are more attracted to countries that have closer bilateral 
political relationships with China and/or are natural resources-based. This underlines our earlier 
argument that POEs tend to be market seekers. Their motivations for going global are based on 
technology and strategy, as demonstrated by our sample.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the company characteristics of non-acquisitive and 
acquisitive POEs (see Table 1 for variable definitions). Our sample consists of 1,494 non-
acquisitive POEs (7,975 firm-year observations) and 288 acquisitive POEs (385 firm-year 
observations). We note that, in China, only a small percentage of POEs have entered the 
international markets.  
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For acquisitive POEs, we can clearly see that a majority of the firms are politically connected 
to the government, regardless of which index is used (i.e. Connection or the PC Index). The mean 
of Connection (0.405) implies that about 40% of acquisitive POEs have political ties. The 
differences in Connection and the PC Index between non-acquisitive and acquisitive POEs are 
statistically significant at the 1% level, providing univariate support for Hypothesis 1, i.e. that 
politically connected POEs are more likely to complete cross-border M&A deals than unconnected 
POEs. However, we find no univariate evidence that the corporate governance (Gov Index) of 
acquisitive POEs is higher than that of non-acquisitive POEs (Hypothesis 2). We will explore this 
factor further in our multivariate analyses.  
For the control variables, we find that acquisitive POEs are on average more profitable (ROA), 
larger (Size), and have lower growth opportunities (Tobin’s q) than non-acquisitive POEs. In 
addition, we find that non-acquisitive firms have stronger ownership-based political connections, 
measured by the variables LBH Connection and Multi BH Connections. A lower level of state 
ownership may help acquisitive POEs in the sense that they could be perceived as less government 
connected. The correlation matrices in Table 4 show that the pairwise correlations are not greater 
than 0.5. To further unveil any potential multicollinearity issues, we also calculate the Variance 
Inflation Factors (VIF) in our multivariate regressions. In line with our bivariate correlation 
analysis, multicollinearity does not appear to pose any problems in a multivariate context.   
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here] 
2.4.2. Political Connections and M&A Engagement by POEs 
To investigate the link between political connections and the probability of becoming acquisitive 
in international markets, we show the results of a fixed-effects panel logit regression in Table 5. 
Our baseline results in column 1 indicate that politically connected POEs are more likely to acquire 
overseas companies. The coefficient of Connection is 1.474 and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Column 2 shows the results when measuring political connections via the PC Index, which 
likewise supports Hypothesis 1, i.e. that the likelihood of completing a cross-border M&A 
transaction increases with the strength of political connections. However, we do not find any 
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statistical support for Hypothesis 2, namely that a firm with sounder corporate governance is more 
likely to complete a cross-border M&A deal. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Next, to have a one-to-one comparison, we perform cross-sectional logistic regressions based 
on a balanced matched sample of acquisitive and non-acquisitive POEs using the PSM method. 
The results in Table 6 (Panels A and B) indicate that after matching, the firm characteristics of non-
acquisitive POEs are not statistically different from those of acquisitive POEs. Thus, the sample is 
well-balanced.  
Using this balanced sample, the baseline results in column 1 (Table 7) indicate that politically 
connected POEs are more likely to acquire overseas companies. The coefficient of Connection is 
0.472, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. The related marginal effect reveals that the 
predicted probability of becoming an acquisitive POE increases from 45.8% by 11.5 percentage 
points (equivalent to a relative increase of 25.1%) when hiring a politically connected top manager. 
Similar results are obtained when measuring political connections via the PC Index (column 2). 
The coefficient of the PC Index is 0.185, also statistically significant at the 5% level. Specifically, 
the predicted probability of becoming a cross-border bidder is 46.3% when the PC Index is 0. This 
probability increases by 4.6 percentage points (or 9.9%) when the PC Index increases from 0 to 1, 
by 8.8% when the PC Index increases from 1 to 2, and by 7.9% when the PC Index increases from 
2 to 3. Columns 3 and 4 show that comparable results are obtained when only the first cross-border 
deal of acquisitive POEs is included. In sum, these PSM results provide further support for 
Hypothesis 1, namely that politically connected POEs have a higher likelihood of entering the 
global market through cross-border M&A deals. Furthermore, the results are both statistically and 
economically significant. They are in line with the intuition that the top managers of POEs are 
more likely to follow the government’s call to go global by completing cross-border M&A 
transactions if they have political connections. These POEs are also more likely to be able to 
manage the logistics of these transactions and to get preferential treatment by the government after 
completing a cross-border M&A transaction. This is supported by our sample firms receiving on 
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average an 83% percent higher loan volume in the two years after completing a cross-border M&A 
deals than in the two years before (see Figure 1). 
[Insert Tables 6 and 7 and Figure 1 about here] 
2.4.3. Corporate Governance and M&A Engagement by POEs 
To investigate the link between corporate governance and a POE’s likelihood of acquiring an 
overseas target, we focus on the coefficient of the governance index (Gov Index). When performing 
post-matching cross-sectional analyses (see Table 7), this coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant, at least at the 10%-level, indicating that POEs with higher corporate governance 
standards are more likely to acquire companies outside China (in line with Hypothesis 2). However, 
the Gov Index was not significant in the panel logistic regression setting in Table 5. Thus, we do 
not find robust empirical support for Hypothesis 2. 
To address a potential endogeneity issue associated with the decision to become an acquisitive 
POE, we conduct a quasi-experiment in which we focus on the replacement of a CEO or chairman 
by a successor with stronger political ties than his or her predecessor (i.e. a higher PC Index). We 
characterize these turnovers using the variable Political Turnover. If political connections result in 
a higher probability of acquiring a company outside China, we expect to find a higher likelihood 
of POEs entering the global markets after a political turnover. To ensure a balanced sample of 
acquisitive and non-acquisitive POEs, we run a similar PSM routine to that used previously, but 
also require the 288 firm-year observations (corresponding to the POEs’ first cross-border deals) 
to have the same PC Index as those in the control group. The diagnostic tests from Table 8 show 
that the PSM successfully balances the sample.  
We again run a logit regression with the dependent variable of becoming an overseas acquisitive 
POE and a set of explanatory variables that include the Political Turnover dummy. The results (see 
Table 9) show that the coefficient of Political Turnover is positive and statistically significant, 
indicating that the likelihood of a POE proceeding with a cross-border M&A significantly increases 
after a political turnover. This finding provides strong support for Hypothesis 1 and for a causal 
relationship between political connections and cross-border M&A activities by Chinese POEs. 
[Insert Tables 8 and 9 about here] 
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2.4.4. The Financial Performance of Multinational POEs after Cross-border M&As 
To explore how POEs fare after completing a cross-border acquisition, we first provide 
univariate results for an event study in which we examine the stock returns of acquisitive POEs 
around the announcement of a cross-border M&A deal (see Table 10). We find that shareholders 
react positively to cross-border M&A announcements with statistically significant CAARs between 
1% and 1.9%, depending on the event window. These findings are in line with Du and Boateng 
(2015) who find that shareholders react positively to cross-border M&A deals by Chinese acquirers. 
Over similar event windows, their CAARs range from 0.45% to 0.64%. However, their study pools 
SOEs and POEs together. Our results suggest that, overall, cross-border M&A announcements by 
POEs generate higher abnormal returns. However, shareholders react differently depending on 
whether the cross-border M&A deal is announced by firms with politically connected or un-
unconnected top management (Panel B). On average, we find that the announcement returns of 
politically connected POEs are 1.6% lower for all cross-border M&A transactions and 1.9% lower 
for the announcement of a first cross-border deal. These univariate findings match what we expect 
under Hypothesis 3, i.e. that politically connected top managers are more likely to engage in 
political empire-building behavior, which may not be in line with shareholder interests.   
We complement these univariate findings with a multivariate analysis in which we control for 
deal characteristics as well as cultural differences between China and the country where the target 
company is domiciled (see Table 11). The results are consistent with the univariate analysis above. 
The announcement returns are on average about 1.6% lower for politically connected POEs.11,12  
We interpret this as further support for Hypothesis 3, namely that investors may believe that a 
                                                     
11 To ensure the robustness of our results, we also examine the CARs for other event windows; the empirical results 
remain qualitatively unchanged. The respective results are available from the authors upon request.  
12 Differences in the cross-border acquisition announcement returns for politically connected and unconnected POEs 
may be driven by differences in the completion probability. All of our announcements resulted in completed deals, but 
this is clearly unknown ex ante. We check CSMAR’s Merger & Acquisition, Asset Restructuring Research Database 
for failed cross-border M&A deals to determine the difference in deal completion probability between the two cases 
(i.e. when top management is and is not politically connected). We find that deal failure is quite uncommon for POEs 
and occurred only twelve times during our observation period. Among these twelve POEs, five had politically 
connected top managers. Given that there are comparatively few deal failures relative to the number of completed 
deals, it seems unlikely that market participants would assume a high probability of deal failure. However, even if they 
do price it in, the probability of failure among politically connected and non-connected POEs is almost evenly 
distributed. Therefore, market participants would be unable to infer any information about the probability of deal 
failure from knowledge of the political connectedness of top management. 
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politically connected top management has other (e.g. political) motives when completing cross-
border M&A transactions instead of focusing purely on shareholder wealth maximization. In 
additional analyses we tested indirectly if the acquisition is related to strategic asset seeking. To do 
so, we compared the difference in Research Intensity between POEs that have completed a cross-
border M&A and propensity-score-matched “control” firms that are not active in the acquisition 
market (see Proelss et al., 2017). We find that the average two-year Research Intensity of 
acquisitive POEs after deal completion is 1.3 percentage points higher than that of control firms 
(p-value = 0.008). We interpret this as evidence that POEs that gain access to “cutting-edge 
technology” through cross-border acquisitions need to increase their R&D spending to successfully 
employ that technology in China (see Wu, 2015). 
The only deal characteristic that is statistically significantly related to the observed 
announcement returns is a deal payment by cash only (All Cash Deal). This positive relationship 
is well documented in the literature (see Travlos, 1987; Fishman, 1989; Brown and Ryngaert, 1991; 
Martin, 1996; and Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002).  
[Insert Tables 10 and 11 about here] 
To examine a POE’s financial performance during the three-year period after it has completed 
a cross-border deal, we calculate the return on equity (ROE) for acquisitive and non-acquisitive 
POEs. Our main variable of interest is the interaction term 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝐵𝑀𝐴 ×  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 . The 
coefficients of Connection and the interaction term (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝐵𝑀𝐴 ×  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) are 0.054 and -
0.198, respectively, and are both statistically significant at the 1% level (see Table 12). This 
indicates an underperformance of about 14 percentage points (0.054 - 0.198), measured by ROE, 
of politically connected POEs relative to non-connected POEs during the three-year period after 
completing a cross-border M&A deal. Notwithstanding the potential endogeneity concern, this 
result is consistent with our political connection trade-off theory (and Hypothesis 3), under which 
politically connected top managers complete cross-border M&A deals largely as a means of 
political empire building. This may occur at the expense of shareholder value, and may thus be 
associated with a decrease in the POE’s firm value. The coefficient of 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝐵𝑀𝐴 is positive and 
significant at the 5%-level, which is consistent with our univariate evidence showing that, on 
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average, investors react positively to cross-border M&A announcements. We also find that serial 
acquirers have statistically significantly higher accounting performance than one-time acquirers 
after completing a cross-border M&A deal, which could be explained by learning gains through 
serial acquisitions (cf., Aktas, Bodt and Roll, 2013). 
[Insert Table 12 about here] 
2.4.5. Robustness Checks 
Our first set of robustness checks focuses on an alternative explanation for the importance of 
political connections, namely that ownership-level political connections matter more than those of 
the top management. To rule out this alternative explanation, we re-estimate the previous panel 
logistic regressions, the cross-sectional logit regressions, and the quasi-experiment while also 
including two ownership-level political connection variables (LBH Connection and Multi BH 
Connections). The results show that neither LBH Connection nor Multi BH Connections is 
statistically significantly positively related to the likelihood of completing a cross-border M&A 
deal. Moreover, the coefficients for the top management political connection variables (Connection 
and PC Index) do not change substantially and remain statistically significant at least at the 5% 
level. Similarly, when we re-perform our quasi-experiment, we find that the replacement of a 
blockholder by a new blockholder with stronger ties is unrelated to the probability of completing a 
cross-border M&A transaction, unlike a political turnover of the top management (see Table 9). In 
sum, we find no evidence that ownership-based political connections increase the likelihood of a 
POE becoming acquisitive in foreign markets, while the political connections of top management 
continue to produce similar effects.  
Furthermore, to address the potential influence of clustered or serial acquisitions by POEs, we 
checked for robustness by using a count model (i.e. panel and cross-sectional Poisson regressions) 
in which the dependent variable is the number of overseas targets acquired by POEs. Some of these 
model specifications also control for ownership-level political connections. We find that political 
connections (measured by Connection and the PC Index) are statistically significantly positively 
related to the number of completed cross-border M&A deals whereas ownership-level political 
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connections show no association. Therefore, we do not find any evidence that the main results are 
driven by clustered or serial acquisitions13. 
Finally, we test for a potential interaction between political connections and a POE’s corporate 
governance. Such an interaction might be expected if politically connected top managers tend to 
pursue cross-border M&A deals for reasons other than maximizing shareholder value, such as 
maximizing political capital. In this context, we conjecture that higher corporate governance 
standards within a company limit top management’s propensity for political empire building at the 
cost of shareholder value. For example, we expect the interaction term (Connection x Gov Index) 
to have a positive coefficient in a regression of POEs’ financial performance after a cross-border 
M&A. In unreported results, we include this interaction term in all previous analyses and find that 
is has no statistical significance, regardless of the dependent variable in question (e.g. the likelihood 
of a cross-border M&A or stock prices following cross-border M&A announcements). One possible 
explanation is provided by Claessens and Fan (2002) who argue that corporate governance 
mechanisms have very limited effectiveness in systems with weak institutions. The arguably weak 
institutional environment in China seems to carry more weight than a sound corporate governance 
system; thus, the latter is neither able to block (value destroying) cross-border M&A deals nor deter 
politically connected top managers from prioritizing their political capital over shareholder 
interests. 
  
                                                     
13 The results of Poisson regression will be provided upon request.  
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3. Do Privately-owned Enterprises in China Need Political Connections to Issue Corporate 
Bonds? 
3.1.  Hypotheses Development 
3.1.1. Political Connections and Corporate Bond Issuance 
The evidence presented in the previous sections suggests that the approval of corporate bond 
issuances in China may not be based solely on firm characteristics, such as credit risk, firm size, 
and corporate governance quality, but also on political ties. Liu, Tang, and Tian (2013) argue that 
the probability of tapping the financial markets in emerging economies is strongly influenced by 
the central government and that discrimination against entrepreneurial firms is prevalent. To 
overcome the market discrimination effectively, entrepreneurial firms tend to build political ties to 
the central authority. In their empirical analysis, Liu, Tang, and Tian (2013) show that Chinese 
entrepreneurial firms with politically connected top executives are more likely to have their IPO 
request approved. They state that the requirements for security issuance imposed by the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) are quite soft, qualitative, and ambiguous and that there 
is ample room for political connections to facilitate a firm’s IPO approval. Similarly, because of 
the ambiguous requirements for security issuance in China, prospective corporate bond issuers can 
use political connections as an effective way to tap into the public debt market. In addition, the 
ambiguous requirements create potential room for corruption. Politically connected bond issuers 
may collude with regulators through means of corruption. For example, an officer of the CSRC 
was arrested during President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign. He accepted bribes to assist 
several enterprises with the approval of IPOs and corporate bonds during his time as deputy director 
in charge of securities issuance for small and mid-cap enterprises (Sina, 2016). Therefore, we 
postulate a collusion and corruption hypothesis: the POEs with political ties to the authority can 
collude with the corrupt officials to place their corporate bonds even though such POEs are not 
necessarily qualified issuers.  
Also, as argued by Pessarossi and Weill (2013), the fact that the Chinese government has been 
committed to developing the corporate bond market since 2007 implies that POEs with strong 
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political connections are also likely to be encouraged along this agenda and are thus more likely to 
favor corporate bonds over private bank debt than their non-connected counterparts. 
Overall, we posit that politically-connected POEs are favored in the corporate bond issuance 
process. Furthermore, in comparison to non-connected POEs, politically-connected POEs are more 
likely to prefer corporate bonds to bank debt. Consequently, our first two research hypotheses are:  
Hypothesis 1: Politically-connected POEs are more likely to issue corporate bonds than non-
connected POEs.  
Hypothesis 2: The more politically connected the POE, the greater the likelihood that it will issue 
a corporate bond rather than take out a bank loan.  
3.1.2. Political Connections and Corporate Governance  
In the previous subsection, we hypothesized that politically-connected POEs have an incentive 
to issue corporate bonds, and that the issuance requests are more likely to be approved for 
connected than for non-connected POEs. However, we also need to determine whether higher 
corporate governance standards (measured by higher corporate governance index levels) coincide 
with bond-issuing POEs. Higher corporate governance standards are clearly intended to protect 
bondholders’ rights. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) shed light on the positive impact of corporate 
governance on corporate bond default risk for companies with corporate bond issuance. Their 
empirical evidence reveals that firms with higher institutional ownership and board independence 
exhibit higher ratings for their issued corporate bonds.  
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2006) explore whether firms with stronger corporate 
governance can benefit from higher credit ratings. They find that default risk is significantly lower 
for firms with higher financial transparency, weaker takeover defenses, board independence, board 
stock ownership, and board expertise, but higher for firms with greater CEO power on their boards 
and more blockholders. Given the surprisingly high number of corporate bond defaults during the 
past two years, it is likely that corporate bond-issuing companies have weaker corporate 
governance than previously and are failing to protect bond investors. 
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We have argued that political connections can facilitate the approval of POEs’ corporate bond 
issuances. Such benefits could be viewed as corruption. This would be in clear contrast to high 
quality corporate governance, which we would expect to circumvent or at least reduce corruption 
(La Porta et al., 2000). Therefore, if corporate governance mechanisms function effectively, 
political connections should not significantly impact firms’ financing activities. Thus, the use of 
political connections itself implies lower corporate governance standards. Moreover, the “zero 
default” myth in China can further create a moral hazard. That is, the firms will issue bond anyway 
even though they do not necessarily exhibit qualified level of corporate governance to protect 
creditors’ right. Our argument is consistent with perspective investors’ concerns that Chinese bond 
issuers may not have sound corporate governance to make them disclose sufficient and authentic 
information. “Because of poor information disclosure, land mines are everywhere in the corporate 
bond market. You never know when you’d step on one,” said Peter Zhao, chief executive of Eagle 
Investments, Shanghai (Wall Street Journal, 2016). Arthur Lau, Asia ex-Japan fixed income asset 
manager of Pine Bridge Investments, declared: “We won’t invest in any corporate bonds issued in 
mainland China even if they are rated triple-A, unless the company has already sold debt outside 
the country, where transactions require a higher level of financial disclosure” (Wall Street Journal, 
2016).  
Based on these arguments, we propose the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 3: POEs issuing corporate bonds have lower corporate governance standards than 
POEs without corporate bond issuances. 
Hypothesis 4: Among the POEs issuing corporate bonds, politically connected POEs have lower 
corporate governance standards. . 
3.1.3. Political Connections and Refinancing Costs 
We mentioned that the existing literature on how political connections in emerging-market 
countries are related to debt-financing costs focuses solely on bank loans, not on corporate bonds. 
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However, we expect the relationship across both financing instruments to be similar, based on the 
following arguments.  
For the Chinese market, borrowing companies are capable of obtaining bank loans with 
drastically lower interest rates when they are politically connected (see Luo and Zhen, 2008; Yu 
and Pan, 2008). These authors explain that the lower interest rates stem from the fact that state-
owned banks act as financial agents for SOEs (which comprise the majority of the samples) and 
tend to offer them preferential treatment.14 However, it is not obvious whether the same dynamics 
exist for POEs, because the majority of POEs in China were not previously SOEs, but were founded 
by private entrepreneurs. Those firms have grown alongside the economic reforms and may be 
subject to “disciplining” market forces that rationally assess the required refinancing costs. 
However, given the realities of the Chinese capital market, it is reasonable to assume that 
politically-connected POEs can place their corporate bonds at favorable terms because state-owned 
banks are the main corporate bond investors.15 We therefore state our Hypothesis 5 as follows: 
Hypothesis 5: Corporate bonds issued by politically-connected POEs have lower coupon rates   
(refinancing costs) than those issued by non-connected POEs. 
3.1.4. Political Connections and Stock Returns around Bond Issuing Announcements 
Ross (1977) and Heinkel (1982) argue that debt issuance can essentially certify the quality of 
the issuing firm. Their theoretical framework shows that managers deliver positive private 
information to the market through debt issuance. In China, Chinese media has frequently noted that 
it is extremely difficult for mid- and small-cap POEs to obtain credit from state-owned commercial 
banks, owing to the favoritism shown toward SOEs. If political connections can facilitate POEs’ 
                                                     
14 In contrast, Bliss and Gul (2012) document a different relationship in the Malaysian market. They show that 
politically-connected firms have better access to bank credit and face fewer financial constraints, but their interest 
expenses are actually higher than those of non-connected firms. They argue that this is because politically-connected 
companies inherently have higher risk. The higher cost of borrowing stems from the efficiency of contracting. 
Although both China and Malaysia are emerging economies in the same region, their market structures differ 
significantly. Malaysia’s market orientation is well established, while China is still a transitional economy. Therefore, 
the dynamics in Malaysia are unlikely to be pertinent for China. 
15 According to the November 2015 “Asia Bond Monitor,” published by the Asian Development Bank, corporate bond 
investors in China are predominately state-owned banks. This differs significantly from other emerging East Asian 
economies, where domestic institutional investors (pension funds, mutual funds, and insurance companies) and foreign 
investors make up the largest stake. 
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access to public debt financing with lower costs, investors will likely view political connections as 
a credible signal of quality. We therefore posit Hypothesis 6:  
Hypothesis 6: Investors react positively to corporate bond issuing announcements by politically-
connected POEs. 
3.2.  Sample Construction 
3.2.1. Accounting, Governance, Bond, and Loan Data 
To identify privately-owned, listed Chinese enterprises, we only consider firms listed in the 
China Listed Private Enterprise Research Database provided by China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR). This database contains all POEs listed on either the Shanghai or 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. For the years 2015 and 2016, we identify POEs by using another 
database called the China Listed Firms’ Shareholder Research Database, because CSMAR ceased 
the first database in 2014.  
All firms in our sample are directly controlled by individuals, families, other non-state entities, 
or foreign enterprises. Accounting data are obtained from CSMAR’s China Stock Market Financial 
Statement Database and corporate governance-related data from CSMAR’s China Listed Firms’ 
Corporate Governance Research Database. Missing information is manually collected from 
Stockstar (www.stockstar.com), a website that provides detailed information on the top 
management of each exchange-listed firm in China.  
Our sample begins in 2007, the year China conducted a crucial reform of its corporate bond 
market, and ends in the first half of 2016. The full sample contains 1,546 privately-owned firms 
with 9,879 firm-year observations. Following the existing literature on publicly listed Chinese 
firms (Wu et al., 2012; Li and Zhou, 2015; Proelss et al., 2016; and Xu et al., 2016), we winsorize 
all accounting data at the 1% and 99% levels to minimize the impact of any outliers16.  
                                                     
16 We also follow Wu et al. (2012) and perform a robustness test in which we conduct all analyses without winsorizing 
our accounting related variables. The results remain qualitatively unchanged. In addition, following Fan, Wong, and 
Zhang(2007), we perform all analyses by winsorizing the top and bottom 5% of all accounting data. Again, the results 
remain qualitatively unchanged. 
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Information on corporate bond issues comes from the Chinese Bond Market Series section in 
CSMAR, which provides detailed information for all corporate bonds issued on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. However, the information in this section does not cover our entire 
sample period, because the bond database has updated information only through 2015. Therefore, 
we also hand-collect corporate bond issuance information for the first half of 2016 from the official 
websites of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges (www.sse.com.cn and www.szse.cn).  
Our corporate bond issuing sample comprises 246 issues by 213 unique Chinese POEs. Because 
our sample only includes publicly listed but not privately held companies, we aim to complement 
the sample with privately held companies that issue bonds. This should reduce any potential 
selection biases that may arise from the fact that publicly listed companies previously raised capital 
by issuing equity. Specifically, we check whether privately held companies have been active in 
issuing corporate bonds. We find that no privately held company issued a corporate bond until 
2015 (Hexun Bond, 2015). In 2015, an SOE (Zhoushan Port Co., Ltd) became the first non-publicly 
listed company to issue a corporate bond on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Given 
that non-publicly listed companies do not frequently issue publicly listed bonds, our subsequent 
statements will be based on the condition that the companies managed a successful IPO.  
To identify bank loans, we search for the 1,546 POEs in CSMAR’s China Listed Firms’ Bank 
Loan Research Database and find 330 POEs with 661 bank loans (see Table 2). We only include 
bank loans with durations of at least two years. Because many firms obtain multiple loans in the 
same fiscal year, we only include one entry in a fiscal year for each firm. In addition, based on 
CSMAR’s classification, we only include “credit loans” and “loans against collateral.”17 We find 
that 61 POEs issued bonds and obtained bank loans. When comparing the choice between bond 
issues and bank loans in Table 12, we exclude these 61 cases.  
3.2.2. Measuring Political Connections 
To measure political connections, we follow the recent literature by Faccio (2006), Fan, Wong, 
and Zhang (2007), Chen et al. (2011), Li and Zhou (2015), and Xu et al. (2016). Political 
                                                     
17 We exclude project financing, trade credits, discounts on notes, letters of credit, acceptances of bills, and other on- 
and off-balance sheet transactions. 
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connections are based on the political background of a company’s chairman or CEO. We manually 
collect this information from the Stockstar website. Each profile provides specific details on past 
and current work experience. For each year, we classify a chairman or CEO as being politically 
connected if he/she is or was an officer in a central or local government department or the military, 
a member of the People’s Congress (PC), or a member of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Thus, our political connection dummy (Connection) equals 1 
if the chairman or CEO of a POE has political connections in a given year, and 0 otherwise (see Li 
and Zhou, 2015; and Xu et al., 2016).18 
In addition, we construct a political connection index (PC Index) to measure the degree of 
connection. The PC Index ranges from 0 to 3, where 3 stands for the highest degree of political 
connectedness. According to a research report by Harvard University’s Kennedy School, the PC, 
in conjunction with the CPPCC, act as the legislative arm of the government and thus as the highest 
political entity in China (see Saich, 2015). The PC’s functions include overseeing the work of 
government departments and electing major officials; amending the constitution; supervising the 
enforcement of constitutional and legal enactments; and examining and approving the state budget 
and the economic plan. Members serving on the standing committee of the PC and CPPCC 
command particular power, as they work actively on lawmaking. In addition, Saich (2015) notes 
that the PC and CPPCC play more than a ceremonial role in China. Therefore, we assign the highest 
PC Index value of 3 to POEs in which the top managers are (or were) members of the standing 
committee of the PC and CPPCC, as well as to POEs whose top manager is the head of the central 
or provincial government. If the top managers of a POE are ordinary members of the PC or CPPCC, 
we assign a value of 2 to the PC Index. Finally, if the chairman or CEO is only an officer of a 
specific governmental department, or was an officer in the army, his or her political connections 
are considered more limited; hence, we assign a value of 1 to the PC Index. Detailed information 
on how the index is constructed is provided in Panel A of Table 14. 
                                                     
18  In unreported robustness checks, we use Fan, Wong, and Zhang’s (2007) alternative measure for political 
connections, which also considers the connections of board members besides the chairman or CEO. It is equal to 1 if 
anyone on the board is politically connected, and 0 otherwise. We use this measure in place of our Connection variable, 
and our results remain qualitatively the same. 
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In our robustness checks in Section 7, we measure political connections for blockholders 
(ownership-level political connections) rather than for top managers. Following Thomsen, 
Pedersen, and Kvist (2006), the threshold of being considered to be a blockholder is 10%. For each 
POE, we identify all the blockholders who are politically connected and then define the variable 
LBH Connection to be the ownership percentage of the largest of these blockholders. We consider 
the blockholder to be politically connected if he or she has political ties to the government (as in 
the definition of political connection for top managers) or if the blockholder is the state. To measure 
the ownership-level political connections, we manually check the background of all blockholders 
of each POE from the Stockstar website. Given that in the majority of Chinese POEs, the chairman 
is the largest blockholder, if we were to consider all politically-connected blockholders, the results 
would generally be the same as those for management-level political connections. Thus, to isolate 
the effect of ownership-level political connections, we only include politically-connected 
blockholders who are not top managers at the same time. In addition, we create the dummy variable 
Multi BH Connections, which is set equal to 1 if more than one blockholder (who is not also a top 
manager) is politically connected and 0 if no more than one blockholder is politically connected.  
Finally, for the POEs without any type of political connections, we investigate whether the new 
arrival of a politically-connected blockholder (who is not also a top manager) increases the 
likelihood of corporate bond issuance. To do this, we construct the dummy variable PBH Turnover, 
which takes the value of 1 for the POEs without management and ownership-level political 
connections in the year when a politically-connected blockholder joins a POE for the first time and 
the following years s/he serves as a blockholder in a POE, and 0 otherwise. 
3.2.3. Corporate Governance and Control Variables 
To evaluate the impact of corporate governance on the likelihood of bond issuance, we construct 
a comprehensive corporate governance index rather than using several governance factors 
individually. According to Brown, Beekes, and Verhoeven (2011), the latter do not capture a firm’s 
full corporate governance quality and are mostly correlated with each other, potentially causing 
multicollinearity in multivariate regressions. A composite governance index is expected to reflect 
a firm’s governance quality more precisely.  
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Several studies use corporate governance indices for U.S. companies (Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick, 2003; DeFond, Hann, and Xu, 2005; Brown and Caylor, 2006) and European companies 
(Dutordoir, Strong, and Ziegan, 2014). In a similar fashion, Shan (2015) constructs an equally-
weighted corporate governance index for Chinese-listed firms that accounts for China’s two-tiered 
board system. We follow Shan’s (2015) procedure, but because the firms in our sample are 
privately-owned, the governance factors are somewhat different (for example, we obviously do not 
have a factor for “privately-owned enterprises”). Our governance index (Gov Index) is constructed 
using nine equally-weighted governance factors. Detailed information on the index construction 
can be found in Panel B of Table 14.  
Following the debt financing and capital structure literature, we control for a vector of firm-
specific characteristics that may influence a firm’s likelihood of issuing corporate bonds. We 
control for profitability (ROA), leverage (Leverage), firm size (Firm size), the ratio of income taxes 
to total assets (Tax), growth opportunities as measured by Tobin’s q, and the ratio of fixed assets 
to total assets (Tangibility). When examining the debt-financing choice between corporate bonds 
and bank loans, we add an additional control variables, the Altman’s Z-score (Altman Z). Finally, 
when analyzing the refinancing cost of corporate bond-issuing firms, we include the risk free rate 
(Risk free), the bond’s time to maturity (Maturity) and total bond issue volume (Volume). Panel A 
of Table 14 gives detailed descriptions of these variables.  
3.2.4. Market Reactions to Corporate Bond Issuance 
To provide a more in-depth examination of how investors react to the announcements of 
corporate bond issuances by POEs, we calculate the short-term stock returns in response to the 
announcements using the value-weighted Shanghai and Shenzhen Composite Index as a market 
factor. The index data is retrieved from CSMAR’s China Stock Market Trading Database.  
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3.3.  Methodology 
3.3.1. Political Connections and Corporate Bond Issuance 
To test whether political connections affect corporate bond issuance (Hypothesis 1), we apply 
the following research design. We begin with a nearest-neighbor propensity score matching (PSM) 
routine, which aims to match each firm-year observation in which a firm issues a corporate bond 
(Bond=1) with one that does not (Bond=0) on the basis of a vector of firm-specific characteristics. 
We use the PSM approach to overcome potential self-selection bias.  
To obtain the propensity scores, we estimate a probit regression using all Chinese POEs in our 
primary sample. The dependent variable equals 1 if the POE issues a corporate bond in a given 
year, and 0 otherwise. The vector of firm-specific matching variables includes profitability (ROA), 
leverage (Leverage), firm size (Firm size), the income tax ratio (Tax), growth options (Tobin’s q), 
and tangibility (Tangibility). We also include industry dummy variables19 and year dummies to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity across industries and over time. After matching, we perform 
the following logit regression to test Hypothesis 1:  
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑(1/0)𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝝂𝒏 ∙ 𝚴𝒊,𝒏,𝒕−𝟏 +
𝜑𝑘 + +𝜋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 ,                (1) 
where Bond is a binary variable that equals 1 if a POE 𝑖 issues a corporate bond in year 𝑡, and 0 
otherwise. Political Connections are measured by either the independent variable Connection or 
the PC Index and the influence of corporate governance is measured by the Gov Index. 𝚴𝒏 is a 
vector of firm-specific characteristics (ROA, Leverage, Firm size, Tax, Tobin’s q, and Tangibility), 
𝜑𝑘 are industry fixed effects, and 𝜋𝑡 are year fixed effects. Political connections and all control 
variables are measured in year t-1 to predict the likelihood of corporate bond issuance in year t. 
We omit firm-level notations for clarity. 
If political connections help a firm issue a corporate bond, we expect the coefficients on 
Connection or the PC Index (𝛽1) to be positive (Hypothesis 1). If POEs issuing corporate bonds 
have lower corporate governance standards, we expect 𝛽2 to be negative (Hypothesis 3). As a 
                                                     
19 Specifically, we use fifteen industry dummy variables following CSMAR’s industry classifications. 
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robustness check, we also employ the fixed-effects logit model to address the within-firm and 
across-time variations in political connections.  
Establishing a causal effect between political connections and the likelihood of corporate bond 
issuance is subject to several potential problems, including endogeneity, selection bias (e.g., due to 
the fact that companies that issue corporate bonds are generally larger), and reverse causality (i.e., 
an anticipated corporate bond issuance may cause a firm to hire a politically-connected manager).  
To circumvent these potential problems, we use a quasi-natural experiment. We examine 
whether chairman or CEO turnovers that result in an increase in the PC Index (better political 
connections) increase the likelihood of issuing corporate bonds. Our first step is to apply a similar 
PSM routine to that of our previous analysis. We include the PC Index as an additional matching 
variable and match POEs that issue corporate bonds within a given year (246 firm-year 
observations) with POEs that do not issue corporate bonds during the observation period. PSM 
ensures that POEs with and without corporate bond issuance have “identical” company 
characteristics at the time of issuance. If stronger political ties increase the chance of issuing a 
corporate bond, we would expect that POEs that replace their top management with more 
politically-connected successors will be more likely to tap into the public debt market than other 
POEs. Our model is specified as follows: 
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑(1/0)𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡−1 +
+𝝂𝒏 ∙ 𝚴𝒊,𝒏,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜑𝑘 + 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                          (2) 
where Political Turnovert is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the chairman or CEO of a POE is 
replaced by someone with a stronger political index within five years prior to the bond issuance, 
and 0 otherwise.20 All other variables are as defined in Equation (1). The coefficient of interest is 
𝛽1, which will be positive if a political turnover increases the likelihood of a subsequent bond issue. 
                                                     
20 We first obtain chairman/CEO turnover information from CSMAR’s China Listed Firms Corporate Governance 
Research Database. Next, we manually check background information on Stockstar to identify whether the turnover is 
considered political. Chairman/CEO turnover is considered to be political if there is an increase in the PC Index. 
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3.3.2. Corporate Governance and Corporate Bond Issuance 
  To examine the overall corporate governance of the POEs that issue corporate bonds, we employ 
the ordered logistic regression analysis.  
     𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 =  𝛼 + (𝛽1 ∙ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝝂𝒏 ∙ 𝚴𝒊,𝒏,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜑𝑘 +
                      +𝜋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡,                  (3) 
This is because the dependent variable (Gov Index) is an index variable ranging from 0 to 9 (0 
reflecting the worst corporate governance and 9 representing the best corporate governance) that 
capture a POE’s overall governance. The independent variable that we are interested in is the bond 
issuance dummy (Bond) that takes the value of 1 if a POE issues corporate bonds, and 0 otherwise. 
All other variables are as defined in Equation (1). If political connections imply lower corporate 
governance and bond issuing POEs fail to exhibit promising corporate governance to offer 
bondholders’ adequate protection, we will observe the coefficient of β1 and β2 to be negative. To 
study the corporate governance among bond issuing POEs, we omit the bond issuing dummy and 
only focus on political connections.   
3.3.3. Choice of Debt Instrument 
To test the hypothesis that the more politically connected the top management team, the greater 
the likelihood that a POE will choose a corporate bond over a bank loan (Hypothesis 2), we estimate 
the following multinomial logit regression: 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡(2/1/0)𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝝂𝒏 ∙
𝚴𝒊,𝒏,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜑𝑘 + 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                                                                   (4) 
where Debt Instrument equals 2 if a POE 𝑖 issues a corporate bond, 1 if it obtains a bank loan, and 
0 if no financing is raised. Political Connections are measured by either the independent variable 
Connection or the PC Index and the influence of corporate governance is measured by the Gov 
Index. 𝚴𝒏 is a vector of firm-specific characteristics (ROA, Leverage, Firm size, Tax, Tobin’s q, 
Tangibility, and Altman’s Z-score). All other variables are as defined in Equation (1). We again 
omit firm-level notations for clarity. We expect that the greater the degree of political connections, 
the more likely it is that the firm will issue a corporate bond (as opposed to either taking out a bank 
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loan or not raising any financing). Thus, we expect 𝛽1 to be positive (Hypothesis 2). If POEs 
issuing corporate bonds have lower corporate governance standards than POEs in the other two 
Debt Instrument categories, we expect 𝛽2 to be negative (Hypothesis 5). 
An important prerequisite of multinomial logit estimation is that the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) must hold among different utility choices (Hausman and McFadden, 1984). 
Before running the multinomial logit regression, we perform the Hausman test for this assumption. 
The results reveal that IIA is not violated for our sample.  
3.3.4. Refinancing Cost Analysis 
To test the influence of political connections on the refinancing cost of POEs, we estimate the 
following tobit regression:  
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝝂𝒏 ∙ 𝚴𝒊,𝒏,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝝉𝒐 ∙ 𝚻𝒐 + 𝜑𝑘 +
𝜋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,                (5) 
where Coupon is the corporate bond’s coupon rate and measures the refinancing cost because all 
corporate bonds are issued at par value. Political connection is measured by Connection and the 
influence of corporate governance is measured by the Gov Index. 𝚴𝒏 is a vector of firm-specific 
characteristics (ROA, Leverage, Firm size, Tax, Tobin’s q, Tangibility, and Risk free), and 𝚻𝒐 is a 
vector of bond characteristics (PDpredicted, Volume, and Maturity). All other variables are as defined 
in Equation (1). Note that PD measures the probability of default of the corporate bond. We obtain 
this measure by transforming the bond rating provided in CSMAR’s China Bond Market Research 
Database using Standard & Poor’s probability of default table for corporate bonds. However, PD 
could be endogenous if political connections are considered in the rating process. To address this 
issue, we first regress PD on Connection (and a vector of firm-specific characteristics) and 
calculate the predicted value of PD (PDpredicted). Next, we regress Coupon on Connection, using 
Equation (4), by including PDpredicted and other control variables. Because the lower bounds of both 
PD and Coupon are zero, we employ a tobit model for both regressions. If a politically-connected 
top manager is able to achieve lower refinancing costs than a non-connected manager, we expect 
𝛽1 to be negative (Hypothesis 6). 
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3.3.5. Stock Returns around Corporate Bond Issuing Announcements 
  To study how the market reacts to corporate bond issuance announcements by POEs, we apply a 
standard event study approach. Following Dutordoir, Strong, and Ziegan (2014), we use the event 
window (0, 1) and an estimation period of (-300, -46) prior to the first announcement date of a 
bond issue (𝑡 =  0). We calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) using a one-factor market 
model (with the value-weighted Shanghai and Shenzhen Composite as the market factor). For 
robustness checks, we also use (-1, 1), (-2, 2), and (-3, 3) event windows.  
To examine the potential link between political connections and market reactions due to bond 
issuance announcements, we use the following multivariate regression:  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 
+ 𝛽𝑗 ∙ ∑ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑗,𝑖𝑗 +  𝝂𝒏 ∙ 𝜨𝒏 + 𝜑𝑘 + 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,                                  (6) 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖  is the cumulative abnormal return of the bond-issuing POE 𝑖  during the 
announcement day and the one day afterwards. The independent variables are the same as in 
Equation (1) and are complemented by bond characteristics (Multi Issuer, Volume, Maturity, 
Coupon, and PD; see our definitions in Table 14, Panel A). If politically-connected POEs can 
enhance the likelihood of external financing through public debt markets, as well as capitalize on 
their connections by reducing their refinancing costs, we argue that political connections will 
deliver a positive signal to shareholders about the firm’s quality. According to Hypothesis 6, we 
expect the coefficient (𝛽1) on Political Connection, as measured by Connection and the PC Index, 
to be positive and statistically significant. 
3.4.  Empirical Results 
3.4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
  Table 15 and Figure 2 show the number of corporate bond issues and bank loans by Chinese POEs 
during each year of our sample period. Note that the number of corporate bond issues proliferated 
after China reformed its corporate bond market. The only exception is 2010, which had only five 
issues, likely due to the recent global financial crisis. Overall, we observe that, despite China’s 
corporate-debt market historically favoring SOEs, the market has become more accessible to non-
 47 
 
state-owned companies in recent years (see Aharony et al., 2000; Brandt and Li, 2003; and Wang, 
Wong, and Xia, 2008). 
[Insert Figure 2 and Table 15 about here] 
Table 16 provides descriptive statistics for Chinese POEs with and without corporate bond 
issues. Our sample consists of 1,546 POEs (8,441 firm-year observations), of which 213 POEs 
(246 firm-year observations) borrowed from the corporate bond market. Moreover, for POEs that 
do issue corporate bonds, we see that their average values of political connection (Connection = 
0.504, PC Index = 1.126) are about twice as high as the corresponding values for POEs without 
bond issues. The variable Connection implies that half of all POEs that issue corporate bonds are 
politically connected. According to Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007) and Li et al. (2008), the mean 
value of political connections for Chinese-listed firms ranges from 25% to 35%. We interpret this 
as univariate support for Hypothesis 1.  
We also find that corporate governance (i.e., the Gov Index) is statistically significantly lower 
at the 1% level for bond-issuing POEs. This could be interpreted as support for Hypothesis 3, in 
that the effective use of political connections may require comparably weak corporate governance. 
With respect to our control variables, we find that companies with higher profitability and 
borrowing capacity (Leverage), larger size (Firm size), and fewer growth opportunities (Tobin’s q) 
have a higher chance of tapping into the corporate bond market. There is no significant difference 
in income tax ratios (Tax) or asset tangibility (Tangibility) between the two groups (see Table 16, 
Panel C). 
Panels D and E in Table 16 provide a comparison between politically-connected and non-
connected POEs. Politically-connected POEs have significantly lower corporate governance 
standards as measured by the Gov Index. They are also more profitable, have higher borrowing 
capacity, larger firm size, and more tangible assets. In contrast, politically-connected POEs have 
lower income tax ratios and fewer growth options (see Table 16, Panel F)21.  
[Insert Table 16 about here] 
                                                     
21 The descriptive statistics for the subsample of debt instrument choice, refinancing costs analysis, and 
announcement returns analysis will be provided upon request.   
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Before moving on to our multivariate analysis, we review the correlation matrix for all variables 
in the main sample (see Table 17). The table raises only few concerns about potential 
multicollinearity in our subsequent regression analysis. This is supported by the variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) in our main regression models, which reveal no evidence of multicollinearity. In all 
tables, the mean and maximum VIF values are well below the critical value of 10 (see Kutner et 
al., 2005)22.  
[Insert Tables 17 about here] 
3.4.2. Political Connections and Corporate Bond Issuance 
We first report the results of using Equation (1) to examine the link between political 
connections and the probability of issuing a corporate bond. As described in Section 5.1, Equation 
(1) is applied to a balanced, propensity score matched sample. The results of the PSM routine are 
shown in Table 18. The procedure produces 492 firm-year observations (246 matched firm-year 
pairs). 23  In the unbalanced sample, we find that bond issuers have statistically significantly 
different firm characteristics from non-connected POEs (see Table 18, Panel B). These differences 
disappear for the PSM sample, implying that the procedure was successful (Table 4, Panels A and 
B). 
Panel A in Table 19 reports the results of the logit regression using the PSM sample (Equation 
1). For our primary measure of political connections (Connection), we find a significantly positive 
association with corporate bond issuance (see Specification 1). The coefficient is 0.722 and the 
marginal effects show that the probability of corporate bond issuance rises from 42.5% by 17.2 
percentage points (an increase of 40.5%) when hiring a politically-connected top manager. The 
results are very similar for our second measure, PC Index (Specification 2), which has a coefficient 
of 0.299. The predicted probability of issuing corporate bonds is 43.1% when the POE’s top 
management is not politically connected (PC Index=0). The probability increases by 7.1 percentage 
                                                     
22 We check the correlation matrices for different subsamples and discover no potential multicollinearity.  
23 We also use the full (unbalanced) sample with all 9,879 firm-year observations to run the logit regression analysis. 
The results are highly consistent with those obtained with the post-matching sample. The results are omitted for 
brevity but are available upon request.  
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points (a 16.5% increase) when the PC Index increases to 1. The predicted probability of corporate 
bond issuance increases by an additional 7.2 percentage points (a 14.3% increase) when the PC 
Index increases from 1 to 2, and by 6.8 percentage points (or 11.8%) when the PC Index increases 
from 2 to 3. In the fixed-effects panel logit regression, shown in specifications (1’) and (2’), the 
results reveal similar effects of political connections on the likelihood of corporate bond issuance. 
These results support Hypothesis 1, suggesting that politically-connected managers can use their 
ties to issue corporate bonds.  
We also consistently find that POEs with lower corporate governance standards are more likely 
to issue corporate bonds, measured by the Gov Index (see Panel A in Table 19). This finding is 
consistent with that from Lin et al. (2013). We explain our findings with their monitoring avoidance 
hypothesis. They argue that bank borrowing is monitored and closely scrutinized by bank lenders. 
Poorly governed firms prefer public debt as a way of insulating themselves from bank monitoring.  
[Insert Tables 18 and 19 about here] 
Next, we estimate Equation (2), which focuses on chairman and CEO turnovers, in an attempt 
to overcome, e.g., possible endogeneity concerns. We search for turnovers in which the succeeding 
manager is more politically connected than his/her predecessor (Political Turnover = 1). If political 
connections are an essential factor for corporate bond issuance, we expect to find a greater 
likelihood of issuance in the years after such a turnover. We find 246 corporate bond-issuing firm-
year observations that fulfill the criterion of a political turnover. For the control group, we run the 
same PSM routine as described for Equation (1), but on this occasion, we also require that the 
turnover POE and the control company have the same PC Index before the turnover. We further 
require that the control firm has no turnover in subsequent years. The diagnostic tests show that the 
firm characteristics and political connections for the turnover companies are not statistically 
different from those of the control companies (see Table 20), implying that matching is successful.  
Post matching, we re-estimate the logit regression specified in Equation (2), expecting a positive 
coefficient for the variable Political Turnover. This expectation is confirmed by Table 21, although 
the level of statistical significance is only 10%. We interpret this as further support for a causal 
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relationship between top management’s political connections and a firm’s corporate bond issuance 
(Hypothesis 1).24  
[Insert Tables 20 and 21 about here] 
3.4.3. Corporate Governance and Corporate Bond Issuance 
Table 22 reports the results of the ordered logit regression analysis. We can see that the 
coefficient of bond in all specifications is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. This 
empirical finding is in line with our Hypothesis 3: POEs issuing corporate bonds are not able to 
maintain overall high governance standards. Interestingly, the empirical results suggest that the 
link between political connections and corporate governance is negative, confirming our 
expectation that the function of political connections could be viewed as corruption. Therefore, 
POEs relying on political connections exhibit poorer corporate governance.  
The empirical results of the corporate governance among corporate bond issuers only are 
displayed in Column 5 and 6. If we only examine the corporate governance for the POEs that have 
placed their corporate bonds, we can see that the overall corporate governance of POEs with 
government connections is significant worse than POEs without such connections, measured either 
by Connection or PC Index.  
Overall, the analysis of bond issuers’ corporate governance suggests that POE bond issuers have 
relatively low corporate governance standard, specifically the ones with political connections. 
Companies whose corporate governance are poor may not able to protect their bond investors. Thus, 
the large amount of bond defaults issued by POEs in recent years may partially stem from such 
POEs’ low corporate governance standards. 
[Insert Tables 22 about here] 
                                                     
24 In unreported tests, we investigate whether the importance of political connections in China decreased over time by 
splitting the sample into two subperiods (2007-2011 and 2012-2016) and rerunning the main regression tables (see Lin 
et al., 2016; Xu and Yano, 2017). We find no loss in statistical significance in the later subperiod, but the magnitude 
of the coefficients for our main variables of interest, Connection and Gov Index, are slightly lower. Our findings suggest 




3.4.4. Political Connections and the Choice of Debt-Financing Instruments 
Our previous analyses suggest that politically-connected POEs are in a better position to issue 
corporate bonds than their non-connected counterparts. However, we have not ruled out the 
alternative explanation that politically-connected POEs simply prefer private over public debt to 
finance their operations. Therefore, we test Hypothesis 2, which states that, in comparison to their 
non-connected counterparts, politically-connected POEs are more likely to choose public debt 
(corporate bonds) over private bank loans as a debt-financing instrument. 
Table 23 provides the results of this multinomial logit estimation, which is defined in Equation 
(3). Specifications 1 and 3 provide a comparison between corporate bond issuing POEs and non-
issuing POEs.25 We consistently find evidence (at the 1% significance level) that POEs are more 
likely to issue corporate bonds when they hire politically-connected top managers, regardless of 
whether political connections are measured by Connection or the PC Index. Consistent with 
Hypothesis 2, specification 2 shows that politically-connected POEs (Connection=1) are more 
likely to issue corporate bonds (as opposed to obtaining bank loans) than their non-connected peers. 
Our results are very similar when using the PC Index to measure political connections 
(specification 4). Similar to our univariate analysis, POEs better political connections are more 
likely to choose corporate bonds over bank loans.  
Surprisingly, our empirical results show, counterintuitively, that POEs facing a higher 
likelihood of bankruptcy are more likely to issue public debt compared to those without debt 
issuance and those taking private bank debt. Intuitively, we would expect that firms with a higher 
default risk would choose private bank debt because of the renegotiation feature (see Denis and 
Mihov, 2003). Denis and Mihov’s (2003) empirical analysis using U.S. firms confirms their 
conjecture that companies with lower Altman Z-scores are more likely to avoid issuing public debt. 
We interpret this surprising result as further evidence that the Chinese corporate bond market is 
influenced by political factors. In line with Hypothesis 1, it may be that political connections 
provide POEs with an implicit guarantee when they are in default, and that, as a result, connected 
                                                     
25 Results from the multinomial logit are highly similar to those from a binary logit model. Respective tables are 
available from the authors upon request. 
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POEs are bold enough to tap into the public debt market even though their financial indicators infer 
higher default probability.  
Given these counterintuitive findings, we explore further whether politically-connected bond 
issuers exhibit higher default risk using Altman’s Z-score. According to the anecdotal evidence 
described in Section 1 that suggested that China’s corporate bond market has experienced a high 
number of bond defaults over the past two years, we question whether politically-connected issuers 
are actually less qualified for the corporate bond market, and whether it is these political 
connections that brings them to the table. To this end, we include an interaction term, Connection 
× Altman Z, in our multilogit framework. The results are in line with our expectation that 
politically-connected issuers have higher default risk (lower Altman Z) than POEs without debt 
issues. The coefficient of the interaction term is statistically significant at the 10% level (see 
Column 5). However, the Altman Z-scores for politically-connected issuers are not significantly 
different from those of POEs that take out bank loans (see Column 6). 
Thus, in a nutshell, our empirical evidence provides at least a partial explanation for the large 
number of corporate bond defaults. Political connections, rather than market forces, appear to 
distort China’s nascent corporate bond market.  
[Insert Table 23 about here] 
3.4.5. Political Connections and Financing Costs 
Our final analysis sheds light on the impact of political connections on a POE’s financing costs 
when it issues a bond. We measure financing costs via the bond’s Coupon rate, because all bonds 
in our sample are issued at par. To capture the determinants of the bond’s Coupon rate we employ 
a tobit regression as specified in Equation (4). As noted in Section 5.3, we first address the 
endogenous nature of the probability of default (PD) by regressing it on political connections, firm 
characteristics, and issuance-related control variables. The predicted probability of default 
(PDpredicted) that results from this process is then employed in Equation (4). 
The results are provided in column 1 of Table 24. In support of Hypothesis 5, we find that 
politically-connected POEs have lower financing costs (lower Coupon rates) when they issue a 
corporate bond than their non-connected peers. The coefficient of the political-connection dummy 
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(Connection) is -0.781, indicating that politically-connected POEs are able to issue corporate bonds 
at approximately a 0.8% lower Coupon rate than POEs without political connections. This discount 
is economically significant and supports the view that, in China, a POE’s financing costs are not 
only determined by financial fundamentals and corporate governance quality, but also by political 
ties. This effect is consistent with prior findings that SOEs are able to borrow at lower interest rates 
than the market rate (see Ferri and Liu, 2010). We also find a positive relationship between the 
predicted value of a firm’s probability of default and the Coupon Rate, which is intuitive assuming 
that credit rating agencies grasp a company’s credit risk appropriately. The relationship indicates 
that firms with better creditworthiness (a lower value of PDpredicted) have lower financing costs (Qian 
and Strahan, 2007; Jiang, Kim, and Shen, 2012).  
Overall, we find that political connections not only affect the likelihood of bond issuance by 
POEs, but also the coupon rate of the bonds they issue. This fact underscores the still immature 
nature of the Chinese corporate bond market and its links to political factors. It appears that, in 
China, politically well-connected corporate borrowers can lower their financing costs through their 
“political friends” instead of, e.g., providing better protection to investors. However, we also find 
that the standard principles of corporate borrowing, such as risk and firm size, are in place and have 
predictive power for the cost of borrowing.  
[Insert Table 24 about here] 
3.4.6. Stock Returns around Corporate Bond Issuing Announcements 
Next, we perform an event study to examine how bond issues affect the stock returns of POEs. 
CAAR is calculated with one factor market model (value-weighted Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Composite Index as the market factor) In unreported tests, we find that the CAAR during a (0,1) 
event window around all bond issues in our sample is -0.5%, and is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels.26 This finding is consistent with the existing literature that suggests that the 
overall average stock price reaction to public debt issuance is not significantly different from zero 
(see Eckbo, 1986; Shyam-Sunder, 1991; Kim and Stulz, 1992). However, shareholders react 
                                                     
26 Because the CAAR is not statistically significantly different from zero, we do not include the table reporting the 
CAAR and its associated t-statistic and p-value in the main text. This table is available from the authors upon request. 
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differently if corporate bonds are issued by politically-connected top management (see Table 25). 
On average, we find that the announcement returns of politically-connected POEs are 1.2 
percentage points higher. This univariate result echoes what we posit under Hypothesis 6, i.e. that 
political connections have a certification effect for issuing firms and enhance their financing 
sources while also reducing their financing costs. Thus, shareholders react positively to the public 
debt issue announcement.  
We complement this univariate analysis with a multivariate regression analysis in which we 
control for bond and firm-specific characteristics (see Table 26). The empirical results are 
consistent with those from the univariate analysis above, with the announcement returns again 
being 1.2 percentage points higher on average for politically-connected POEs.27 For robust check, 
CAAR are calculated with a one factor market model (equal-weighted Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Composite Index as the market factor), a Fama-French three factor model (Fama and French, 1996), 
and a Fama-French five factor model (Fama and French, 2015), respectively. The results from those 
estimations consistently show that POEs with political ties generate higher bond issuing 
announcement returns. We interpret this as further support for Hypothesis 6.  
[Insert Tables 25 and 26 about here] 
 
3.5.  Robustness Tests 
3.5.1. Further Endogeneity Check 
  The quasi-natural experiment above may not perfectly resolve the endogeneity issue because the 
top mangers’ turnover is still endogenously determined within the firm. Thus, top managers’ 
turnover cannot be viewed as a purely exogenous shock and the estimation based on the quasi-
natural experiment may not be robust. To further cope with the endogeneity issue and provide more 
robust estimation, we employ an instrument variable for our interested variable, political 
connections. Following Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar (2012) and Houston et al. (2014), we 
                                                     
27 To ensure the robustness of our results, we also employ the CARs for alternative event windows in our regression 




instrunment political connections by the geo-distance between a POE’s headquarter and the 
provincial capital city where the POE is located. The data of Chinese cities’ coordinates is 
purchased and collected from GeoPostcodes to calculate the geo-distance28 . In the first-stage 
estimation, we predict political connections using the geo-distance between a POE’s headquarter 
and the capital city of the province where the POE is located. Geo-distance is measured by the 
natural logarithm of one plus the geo-distance between a POE’s headquarter and the provincial 
capital city through a probit model. The fitted values of political connections obtained from the 
first-stage estimation are then applied in the second-stage regression. We perform the instrument 
variable analysis for both post-match cross-sectional analysis and panel analysis, because 
propensity score matching routine may not perfectly mitigate potential endogeneity of the political 
connections. For the first stage estimation, we observe that geo-distance is a good predictor of 
political connections: the geo-distance to the provincial capital city is significantly (significant at 
the 1% level) shorter for connected POEs than their unconnected counterparts29. The panel B in 
Table 19 shows results of the second-stage estimation. We can see that the instrumented value of 
political connections is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in both the post-match 
cross-sectional analysis (Colum 1) and the panel analysis (Column 2). In addition, The Stock-Yogo 
test (Stock and Yogo, 2005) and Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Durbin, 1954; Wu, 1973; and Hausman, 
1978) suggest that endogeneity is at presence and our instrument variable is not a weak instrument. 
Overall, the results from the instrument variable analysis reinforce the positive impact of political 
connections on Chinese POEs’ access to the public debt market.  
  Given the endogeneity concerns for political connections, the suggested relationship between 
political connections and refinancing costs, and announcement returns may not be robust as well. 
                                                     
28 We are aware that in the study of Houston et al. (2014), they instrument political connections by not only the distance 
between a firm’s location and the state capital of the U.S., bu also the distance between a firm’s location and the capital 
city of the U.S., Washington D.C. We intend to do the similar estimation by calculating the geo-distance between a 
POE’s headquarter and the Chinese capital city, Beijing. However, because Chinese POEs are highly clustered in 
China’s east and coastal provinces, there is no significant variations on the distance between a POE’s location and 
Beijing.   
29 To avoid further inflating the page numbers, we only report the results of the second stage estimation for the 
instrument variable analysis. The results of the first stage estimation will be provided upon request. 
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Thus, we additionally perform similar instrument variable analysis for the refinancing costs 
analysis and the announcement returns analysis. The results are shown in Column 2 of Table 24 
and in Column 5-8 of Table 26. The results of the instrumented value of political connections 
consistently reveal that politically connected POEs are able to place their bonds at lower costs and 
shareholders in connected POEs positively react to the bond issuing announcement.  
  Furthermore, Cooper et al. (2010) state that firms may choose to hire politically connected top 
managers to overcome certain weakness in their business. Thus, there might be a selection effect 
in political connections. Although we have already employed propensity score matching routine to 
deal with the potential selection bias in political connections, applying the conventional Heckman 
selection model (Heckman, 1976) may further strengthen our argument. We report the second stage 
of the Heckman selection model including the inverse Mills ratio in Colum 3 in Panel B, Table 19. 
The inverse Mills ratio is statistically significant at the 5% level, indicating there is a selection bias. 
After controlling for the selection bias, the positive link between political connections and bond 
issuance remain unchanged30.  
3.5.2. The Political Connections of Blockholders 
An alternative explanation for our findings might be that the political connections of a firms’ 
blockholders and not those of the top management are driving our results. This notion is related to 
the research of Anderson, Chi and Wang (2017), who analyze the link between political 
connections and venture capitalist (VC) exits in China. They differentiate between management-
level political connections (top managers having political connections) and ownership-level 
political connections (the controlling shareholder is the government). Their empirical results 
suggest that political connections facilitate successful VC exits, but that management-level political 
connections have a much greater impact than ownership-level political connections, since the latter 
come at the cost of severe agency problems. 
                                                     
30 We perform Heckman selection model for both refinancing costs analysis and announcement returns analysis. 
However, we do not find a statistically significant value of inverse Mills ratio and the results on political connections 
remain qualitatively unchanged. Results can be provided upon requests.  
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To control for ownership-level political connections, we use the methodology described in 
Section 4.2. There is no single best way to measure these connections, thus we employ several 
proxies (see also Table 14): LBH Connection (the percentage ownership of the largest politically-
connected blockholder) and Multi BH Connections (a dummy variable that equals 1 if more than 
one non-management blockholder is politically connected). We incorporate these variables 
simultaneously with the management-level political connection variables in our model.  
Interestingly, we find that – in contrast to management-level political connections – ownership-
level connections measured by LBH Connection are negatively associated with the likelihood of 
issuing a corporate bond. Furthermore, it seems that having additional politically-connected 
blockholders does not affect the probability of issuing a corporate bond over and above having one 
politically-connected blockholder. In our dataset, the biggest non-management, politically-
connected blockholder is, in general, the state and their percentage ownership is predominantly in 
the 10% to 20% range. Hess, Gunasekarage, and Hovey (2010) find that governmental ownership 
for listed Chinese firms is only beneficial above the 35% level. Low-level state ownership is in fact 
detrimental to firm value, especially when the company is a POE. They argue that state 
blockholders with lower levels of ownership tend to extract rents for their own benefits, creating a 
severe agency problem (see also Shleifer, 1998; Lerner, 2010). Our results suggest a similar 
relationship in that the costs of direct governmental ownership outweigh the benefits of potential 
preferential treatment.  
We examine the relationship between ownership-level political connections and the choice of 
debt instrument (loans versus bonds), and find that they are unrelated, regardless of whether we 
use LBH Connection or Multi BH Connections as a proxy. 
Finally, as described in Section 4.2, we perform a quasi experiment to test the robustness of the 
previous results regarding the relationship between ownership-level political connections and 
corporate bond issuances. We identify all non-connected POEs, and define a variable, PBH 
Turnover, that equals 1 if a politically-connected blockholder comes in for the first time (while 
management remains non-connected). We find the coefficient of PBH Turnover to be statistically 
 58 
 
insignificant, indicating that such turnovers have no significant influence on the likelihood of 
corporate bond issuance.  
In summary, the above robustness tests reveal that 1) the influence of top management political 
connections is not altered by simultaneously considering ownership-level political connections, 
and 2) ownership-level political connections are not positively associated with the issuance of 
corporate bonds31.  
4. The Great Wall and beyond: The value of implicit government guarantees for corporate 
bonds in mainland China and its Northeast regions 
4.1.  Institutional Background 
4.1.1. The Development of LGFVs and Chengtou Bonds 
Local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) are state-owned companies whose controlling or 
sole shareholders are local governments. Specifically, the shareholders are mainly the State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Committees (SASACs) of local governments. Prior to the 
Tax Sharing Reform of 1994, local governments in China were free to allocate their tax revenue to 
infrastructure and urban development projects of their choice. However, the reform removed the 
rights of local governments to control their tax revenue. In response, they were obligated to seek 
other sources of funding (Zhang and Barnett, 2014; Ambrose, Deng, and Wu, 2015). Along with 
the tax reform, the updated Budget Law in 1994 prohibited local governments from running budget 
deficits, thereby motivating them to run implicit budget deficits through their LGFVs. Thus, the 
aforementioned policy changes resulted in an abundance of LGFVs. Nevertheless, before 2009, the 
financing activities of LGFVs were severely regulated by China’s central government.  
In 2009, in response to the global financial crisis, the Chinese government issued a four-trillion 
Chinese yuan stimulus package to prompt China’s economic growth. Local infrastructure projects 
were the major component of the stimulus package, meaning that local governments were burdened 
with the financing. Because the central government only provided 25% of the four-trillion yuan 
                                                     
31 The results of ownership-level political connections will be provided upon request. 
 59 
 
package, it left a shortfall of three trillion for local governments to find (Bai, Hsieh, and Zheng, 
2016; Chen, He and Liu, 2017). As noted above, due to the 1994 Budget Law, local governments 
were forced to finance their investments through LGFVs. Nevertheless, China’s lawmakers 
alleviated the regulations and allowed some flexibility with regard to financing using LGFVs. In 
particular, local governments were permitted to finance infrastructure projects by acquiring bank 
loans through their LGFVs and consequently, such loans grew at an unprecedented rate32. In turn, 
LGFVs issued a large number of bonds to finance the massive bank debt. In 2008, there were only 
12 LGFVs that issued these bonds, a figure that increased to 516 in 2013 (Chen, He, and Liu, 2017). 
The percentage of China’s aggregate corporate bonds accounted for by Chengtou bonds rose from 
13% in 2008 to 61.5% by the end of 2016 (Chen, He and Liu, 2017). Chengtou bonds are not only 
traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, but also in a specific market called the 
“interbank market”33. The bondholders are mostly qualified financial institutions including banks, 
mutual funds, and insurance companies (Borst, 2016).  
The nature of Chengtou bonds is controversial. Legally, Chengtou bonds are classified as 
corporate bonds, but the Chinese media and academics often consider them to be municipal debt. 
The related uncertainty largely stems from the fact that the rules and regulations are continually in 
flux. Chengtou bond investors are uncertain of the extent to which local governments are liable for 
the Chengtou bonds issued by their LGFVs. Because of the natural tie between local governments 
and LGFVs, and the fact that China’s lawmakers encouraged local governments to raise funds for 
the stimulus package through LGFVs, it is reasonable for investors in quasi-municipal corporate 
bonds to expect an implicit governmental guarantee in the case of default (Chen, He, and Liu, 2017). 
                                                     
1 Bai, Hsieh, and Zheng (2016) estimate that about 90% of local government infrastructure projects were financed with 
bank loans in 2009. In addition, Chen et al. (2017) show that LGFVs took out approximately 2.3 trillion Chinese yuan 
in new bank loans in 2009, accounting for 27.5% of China’s GDP. The average proportion of bank loans to GDP in 
previous years was only around 15%. 
2 Unlike the exchange-traded corporate-bond market, which is regulated by China’s Securities Regulatory Commission, 
the interbank bond market is regulated by China’s central bank (the People’s Bank of China). The corporate bonds 
issued in the interbank market are called enterprise bonds. Only high quality state-owned companies can issue 
corporate bonds in the interbank market (Huang and Zhu, 2009).  
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4.1.2. Policy Changes Regarding LGFVs 
Even if an implicit governmental guarantee is assumed, Chengtou bond investors may be worried 
about the ability of local governments to bail out the debt in the case of default. Their worries may 
well stem from local governments’ massive debt accumulation, China’s slowing economic growth, 
and the large number of corporate bond defaults in recent years (Schweizer, Walker, and Zhang, 
2017). Furthermore, Gao, Liao, and Wang (2017) provide direct evidence that LGFVs have 
defaulted on their bank loans (at least before 2014), suggesting that Chengtou bonds could also be 
at risk.  
Recent policy changes reducing the liabilities of local governments for their LGFVs are likely 
to have further curtailed investors’ bail-out expectations. On September 2014, the State Council of 
China (SCC) issued Document 43, which (a) prohibited local governments from providing 
guarantees for the corporate bonds issued by their LGFVs and (b) revoked the option of local 
governments raising funds through their LGFVs (Chen, He, and Liu, 2017).  
In addition to Document 43, the SCC issued another document, Document 88, in November 
2016. This document further limited local governments from offering implicit guarantees for 
Chengtou debts. It states that if the Chengtou bondholders do not agree to a “swap program” which 
would replace their Chengtou bonds with newly issued municipal bonds, they should assume that 
their Chengtou debts no longer carry any government guarantees (Sina Finance, 2017a).  
Finally, in April 2017, the Ministry of Finance issued Document 50, which specified the 
following rules to further limit local governments’ guarantees for their LGFVs. Firstly, local 
governments cannot inject their assets of public welfare, nor their land reserves, into their LGFVs. 
Moreover, local governments cannot promise to use revenue from expected land sales as a 
guarantee for LGFVs’ debt repayment. Secondly, LGFVs must declare to Chengtou bondholders 
that local governments are not responsible for new Chengtou debts. Thirdly, financial institutions 
are not permitted to ask for or accept any sort of guarantee from local governments when providing 
financing to LGFVs (Sina Finance, 2017b). It is widely agreed by the Chinese media that 
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Document 50 completely stalled the possibility for local governments to offer guarantees for 
LGFVs’ Chengtou debts. A news article on a well-known Chinese website (Sohu Finance, 2017) 
reported that the yield spread of both AA+ and AA Chengtou bonds increased by 1.5 basis points 
after the announcement of Document 50.  
4.2.  Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Kahan and Rock (2010) provide the theoretical background for understanding the role of implicit 
government support in determining corporate debt pricing. They argue that unlike private investors, 
whose goal is purely to maximize their wealth, government investors can incorporate social as well 
as political objectives into corporate financing decisions. In addition, government investors are 
able to influence the cost of debt in their invested companies via unique channels that are not 
available to private investors. 
4.2.1. Implicit Government Guarantees and the Bond Yield Spread 
Methodologically, we follow existing research that sheds light on the relationship between 
implicit government guarantees and debt pricing. In general, these studies show that implicit 
government guarantees alleviate bond risk. Flannery and Sorescu (1996) investigate the effect of 
implicit government support on the yield spreads of the subordinated debt of U.S. banks between 
1983 and 1991. They argue that subordinated debentures are perceived by investors to have an 
implicit government guarantee. Their empirical results support this hypothesis by showing that 
investors of subordinated debt accept lower yield spreads. Heppke-Falk and Wolff (2008) and 
Schuknecht, von Hagen, and Wolswijk (2009) examine the effect of government bail-outs in the 
sub-national bond market in Germany. They find that receiving a bail-out from the federal 
government significantly reduces the risk premia of sub-national bonds issued by local 
governments with financial troubles. Acharya, Anginer, and Warburton (2016) investigate the 
credit spreads of unsecured bonds issued by U.S. financial institutions. They demonstrate that these 
credit spreads are sensitive to risk for most U.S. banks, but not for the largest banks (in the 90th 
percentile). They attribute this result to the “too big to fail” phenomenon. The bondholders of the 
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largest U.S. financial institutions expect the government to bail them out in the event of financial 
distress. Hence, bondholders do not price the risk accurately and the largest banks are able to 
borrow at discount rates.  
The aforementioned literature has documented that implicit government guarantees are 
beneficial for debt pricing in developed countries. In more general terms, a vast body of literature 
has shown the positive effect of government support on the financing activities of firms in emerging 
markets, including China (Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 2007; Pessarossi and Weill, 2013; Li and Zhou, 
2015; Schweizer, Walker, and Zhang, 2017). However, no study has examined the specific impact 
of implicit government support on investors’ risk perception of corporate bonds in China. The 
institutional landscape in China exhibits a very concentrated political and governmental system, 
and as a result the government intervenes strongly in corporate financing activities (Schweizer, 
Walker, and Zhang, 2017). Hence, we postulate that in China, implicit government guarantees 
should have a relatively strong influence on the yield spread of corporate bonds. Moreover, as 
discussed in Section 2, Chengtou bonds are issued by LGFVs, with China’s local governments 
being the sole or dominant shareholders. Therefore, we expect local governments to offer even 
more support to such LGFVs and to aim preventing them from defaulting on their Chengtou bonds. 
A widespread perception of an implicit government guarantee on the part of Chengtou bond 
investors would effectively lower their required risk premium. Based on the above arguments, we 
propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The yield spreads of Chengtou bonds are lower than those of corporate bonds issued 
by privately-owned enterprises (POEs). 
4.2.2. Implicit Government Guarantees and Credit Ratings 
It has been argued thus far that bond investors expect the government to bail out firms in financial 
trouble when those firms have implicit government support. Hence, an implicit government 
guarantee should be more valuable for firms with a higher probability of default. The existing 
literature supports our conjecture. Borisova et al. (2015) study the effect of implicit government 
 63 
 
guarantees on the cost of publicly-traded corporate bonds for a sample of 43 countries. 
Governments’ equity ownership, which is used as a proxy for implicit government guarantees, is 
found to produce lower yield spreads for firms that are experiencing a greater degree of financial 
distress. Yet, in the case of high-quality Chengtou bonds, issuers possess high credit ratings. Thus, 
bond investors should perceive such bonds as having a low likelihood of default and hence of being 
less likely to be rescued by the government. In other words, we expect the value of an implicit 
government guarantee to be lower for Chengtou bonds with higher credit ratings. We therefore 
postulate our second hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: The effectiveness of implicit government support increases as the credit rating of a 
Chengtou bond decreases. 
4.2.3. Regional Effects and the Bond Yield Spread 
The provincial fiscal and business environment is likely to have a direct influence on the 
effectiveness of implicit government guarantees. Evidence in support of this view is mainly based 
on studies for the United States. Poterba and Rueben (1999, 2001) investigate the impact of local 
fiscal rules on the yield spreads of state obligation bonds. They demonstrate that U.S. states with 
tighter budget rules and more restricted provisions on the authority of state legislatures to issue 
bonds tend to have lower yield spreads on their issued bonds. Similarly, Lowry (2001) shows that 
investors place a higher risk discount on bonds issued by states with tougher fiscal rules, whereas 
they attribute higher risk to bonds issued by states experiencing consecutive deficits. Feld et al. 
(2017) investigate the difference in yield spreads of sub-national (“canton”) bonds across different 
cantons in Switzerland and find a substantial negative effect of the strength of cantonal fiscal rules 
on bond yield spreads. 
In China, it is well recognized by bond investors and the financial media that the provinces in 
Northeast China (“Dongbei”) exhibit the poorest fiscal and business environments34 . After the 
                                                     
34 Northeast China consists of three provinces: Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning.  
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founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, Northeast China, historically known as Manchuria, 
became the cradle for the country’s Soviet-style development of heavy industry. However, 
Northeast China has been experiencing economic difficulties for the past three decades, lagging far 
behind provinces in the south and coastal areas where market-oriented reform has created economic 
miracles. According to the East Asia Forum (2017), the economic decline of Northeast China is 
due to the fact that “the system is broken: [The Northeast has] a poor environment for businesses, 
a lingering concept of ‘big government’ inherited from the planned-economy era, and unpredictable 
administrative interference”. Anecdotal evidence also testifies as to Northeast China’s poor 
financial condition. For instance, China Banking News (2017) reports that Northeast China has a 
very high ratio of non-performing loans. Similarly, Bloomberg (2017) notes that bond investors 
have blacklisted provinces in Northeast China after a run of defaults. The Bloomberg article also 
documents that the Liaoning province of Northeast China holds the highest number of corporate 
bond defaulters out of the 31 provinces in mainland China. In addition, the economic growth of the 
province is the lowest among all provinces in mainland China. Furthermore, an analysis conducted 
by Standard & Poor’s (Financial Times, 2014) shows that Northeast China fared the worst among 
all regions in China and that two of the three provinces in Northeast China have speculative-grade 
credit features. The state of affairs is adroitly summarized by a saying among Chinese investors to 
“never invest beyond Shanghaiguan”, meaning that it is unwise to invest in Northeast China 
(Global Times, 2018).  
Based on the above evidence, we posit that bond investors demand a higher risk premium from 
bonds issued located in Northeast China. Moreover, because of the poor financial condition and 
highly corrupt political environment, bond investors are likely to expect the implicit government 
guarantees offered by the governments of Northeast China to be less credible than those of other 
regions. Our research hypotheses are thus: 
Hypothesis 3: The Chengtou bonds issued by LGFVs located in Northeast China have a higher 
yield spread than those issued by LGFVs in other regions of the country. 
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Hypothesis 4: Implicit government guarantees for Chengtou bonds are less effective in Northeast 
China than in other regions of the country. 
4.2.4. Policy Changes and the Bond Yield Spread 
Policy changes can alter investors’ expectations of implicit government guarantees and, thus, 
their perceived risk premium on debts. Flannery and Sorescu (1996) find that after the passage of 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991, the yield spreads 
of U.S. banks’ subordinated debt became more sensitive to the specific risks of issuing banks. This 
phenomenon reflects the fact that as the implicit guarantee was diminished through policy and 
legislative changes, debt holders realized that they were no longer protected from losses and 
responded by more accurately pricing risk. Sironi (2003) finds that the yield spreads of 
subordinated debt in EU countries started to exhibit risk sensitivity in the second half of 1990. The 
author argues that the implicit government guarantee perceived by investors diminished during this 
period due to the introduction of the Euro (which resulted in EU countries losing their own 
monetary policies) and due to specific budget constraints imposed by the EU. Acaya, Anginer, and 
Warburton (2016) study the effect of the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 on the link between 
credit spreads and risk sensitivity for unsecured bonds issued by large U.S. financial institutions. 
Their empirical results show that the act did not remove investors’ expectations of an implicit 
government guarantee. However, the act specifically targets too-big-to-fail financial institutions, 
which are a special case, as bond investors tend to assume that government support for such 
institutions will always be in place.  
As described in Section 2, the three documents issued by the State Council of China (SCC) 
sought to restrict local governments from providing guarantees on Chengtou bonds issued by their 
LGFVs. We expect the yield spreads of Chengtou bonds to become more sensitive to specific risks 
associated with individual LGFVs than before as a result of this legislation. Therefore, we expect 
the difference in yield spreads between Chengtou bonds and POE bonds to become smaller after 





Hypothesis 5: The issuance of Document 43 (Document 88, Document 50) has a more positive 
influence on the yield spreads of Chengtou bonds than on the yield spreads of POE bonds.  
4.3.  Data and Sample 
4.3.1. Sample Construction 
We collect information on Chinese-listed corporate bonds from the “China Bond Database”, part 
of the so-called Wind database, which is the most comprehensive database covering China's fixed-
income markets and providing fundamental, pricing, credit rating, and transaction data. 
Specifically, we collect data on all publicly traded corporate bonds on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges as well as in the interbank market. The Wind database classifies corporate bonds 
into several categories including Chengtou bonds, corporate bonds issued by state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), and corporate bonds issued by privately-owned enterprises (POEs). To study 
the effect of implicit government guarantees on quasi-municipal corporate bonds, we only include 
Chengtou bonds and corporate bonds of POEs in our sample35. Our final sample thus includes 
information on 2,700 quasi-municipal corporate bonds and 890 POE-issued corporate bonds during 
the period January 2010 to December 2017, i.e., the full sample period available from the Wind 
database at the time of our analysis. 
4.3.2. Bond Yield Spreads 
Our dependent variable is the monthly trading yield spread of Chengtou bonds and POE 
corporate bonds (Spread). The trading yield spread captures a bond’s individual bond risk as 
perceived by the market. Specifically, the yield spread is calculated as the difference in the bond 
yield between a corporate bond and a treasury bond with the same maturity. 
                                                     
35 We screen out SOEs for the following reason: Although China has been transforming into a more market-oriented 
economy, it still has a highly concentrated political system. Capital allocations and legal systems in China are 
ultimately controlled by central and local governments. The Chinese government tends to guarantee the prosperity of 
SOEs on the grounds that the state is the controlling shareholder (Schweizer, Walker, and Zhang, 2017). Because we 
only want to investigate the implicit government guarantee carried by Chengtou bonds issuers (LGFVs), the inclusion 
of SOEs would undermine the robustness of our analysis.   
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4.3.3. Implicit Government Guarantee 
As mentioned previously, we consider Chengtou bonds to carry an implicit government 
guarantee because local governments are the sole or dominant shareholder of Chengtou bond 
issuers (LGFVs). We proxy for implicit government guarantees with a dummy variable (Implicit) 
that equals one if a corporate bond is classified as a Chengtou bond in the Wind database and zero 
otherwise.  
4.3.4. Credit Rating 
To capture the differential effect of implicit government guarantees on the yield spreads of 
“Chengtou” bonds of different credit ratings (see Hypothesis 2), we obtain the bond issuers’ credit 
rating from the Wind database36. Credit ratings in this database are classified into four categories: 
AAA, AA+, AA, and AA-37. We create a variable (Rating) ranging from one to four, with AA- 
assigned a value of one and AAA a value of four.  
4.3.5. Regional Effects 
To examine whether the poor financial and business environment in Northeast China is 
associated with higher bond yield spreads, we construct a dummy variable (Northeast), which takes 
on a value of one if a bond issuer is located in Northeast China and zero otherwise.  
4.3.6. Control Variables 
Following the literature on debt financing, we first control for a vector of firm-specific 
characteristics that may influence a bond issuer’s risk: profitability (ROA), leverage (LEV) and firm 
size (Size). Second, we control for a variety of bond-specific characteristics, i.e., the issuing volume 
(Volume), the remaining time to maturity (Maturity), and the difference between the highest and 
                                                     
36 Bonds are rated at issue by one of the five major credit rating agencies: (i) the China Chengxin International Credit 
Rating Co., Ltd. (a joint venture with Moody's); (ii) the China Lianhe Credit Rating Co. Ltd. (a joint venture with Fitch 
Ratings); (iii) the Dagong Global Credit Rating Co., Ltd.; (iv) the Pengyuan Credit Rating Co., Ltd.; and (v) the 
Shanghai Brilliance Credit Rating & Investors Service Co., Ltd. (see Ang, Bai, and Zhou, 2016). 
37 Ang, Bai, and Zhou (2016) argue that bond ratings in China are highly inflated and homogeneous, ranging from 
AAA to A only.  
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lowest price in a given month (Liquidity). Third, to control for macroeconomic conditions, we 
include the quarterly change in the gross domestic product (GDP) of the province in which the 
bond issuer is located (GDP growth), the yearly return of the one-year treasury bill (Risk free rate), 
the difference in the yearly return between ten-year and two-year treasury bonds (Yield curve slope), 
and a ratio that measures the growth rate in the money supply (M2 growth). Finally, we include an 
indicator variable that represents the presence of an explicit guarantee (Explicit). We include this 
variable because some of the bond issuers have explicit guarantors, who are usually SOEs or state-
owned financial institutions. Thus, the indicator variable is set equal to one if a bond issuer has a 
guarantor at the time of bond issuance and zero otherwise. Table 27 provides detailed descriptions 
for all variables. 
4.4.  Methodology 
4.4.1. Implicit Government Guarantees and Bond Yield Spreads 
To examine whether implicit government guarantees lower bond investors’ risk perception, we 
estimate the following panel regression: 
 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∙  𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 𝑖,𝑡  × 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾 ∙ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿 ∙ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 +
                            𝜃 ∙ 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜀                                                                                                                                        (1) 
where 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is the monthly trading yield spread for bond i. Implicit government guarantees 
are measured by 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡 and credit ratings are measured by 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡. 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of 
firm-specific characteristics (ROA, Leverage, Size), 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 captures bond-specific characteristics 
(Volume, Maturity, Liquidity, Explicit), 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑡  proxies for macroeconomic conditions (GDP 
growth, Risk free rate, Yield curve slope, M2 growth), and 𝜋𝑡  are year fixed effects. If bond 
investors expect the implicit government guarantee in “Chengtou” bonds to mitigate the bonds’ 
individual risk, 𝛽1  will be negative (Hypothesis 1). Furthermore, we expect the implicit 
government guarantee to be more effective for bonds with a higher probability of default 
(Hypothesis 2), in which case the interaction coefficient 𝛽3 will be positive.  
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4.4.2. Regional Effects and Bond Yield Spreads 
To investigate whether bond investors attribute a higher risk to bonds for which the issuer is 
located in Northeast China, we add the dummy variable Northeast to equation (1):  
 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽4  ∙ 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡  × 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽5 ∙
                            𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡  × 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖  + 𝛾 ∙ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿 ∙ 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃 ∙ 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜀                                (2)  
If the poor investing environment of Northeast China causes bond investors to have higher risk 
expectations, 𝛽3 will be positive (Hypothesis 3). In addition, if investors believe that the implicit 
support offered from the governments in Northeast China is not credible, the coefficient of the 
interaction term 𝛽5 will be positive (Hypothesis 4).  
4.4.3. Policy Changes and Bond Yield Spreads 
We carry out a difference-in-differences (DID) regression to examine whether the strength of 
implicit government guarantees diminished after the issuance of Documents 43, 88, and 50. Our 
DID model is specified as follows: 
 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡43,88,50 + 𝛽3 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡43,88,50 + 𝝂𝒏 ∙ 𝜨𝒏 + 𝜋𝑡 +  𝜀               (3) 
 
where 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡 captures the treatment status and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡43,88,50  represents a series of three dummy 
variables (Post43, Post88, and Post50) that indicate whether a given observation in our sample falls 
after the issuance of either of the three documents (post Document 43, post Document 88, and 
Document 50, respectively). 𝚴𝒏  is a vector of all control variables. Our main interest is the 
coefficient of the DID estimator (𝛽3). If the implicit government guarantee originally embedded in 
“Chengtou” bonds diminished after the issuance of a given document (43, 88 or 50), the coefficient 
of the DID estimator will be positive. To study the isolated effect of each document, we only include 
the observations for the five months before and after the document was issued38.  
                                                     
38 We initially planned to compare the yield spreads for a period of six months before and after each document was 
issued. However, this would have led to an overlap between Document 88 and Document 50.  
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4.5.  Empirical Results 
4.5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
We start our empirical analysis by examining three figures that depict the dynamic change in 
yield spreads for Chinese corporate bonds over our sample period. Figure 3 shows the fluctuation 
in yield spreads for different Chengtou bonds, classified by credit rating. The yield spreads decrease 
for bonds with higher credit ratings, which is in line with common knowledge. Of greater interest 
is the effect of the issuance of the three documents intended to refrain local governments from 
providing implicit guarantees for corporate bonds issued by their LGFVs. We can see clearly that 
there is a significant increase in the yield spreads of Chengtou bonds immediately following the 
issuance of Document 43, reflecting a greater sensitivity of investors to bond-specific risks. What 
is perhaps surprising is that this increase only lasts for a relatively short period, from the issuance 
of Document 43 (September 2014) to the beginning of 2015. From the beginning of 2015, the yield 
spreads decrease to an even lower level than before Document 43. This seemingly counter-intuitive 
finding is further addressed in our multivariate analysis and is discussed in detail in Section 6.5. 
Unlike Document 43, the subsequent documents exhibit the expected effects; the risk of Chengtou 
bonds increases after the issuance of both Document 88 and Document 50.  
The yield spreads of POE corporate bonds, depicted in Figure 4, fluctuate more than those of 
Chengtou bonds. Moreover, we do not observe the same effect of the three governmental 
documents, which is not surprising since they targeted Chengtou bonds. We interpret this finding 
as evidence that POE bonds are not guaranteed by Chinese governments and that their prices are 
therefore more market-driven, i.e., their price movement is affected by market forces only. Finally, 
to facilitate a comparison of the temporal behavior of Chengtou and POE bonds, Figure 5 shows 
the difference in yield spreads between the two bond types.  
[Insert Figures 3, 4, and 5 about here] 
Table 28 provides descriptive statistics for Chengtou and POE bonds. The table shows that 
Chengtou bonds are less risky than corporate bonds issued by POEs, with average yield spreads of 
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220.4 basis points (or 2.204%) and 287.6 basis points (or 2.876%), respectively. The differences 
in both the mean and the median (shown in Panel C) are significant at the 1% level. We interpret 
this finding as univariate evidence for Hypothesis 1, namely that implicit government guarantees 
effectively alleviate the risk of Chinese corporate bonds. In addition, we conclude that - compared 
with more market-oriented POEs - Chengtou bond issuers are less profitable (ROA), larger (Firm 
size), and have fewer liabilities (LEV). With respect to bond-specific characteristics, Chengtou 
bonds tend to have larger issue volumes (Issue size) and longer maturities (Maturity); they are also 
more likely to have an explicit guarantor (Explicit).  
[Insert Table 28 about here] 
Table 29 shows the univariate differences in the yield spreads between different classifications 
of corporate bonds. In Panel A, we classify both Chengtou bonds and POE bonds into four sub-
groups based on credit ratings. Regardless of the credit rating, corporate bonds with an implicit 
government guarantee consistently exhibit lower risk than private companies’ bonds, with the 
differences in both the mean and median being significant at the 1% level. These results further 
corroborate Hypothesis 1. In addition, the difference in the yield spread between Chengtou and 
POE bonds increases with decreasing credit ratings. This indicates that the implicit government 
guarantee is more potent for bond issuers who are more likely to experience financial distress, 
supporting Hypothesis 2.  
Panel B classifies Chengtou and POE bonds based on the province in which the bond issuer is 
located – specifically, Northeast China versus other provinces. The panel shows that both types of 
bonds are riskier when issued in Northeast China. This finding provides univariate support for 
Hypothesis 3. 
[Insert Table 29 about here] 
Before proceeding to our multivariate analysis, we examine the correlation matrix for all 
variables in our sample. The results in Table 30 raise few concerns about potential multicollinearity. 
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[Insert Table 30 about here] 
4.5.2. Implicit Government Guarantees and Bond Yield Spreads 
We first present the results of our regression analysis of Equation (3) to investigate the influence 
of implicit government support on corporate bond yield spreads. We can clearly see from the first 
column of Table 31 that the coefficient of Implicit is negative (-163.58) and statistically significant 
at the 1% level. This indicates that the risk (as captured by the yield spread) of corporate bonds 
with an implicit government guarantee is approximately 1.64% lower than that of bonds without 
such a guarantee. Together with the previous univariate evidence, this implies that our first 
hypothesis is supported: investors attribute lower risk to Chengtou bonds, presumably due to the 
implicit government support they carry. Column 2 includes the interaction term between an implicit 
government guarantee and the bond issuer’s credit rating. The coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level, while the coefficients of both of the base effects (Implicit 
and Rating) are negative. Taken together, these results reveal that for bond issuers with better credit 
ratings, the mitigating effect of implicit government guarantees on corporate bond risk is attenuated. 
Put differently, an implicit government guarantee is more valuable for bond issuers that have a 
higher probability of default, which supports Hypothesis 2. In addition, Columns 3 to 6 provide the 
results for a robustness check of Hypothesis 2 by dividing the sample into four groups according 
to credit rating. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, we find that with a decrease in the credit rating from 
AAA to AA-, the effect of an implicit government guarantee in lowering the yield spread (relative 
to corporate bonds without such a guarantee) increases from 75.39 basis points to 166.85 basis 
points. 
In addition, consistent with the corporate debt literature, we find some statistical evidence that 
bond yield spreads are lower for more profitable firms (ROA), firms with lower leverage (LEV), 
larger firms (Firm size), bonds with higher issue volume (Issue size) and bonds with explicit 
guarantors in the bond prospectus (Explicit). Furthermore, bond risks are positively associated with 
time to maturity (Maturity) and the Yield curve slope, whereas they are negatively associated with 
monetary expansion (M2 growth). Interestingly, for the lowest-rated bonds (AA-) only, leverage is 
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negatively associated with yield spreads. Perhaps for the firms that are most likely to experience 
financial troubles, the existing debt level has a signaling effect for bond investors about the firm’s 
future financial performance (Ross, 1977; Barclay, Smith, and Watts, 1995). Another interesting 
finding is that the GDP growth rate (GDP growth) has a positive sign, suggesting that corporate 
bonds are riskier in provinces with a higher GDP growth rate. A possible explanation is offered by 
Ang, Bai, and Zhou (2016). They demonstrate that provinces with higher GDP growth also have 
higher growth volatility, which is perceived by bond investors as a greater macroeconomic risk.  
[Insert Table 31 about here] 
4.5.3. Regional Effects and Bond Yield Spreads 
Our empirical analysis related to Hypotheses 3 and 4 is provided in Table 32. The coefficient of 
the indicator variable Northeast is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This result 
confirms Hypothesis 3; that is, due to the poor business and economic environment of the three 
provinces of Northeast China, bond investors are more sensitive to risk for bonds issued in this 
region. To test Hypothesis 4, we include the interaction effect of the implicit government guarantee 
and the Northeast dummy. As noted in our hypothesis development, if bond investors feel that the 
governments in Northeast China are not credible, the mitigating effect of the implicit government 
guarantees on bond yields should be weakened by the interaction with Northeast. However, we do 
not observe a significant effect for the interaction term (Column 2). Interestingly, after including 
the interaction effect, the Northeast dummy itself loses significance, whereas the implicit 
government guarantee remains statistically significant. These findings suggest that, contrary to our 
expectations, the effect of implicit government guarantees is not eroded by the poor business 
environment in Northeast China. In other words, bond investors are still confident in the 
governments of the Northeast provinces.  
[Insert Table 32 about here] 
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4.5.4. Document 43 and Bond Yield Spreads 
Next, we perform a DID estimation to examine the impact of an exogenous shock that occurred 
during our sample period, that is, the impact of a crucial document issued by China’s central 
government to limit the influence of implicit government guarantees. The effect of Document 43 
is shown in the first column of Table 33. Surprisingly, we observe a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient for the interaction term Implicit × Post43, suggesting that the mitigating effect 
of the implicit government guarantees on bond yield spreads became even stronger after the 
issuance of Document 43. The magnitude of the interaction coefficient (-19.68) shows that the 
difference in yield spreads between Chengtou and POE bonds increases by almost 20 basis points. 
This finding, which is consistent with Figure 5, indicates that implicit government guarantees are 
perceived to be even more effective after the issuance of Document 43. In a nutshell, this finding 
is seemingly at odds with the Chinese government’s initiative to limit local governments’ implicit 
support for Chengtou bonds, as well as our hypothesis. Logically, if Document 43 was effective in 
reducing investors’ expectations about the implicit government guarantees embedded in Chengtou 
debts, we should observe no significant difference in the yield spreads between Chengtou and POE 
bonds, or at least a reduced gap in the yield spreads between Chengtou and POE bonds after the 
passage of Document 43. The following section aims to resolve this puzzle. 
4.5.5. On the Effectiveness of Document 43 
In an attempt to explain the stronger effect of implicit government guarantees as well as the 
enlarged gap in yield spreads between the two types of corporate bonds following the issuance of 
Document 43, we delve into the existing literature pertaining to China’s Chengtou debts. Chen, He, 
and Liu (2017) argue that it is unclear whether the rules specified in Document 43 have been strictly 
implemented. In addition, they suggest that rules from other regulatory bodies of the Chinese 
government counteracted the effectiveness of Document 43. Specifically, in 2015, the Ministry of 
Finance initiated the “swap program” allowing local government to issue municipal bonds to 
replace some “qualified” debts. Since municipal bonds carry an explicit guarantee from the central 
government, the perceived default risk of Chengtou bonds was greatly reduced. In other words, 
 75 
 
investors in Chengtou bonds believed that some level of implicit government guarantee was still in 
place. This is reflected in the fact that, although the net issuance of “Chengtou” bonds dropped 
from 1.7 trillion Chinese yuan in 2014 to 1.1 trillion in 2015, it rebounded to 1.5 trillion in 2016 
(Chen, He, and Liu, 2017). Clarke (2016) further explains why “Chengtou” bonds were viewed as 
safer rather than riskier following the issuance of Document 43. He notes that in order to cope with 
the economic slowdown during that time, three government departments jointly issued Document 
40, which was widely viewed by the public as reversing the original policies specified in the 
previously issued Document 43. Document 40 states the following: “local financing firms can 
continue to get loans from banks to fund ongoing projects. If the local firms have trouble repaying 
their bank debts, their loan contracts should be renegotiated and extended” (Clarke, 2016, pp. 19). 
Clarke’s (2016) observation is consistent with a report from the Wall Street Journal, which stated 
that the Chinese authorities announced their intention to relax some of the limits on the capability 
of local governments to raise funds through their LGFVs (Wall Street Journal, 2015). The move 
restored a back door that was closed by Document 43. In effect, China resorted to greater stimulus 
measures to meet its economic development targets while compromising its initiative to clean up 
the runaway local Chengtou debts (Wall Street Journal, 2015). Alongside these regulatory changes, 
China’s corporate-bond market experienced a large number of defaults, mostly for POE bonds (see 
Schweizer, Walker, and Zhang, 2017). The first corporate bond default, which involved a bond 
issued by a POE, is reported to have taken place in 2014 (Sohu Finance, 2018). Thereafter, the 
default risk of corporate bonds increased drastically, with 59 defaults reported between 2014 and 
2016, of which 48 involved POEs (Sohu Finance, 2018). In summary, these events help explain 
why the gap in yield spreads between Chengtou and POE bonds increased after Document 43 was 
issued. 
4.5.6. The Effects of Document 88 and 50 
In contrast to Document 43, Columns 2 and 3 in Table 33 show that Documents 88 and 50 were 
effective in reducing the influence of implicit government guarantees on bond yield spreads. The 
interaction terms Implicit × Post88 and Implicit × Post50 are positive (17.34 and 21.71, respectively) 
and are statistically significant at the 5% level or better. These results indicate that the Chinese 
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authorities’ ongoing efforts to curtail local governments’ support for their LGFVs were successful. 
Although implicit government guarantees for Chengtou bonds are still in place, we can see the 
general trend that the yield spreads of Chengtou and POE bonds are converging. The gap in the 
yield spreads between Chengtou and POE bonds significantly mitigated following the initiatives 
of the Chinese government. 
[Insert Table 33 about here] 
4.6.  Further Analysis 
To further investigate the value of implicit government guarantees carried by Chengtou bonds, 
we test whether the effectiveness of these guarantees exhibits variations across different levels of 
the Chinese government. According to Wu and Feng (2014), local government debt financing not 
only has a long history in China that goes back to 1979, but is also widespread across all levels of 
local governments.39 Similarly, the existing literature reveals that the debt financing of LGFVs 
varies significantly across different administrative levels of China’s local governments. Ambrose, 
Deng, and Wu (2015) show that higher administrative levels of local governments are more active 
in debt financing, with larger issue volume and shorter issue intervals. Moreover, their study 
suggests that the risk premium of the bonds issued by LGFVs is significantly associated with the 
administrative levels of local governments. Specifically, bonds issued by lower administrative 
levels have higher yield spreads. They reason that the localities of higher administrative levels have 
better economic conditions and that companies in these areas enjoy a more promising business 
environment, and thus investors price less risk into bonds issued by their LGFVs. At the same time, 
they find that investors’ risk sensitivity for POE bonds is unaffected by administrative levels. 
Instead, the yield spreads of POE bonds depends more on the issuers’ accounting performance.  
Based on Ambrose, Deng, and Wu’s (2015) findings, we argue that the value of implicit 
                                                     
39 According to China’s governance structure, local governments are divided into five levels. They are provincial-level 
(municipalities) governments, sub-provincial-level governments, city-level governments, prefecture-level 




government guarantees perceived by bond investors is different for Chengtou bonds issued by 
different level governments. Because cities that house higher administrative levels of government 
tend to have better economic conditions and business environments, investors would expect 
Chengtou bonds issued by the LGFVs at a higher administrative level to be less likely to default 
and price less risk into the bonds’ risk premiums. For instance, municipalities (provincial-level 
cities) are of the highest administrative level among all localities, and in turn the Chengtou bonds 
issued by municipalities’ LGFVs should have the lowest yield spreads, compared to Chengtou 
bonds issued by LGFVs in other administrative level cities. Therefore, implicit government 
guarantees are not valuable for such bonds as bond investors would assume these bonds to have 
stable cash flows and a lower default risk. With a low likelihood of financial distress, the 
expectation of government bail-outs is low. On the contrary, LGFVs in lower administrative level 
cities operate in a riskier business environment and thus their Chengtou bonds should have a higher 
probability of default. As a result, investors’ bail-out expectations would be higher, making the 
implicit government guarantees more valuable for Chengtou bonds issued by LGFVs with lower 
administrative levels. Based on the above arguments, we hypothesize that the mitigating effect of 
implicit government guarantees on Chengtou bond yield spreads increases as the issuer city’s 
administrative level decreases. 
To test our hypothesis pertaining to local governments’ administrative level, we create an 
indicator variable (Level) which ranges from 4 to 1, with 4 indicating that the bond issuer is located 
in a provincial-level city, 3 for issuers in sub-provincial-level cities, 2 for issuers in city-level cities, 
and 1 for issuers in prefecture-level cities40. Our main interest is the interaction term between 
Implicit and Level. If implicit government guarantees are most valuable for issuers in prefecture-
level cities and least important for those in municipalities (provincial-level cities), we should 
observe a positive coefficient for the interaction term. 
                                                     
40 Please note that we only assign four values for the indicator variable measuring local governments’ administrative 
level because in our sample, the lowest administrative level cities in which bond issuers are located are prefecture-
level.   
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Our empirical results are presented in Table 34. As we can see, the effect of local governments’ 
administrative level on yield spreads is negative (Column 1) and this base effect remains negative 
after including the interaction term (Column 2). This finding is consistent with that of Ambrose, 
Deng, and Wu (2015): corporate bonds issued in lower level administrative cities are riskier for 
bond investors. Most importantly, the positive coefficient on the interaction term between Implicit 
and Level on yield spreads confirms our hypothesis that implicit government guarantees are more 
desirable for Chengtou bonds issued by LGFVs in lower administrative level cities, as these bond 
issuers face a higher probability of financial turmoil and in turn government bail-outs are more 
useful. This result also provides a marginal contribution by complementing the findings of 
Ambrose, Deng, and Wu (2015). In their study, they find that the administrative level of local 
governments is only related to the yield spreads of LGFV bonds, but not that of POE bonds. 
Arguably, we provide a more convincing explanation for the implicit government guarantees 
carried by LGFV bonds. We argue that it is the embedded government guarantees in Chengtou 
bonds that make the yield spreads correlate to local governments’ administrative level. However, 
POE bonds do not carry such implicit support from local governments. This is why their yield 
spreads depend more on market forces. 
[Insert Table 34 about here] 
We suspect that the administrative level of local governments may measure the same thing as 
credit ratings do. If bond issuers in lower administrative level cities have a higher probability of 
default, they may in turn have lower credit ratings. Therefore, the administrative level indicator 
variable may be highly correlated with credit ratings. As a robustness check, we thus measure the 
pairwise correlation coefficient between our credit rating and administrative level variables. Our 
analysis reveals a correlation coefficient of only 0.315. We consequently rule out this concern.  
In another robustness test, we include the interaction effect between implicit government 
guarantees and local governments’ administrative levels into our DID regression analysis. We 
generally find similar results as in our previous DID analysis.  
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[Insert Table 35 about here] 
5. Conclusions 
The first essay investigates the factors that affect the likelihood and consequences (in terms of 
firm performance) of cross-border M&A transactions by Chinese POEs. Using a sample of 1,782 
privately owned and publicly listed firms in China over the 2007-2016 period, we find strong 
empirical evidence that politically connected POEs have a greater chance of expanding their 
operations internationally through cross-border M&A activities than POEs without such 
connections. This is in line with the first part of our political connection trade-off theory, namely 
that politically connected top managers are more motivated to carry out cross-border M&A deals 
than their unconnected counterparts and are in a better position to handle the logistics. Our results 
hold after accounting for the potentially endogenous relationship between political connections and 
Chinese POEs’ global expansion and after controlling for ownership-level political connections. 
However, we find at most weak support for the notion that sounder corporate governance increases 
a POE’s probability of completing a cross border M&A deal. 
Finally, with respect to Chinese POEs’ performance after announcing and completing a cross 
border M&A deal, our results are consistent with the second part of our political connection trade-
off theory. We find that the average announcement returns of cross-border M&A deals are lower 
for POEs in which the top managers are politically connected. We further show that accounting 
performance (measured by ROE) in the three-year period after deal completion is poorer for 
connected than for unconnected POEs. These findings provide empirical support for the anecdotal 
evidence (reported in the news) that top managers with political connections might be pursuing a 
political agenda and thereby create a moral hazard conflict at the expense of shareholder value.  
Overall, our empirical analysis supports the notion that for emerging markets, the institutional 
environment affects POEs’ decisions to become acquisitive in foreign markets. Specifically, it 
highlights the crucial role played by political connections in China in facilitating POEs’ outbound 
FDI. When operating in an institutional environment that features excessive favoritism toward 
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SOEs, building political ties can be an effective way of overcoming market discrimination and 
obtaining state-controlled financial resources. In other words, establishing political connections 
allows Chinese POEs to receive preferential treatment from the Chinese government in completing 
the financial and bureaucratic activities necessary for successful cross-border M&A (for example, 
obtaining credit from state-owned banks, obtaining tax rebates, and simplifying the tedious and 
complex “going global” approval process). However, this may come at the cost of politically 
connected top managers overweighing their objective to create political capital while ignoring 
shareholder interests. In sum, the outcomes of this study are as expected under the political 
connection trade-off theory.  
In the second essay, we examine how political connections can affect a Chinese POE’s likelihood 
of issuing corporate bonds. We hypothesize that political connections can facilitate corporate bond 
issuance because the state remains the ultimate controller of financial resources, as illustrated by 
the fact that it shows favoritism toward SOEs in the allocation of capital.  
Using a sample of 1,546 Chinese-listed POEs over the 2007-2016 period, we find supporting 
evidence for our prediction. The likelihood of issuing corporate bonds is significantly higher for 
POEs with political connections. This result is robust and holds after we control for other potential 
problems, such as the endogenous relationship between political connections and corporate bond 
issuance. Moreover, we provide empirical evidence that political connections play a role in 
influencing the debt-financing decisions of Chinese POEs. In comparison to their non-connected 
counterparts, politically-connected POEs are significantly more likely to choose public debt over 
private bank debt. 
In addition, we further examine the link between political connections and the financing costs 
of corporate bond-issuing POEs. Our empirical results are consistent with the notion that 
politically-connected Chinese POEs are able to place their corporate bonds at a lower coupon rate. 
This suggests that they can capitalize on their political ties because their bondholders are, to a large 
extent, state-owned banks.  
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We also examine the market’s reaction to corporate bond issuance announcements by POEs. Our 
empirical results show that the stock returns of politically-connected issuers around the 
announcements exceed those of non-connected issuers by 1.2 percentage points. This result 
indicates that investors view political connections as a positive signal of firm quality, because such 
connections can help privately-owned companies acquire additional financing resources at lower 
costs in an institutional environment that exhibits strong favoritism toward state-owned companies.  
Surprisingly, we find that corporate bond-issuing POEs actually have a higher probability of 
experiencing a bankruptcy than either POEs without debt issuance or those choosing private bank 
debt. This is counterintuitive to the general notion that firms with higher default probabilities tend 
to borrow from the private debt market due to its renegotiation feature. This finding is as 
unexpected as the negative corporate yield spread detected by Luo, Ye, and Hu (2016). Given the 
significant number of recent corporate bond defaults and the worries of foreign investors about the 
murkiness of the corporate bond market in China, it is possible that the “misuse” of political 
connections has partly contributed to the recent problems regarding corporate bond defaults and to 
the worries of foreign investors about investing in China. We argue that political factors distort the 
market forces of the corporate bond market by bringing less qualified companies to the public debt 
market. Ultimately, such unqualified issuers will be penalized by the market.  
In summary, our empirical results show that political connections are a key determinant for POEs 
that are considering a corporate bond issue in China. Furthermore, they indicate that debt financing 
in China is not purely driven by financial or corporate governance factors. This study is one of few 
that highlights the influence of political connections on a firm’s financing decisions, and, to the 
best to our knowledge, is the first to consider the interplay between corporate governance and 
political connections. Our findings show that the likelihood of POEs issuing corporate bonds is 
highest when top management is politically well-connected, the firm’s corporate governance 
standards are comparatively low, and there is a higher probability of bankruptcy. Thus, we find that 
political ties appear to be most valuable in an environment with low corporate governance 
standards. Our study has practical implications for Chinese policymakers and POEs. Although 
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Chinese authorities have recognized that an underdeveloped corporate bond market severely 
hinders the development of the Chinese economy, they may have underestimated the negative 
consequences of political intervention. The considerable favoritism toward politically well-
connected POEs has the potential to not only economically misallocate the state’s financial 
resources, but also to greatly discourage foreign investors from participating in China’s corporate 
bond market. 
Although our event study shows that political connections can, in the short term, add value to 
firms, if political ties, rather than sound financial performance, continue to be a key determinant 
for issuing corporate bonds, then credit risk cannot be effectively or accurately priced. Under this 
scenario, the corporate bond markets will most likely fail to solve the financing constraints faced 
by (in particular mid-cap) enterprises. Presumably, this will have a negative effect on the 
sustainable growth of China’s corporate bond market and its overall economy. In this context, Gu 
and Kowalewski (2016) find that countries with strong creditor rights protection and better 
information disclosure have a better developed corporate bond market.  
Thus, Chinese policymakers should work on improving the transparency of the corporate bond 
market, with an eye toward establishing an effective and trustworthy bond rating system. Similarly, 
the top management of POEs should focus on establishing sound corporate governance policies 
and on disclosing reliable and sufficient information to their bond investors. 
In the third essay, we investigate how implicit government guarantees influence bond specific 
risks for publicly traded corporate bonds in China. We hypothesize that because quasi-municipal 
corporate bonds (known as “Chengtou” bonds) are issued by local government financing vehicles 
(LGFVs), they are perceived to carry an implicit government guarantee that can effectively mitigate 
the perceived risk of these bonds. LGFVs are corporations that have limited liabilities, with local 
government and state-owned entities being the sole or dominant shareholders. By measuring 
corporate bond risk in terms of the trading yield spread, we find strong empirical evidence that 
corporate bonds with implicit government guarantees are significantly less risky than bonds issued 
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by privately-owned enterprises (POEs). Moreover, our analysis shows that the implicit government 
guarantee is most effective in reducing risk for bonds with the highest likelihood of default. In 
addition, we demonstrate that the risk of Chinese corporate bonds is affected by local business and 
economic conditions. In Northeast China, a region with significantly poorer financial conditions 
and lower economic development than the rest of the country, bond issuers tend to compensate 
bond investors with higher bond yields, implying that bond issuers in Northeast China are 
perceived as significantly riskier. However, the implicit support from the governments in Northeast 
China is still effective in lowering bond yield spreads. Furthermore, we verify whether the 
effectiveness of implicit government guarantees carried by LGFV bonds varies across different 
administrative levels of local government. Our results demonstrate that the expected government 
support is most valuable for bonds issued in the lowest administrative level cities because such 
issuers have the highest expectation of financial distress. Conversely, for issuers in Chinese 
municipalities (the highest administrative level) with the lowest likelihood of bond defaults, the 
value of expected government bail-outs turns out to be the lowest.  
A further goal of this study is to examine the effect of three exogenous shocks (the issuance of 
Documents 43, 88, and 50 by China’s central authorities) on corporate bond yield spreads. Our 
difference-in-differences analysis reveals that Document 43 does not appear to alter investors’ 
beliefs regarding the implicit government guarantee embedded in quasi-municipal corporate bonds. 
In fact, after the issuance of Document 43, investors consider Chengtou bonds to be even safer. 
Since Document 43 did not achieve the Chinese authorities’ goals, two more documents 
(Documents 88 and 50) were subsequently developed to rein in LGFVs’ debt financing activities. 
We find that after the issuance of each of these Documents, the influence of the implicit government 
guarantee is reduced and the gap in bond yield spreads between Chengtou and POE bonds 
significantly decreases. In summary, the recent policies aiming to void government guarantees on 
corporate debts imply that China’s corporate bond markets are moving toward market-oriented 
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Figure 1: Bank Loan Volume of POEs before and after Cross-border M&A Transactions 
This figure shows the mean bank loan volume (in million Chinese Yuan) POEs receive before and after the completion 
of a cross-border merger or acquisition (CBMA), based on 203 observations for which bank loan data are available in 
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Figure 2: Debt Financing Activities by POEs 
This figure displays the number of bond issues and bank loans obtained by Chinese POEs per year between January 







Figure 3: The Yield Spread of Chengtou Bonds 
 
This figure shows the dynamic behavior of the yield spreads of all Chengtou bonds in our sample from 2010 to 
2017, classified according to the credit rating of the bond issuer. Yield spreads (unit: bp = basis points) are 








Figure 4: The Yield Spread of POE Bonds 
 
This figure shows the dynamic behavior of the yield spreads of all POE bonds in our sample from 2010 to 2017, 
classified according to the credit rating of the bond issuer. Yield spreads are calculated as the difference in yields 







Figure 5: Differences in the Yield Spread between Chengtou and POE Bonds 
 
This figure shows the dynamic behavior of the difference in yield spreads between Chengtou and POE bonds 










Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Panel A: Independent Variables 
 
(continued)  
Variable Definition Source 
CBMA  Dummy variable that equals 1 when a POE is an 
acquiring POE and 0 otherwise. Specifically, the dummy 
variable equals 1 if a given POE conducts a cross-border 
M&A in a given year, and 0 otherwise.  
CSMAR: China Listed Firms’ 
Merger & Acquisition, Asset 
Restructuring Research Database  
Connection Dummy variable that equals 1 if the chairman or CEO is 
currently working or has worked in a central or local 
government department, the military, the People's 
Congress (PC), the People’s Court and Procuratorate, or 
the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC), and 0 otherwise. 
http://www.stockstar.com/ 
PC Index Political connection measure that equals 3 if the 
politically connected chairman or CEO is the head of a 
government department or the head or a standing member 
of the PC or CPPCC, 2 if (s)he is a member of the PC or 
CPPCC, 1 if (s)he is an officer of a local government 




Percentage of ownership for the largest politically-
connected blockholder in a POE, if said ownership is at 
least 10%. The blockholder is considered to be politically 
connected if (s)he is currently working (or has worked) in 
a central or local government department, the military, the 
People’s Congress (PC), the People’s Court and 
Procuratorate, or the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC). The blockholder is 
also considered politically connected if it is a state entity. 
In addition, this blockholder cannot be the chairman/CEO 
at the same time. Otherwise, the variable is 0.  
http://www.stockstar.com/ 
CSMAR: China Listed Firms’ 




Dummy variable that equals 1 if more than one 
blockholder is politically connected and 0 otherwise. In 
addition, these blockholders cannot be the chairman/CEO 
at the same time. 
http://www.stockstar.com/ 
CSMAR: China Listed Firms’ 
Corporate Governance Research 
Database 
ROA Net income over the value of total assets. CSMAR: China Stock Market 
Financial Statements Database 
ROE Net income over the book value of total shareholders’ 
equity. 
CSMAR: China Stock Market 
Financial Statements Database 
Leverage Book value of total liabilities over the book value of total 
assets. 
CSMAR: China Stock Market 
Financial Statements Database 
Firm Size Logarithm of the book value of total assets. CSMAR: China Stock Market 
Financial Statements Database 
Tobin’s q Sum of the market value of equity and the book value of 
debt over the sum of the book value of equity and the 
book value of debt. 
CSMAR: China Stock Market 
Financial Statements Database 
Tangibility Net fixed assets over the value of total assets. CSMAR: China Stock Market 






Variable Definition Source 
CAAR Cumulative Average Abnormal Return calculated using a 
one-factor market model (the return on the value-
weighted Shanghai and Shenzhen Composite Index) over 
the event window (-1, 1) 
CSMAR: China Stock Market 
Trading Database 
CAR Cumulative Abnormal Return calculated using a one-
factor market model (the return on the value-weighted 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Composite Index) over the event 
window (-1, 1) 
CSMAR: China Stock Market 
Trading Database 
Hofstede Bilateral difference in the sum of Hofstede’s six-
dimensional national culture index between China and the 





CEPII’s distances measure: Bilateral distances weighted 
by the share of the city’s population in the overall 
country’s population between the biggest city of China 
and the biggest city of the country in which the target 
firm is located 





Dummy variable that equals 1 if an acquiring POE 
completes more than one cross-border M&A, and 0 
otherwise. 
CSMAR: China Listed Firms’ 
Merger & Acquisition, Asset 
Restructuring Research Database 
Deal Size Logarithm of the appraised value of the target firm. CSMAR: China Listed Firms’ 
Merger & Acquisition, Asset 
Restructuring Research Database 
Public Target Dummy variable that equals 1 if the target firm is a public 
listed company, and 0 otherwise. 
CSMAR: China Listed Firms’ 
Merger & Acquisition, Asset 
Restructuring Research Database 
All Cash Deal Dummy variable that equals 1 if the cross-border M&A is 
paid with cash only, and 0 otherwise. 
CSMAR: China Listed Firms’ 
Merger & Acquisition, Asset 
Restructuring Research Database 
All Stock 
Deal 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the cross-border M&A is 
paid with stock only, and 0 otherwise. 
CSMAR: China Listed Firms’ 
Merger & Acquisition, Asset 
Restructuring Research Database 
Common 
Law 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the target firm is located 
in a country that applies common law, and 0 otherwise. 
CSMAR: China Listed Firms’ 
Merger & Acquisition, Asset 
Restructuring Research Database 
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Panel B: The Corporate Governance Index 
The Corporate Governance Index is constructed as in Schweizer, Walker, and Zhang (2016) and reflects the sum of 
the nine governance mechanisms described below. 
 
Gov Indexi,t = ∑ 𝐆𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞 𝐌𝐞𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐧𝐢𝐬𝐦𝟗𝐣=𝟏 j 
Governance 
Mechanism 
Definition Measurement and Supporting Literature 
Chairman age Age of the company’s chairman Equals 1 if the age of the chairman of firm i in fiscal 
year t is less than the mean value of the sample in 
fiscal year t, and 0 otherwise (Waelchli and Zeller, 
2013; Jiang and Kim, 2015).41 
Chairman tenure Number of years the company’s 
chairman has been in office 
Equals 1 if the tenure of the chairman of firm i in 
fiscal year t is less than the mean value of the sample 
in fiscal year t, and 0 otherwise (Berger, Ofek, and 
Yermack, 1997; Jiang and Kim, 2015). 
Board size Number of directors on the board 
of directors 
Equals 1 if the board size of firm i in fiscal year t is 
less than the mean value of the sample in fiscal year 
t, and 0 otherwise (Yermack, 1996; Conyon and 
Peck, 1998; Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999). 
Board independence Number of independent directors 
on the board of directors 
 
Equals 1 if the number of independent directors on 
the board of firm i in fiscal year t is greater than the 
mean value of the sample in fiscal year t, and 0 
otherwise (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Kim, 
Kitsabunnarat-Chatjuthamard, and Nofsinger, 2007). 
Board meeting Number of annual meetings of 
the board of directors 
Equals 1 if the number of annual meetings of the 
board of directors of firm i in fiscal year t is less than 
the mean value of the sample in fiscal year t, and 0 
otherwise (Vafeas, 1999; Yi, Yu, and Jiang, 2011). 
Supervisory board 
size 
Number of supervisors on the 
supervisory board 
Equals 1 if the number of supervisors on the 
supervisory board of firm i in fiscal year t is greater 
than the mean value of the sample in fiscal year t, 
and 0 otherwise (Firth et al., 2007; Ding et al., 2010; 
Jia et al., 2009). 
Ownership 
concentration 
Percentage of shares held by the 
company’s largest shareholder 
Equals 1 if the percentage of shares held by the 
company’s largest shareholder of firm i in fiscal year 
t is greater than the mean value of the sample in 
fiscal year t, and 0 otherwise (Stiglitz, 1985; Rediker 
and Seth, 1995; Voulgaris, Stathopoulos, and 
Walker, 2010; Huang et al., 2011). 
Foreign auditor Hiring of a foreign auditor Equals 1 if firm i hires a foreign auditor in fiscal year 
t, and 0 otherwise (Gao and Kling, 2008; Peng, Wei, 
and Yang, 2011). 
State shares State shares account for at least 
5% of the firm’s total shares  
Equals 0 if the state holds more than 5% of the 
shares in firm i in fiscal year t, and 1 otherwise 
(Bloom et al., 2012; Jiang, Huang, and Kim, 2013). 
                                                     
41 As Jiang and Kim (2015, pp 209) point out, using chairman age and tenure for constructing the corporate governance 
index for Chinese companies is appropriate because “the actual person who is actively in charge of the business is not 
the CEO. It is the board chairperson who actively controls and runs the firm. In China, this is common knowledge. 
However, based on the academic literature, it seems that many scholars are unaware of this.” 
 110 
 
Table 2: Overview of Cross-border M&A Transactions by Chinese POEs  
Panel A of this table reports the number of Chinese POEs completing a cross-border M&A transaction for the first 
time by year, along with percentages, between 2007 and 2016. Chinese POE data are retrieved from the CSMAR 





Year Number of Acquiring POEs Percentage (%) 
2007 12 4.17 
2008 12 4.17 
2009 13 4.51 
2010 22 7.64 
2011 32 11.11 
2012 42 14.58 
2013 32 11.11 
2014 28 9.72 
2015 62 21.53 
2016  33 11.46 




Number of Completed 
Cross-border M&A Deals 
Number of POEs Percentage (%) 
1 219 76.04 
2 52 18.06 
3 10 3.47 
4 5 1.74 
5 1 0.35 
7 1 0.35 
Total 288 100.00 
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Table 3: Locations of the Targets Acquired by POEs 
Distribution of target countries for Chinese POEs operating as acquiring POEs between 2007 and 2016.  
 


























New Zealand 1 






South Africa 1 





United Kingdom 22 
United States 92 
Uruguay 2 
Vietnam 1 




Table 4: Summary Statistics for all POEs 
This table reports summary statistics (mean, median, standard deviation, 25% and 75% quantiles, and the number of 
firm-year observations, N) for all sample variables for non-acquiring POEs (Panel A) and acquiring POEs (Panel B) 
between 2007 and 2016. All variable definitions are as in Panel A of Table 1. Panel C reports the pairwise differences 
in means (t-test) and medians (Wilcoxon test) of the variables between acquiring and non-acquiring POEs. Related p-
values are shown to the right in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75% N 
Panel A: Non-acquiring POEs 
Connection 0.291 0.000 0.454 0.000 1.000 7,975 
PC Index 0.633 0.000 1.050 0.000 1.000 7,975 
LBH Connection 0.025 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.000 7,975 
Multi BH Connections 0.012 0.000 0.109 0.000 0.000 7,975 
Gov Index 3.337 3.000 1.213 3.000 4.000 7,975 
ROA 0.044 0.043 0.052 0.017 0.072 7,975 
Leverage 0.392 0.379 0.207 0.221 0.547 7,975 
Firm Size 21.345 21.235 0.915 20.679 21.911 7,975 
Tobin’s q 2.941 2.383 1.729 1.693 3.697 7,975 
Tangibility 0.204 0.179 0.142 0.094 0.290 7,975 
Panel B: Acquiring POEs 
Connection 0.405 0.000 0.492 0.000 1.000 385 
PC Index 0.901 0.000 1.164 0.000 2.000 385 
LBH Connection 0.017 0.000 0.083 0.000 0.000 385 
Multi BH Connections 0.003 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.000 385 
Gov Index 3.397 3.000 1.182 3.000 4.000 385 
ROA 0.056 0.051 0.055 0.026 0.081 385 
Leverage 0.390 0.399 0.206 0.215 0.540 385 
Firm Size 21.770 21.629 1.065 21.045 22.415 385 
Tobin’s q 2.879 2.284 2.360 1.616 3.251 385 
Tangibility 0.208 0.182 0.142 0.094 0.306 385 
Panel C: Differences Differences in Means Differences in Medians   
Connection -0.1114*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000)   
PC Index -0.268*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000)   
LBH Connection 0.009* (0.064) 0.000*** (0.006)   
Multi BH Connections 0.009* (0.091) 0.000* (0.091)   
Gov Index -0.060 (0.343) 0.000 (0.239)   
ROA -0.011*** (0.000) -0.008*** (0.000)   
Leverage 0.003 (0.816) -0.020 (0.902)   
Firm Size -0.425*** (0.000) -0.394*** (0.000)   
Tobin’s q 0.062 (0.498) 0.099** (0.024)   




Table 5: Correlation Matrices 
This table reports the correlation coefficients between our sample variables for all POEs (Panel A) and for our subset of acquiring POEs (Panel B) between 2007 and 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) CBMA 1.000           
(2) Connection 0.052*** 1.000          
(3) PC Index 0.053*** 0.938*** 1.000         
(4) LBH Connection -0.020 -0.056*** -0.073*** 1.000        
(5) Multi BH Connections -0.018 0.018 -0.006 0.317*** 1.000       
(6) Gov Index 0.010 -0.066*** -0.059*** -0.022* 0.003 1.000      
(7) ROA 0.046*** 0.042*** 0.060*** -0.058*** -0.006 0.001 1.000     
(8) Leverage -0.003 0.058*** 0.038*** 0.155*** 0.060*** -0.035** -0.355*** 1.000    
(9) Firm Size 0.096*** 0.154*** 0.145*** 0.038*** 0.033** -0.046*** 0.058*** 0.396*** 1.000   
(10) Tobin’s q -0.007 -0.076*** -0.066*** -0.051*** -0.031** 0.063*** 0.250*** -0.299*** -0.335*** 1.000  




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
(1) CAR 1.00                 
(2) Connection -0.13 1.00                
(3) PC Index -0.13 0.94*** 1.00               
(4) Gov Index -0.02 0.02 0.08 1.00              
(5) Hofstede 0.01 -0.08 -0.10 0.04 1.000             
(6) Culture Distance -0.02 0.07 0.14* 0.01 -0.48*** 1.00            
(7) Multi Acquirer 0.03 0.09 0.00 -0.15* 0.10 -0.11 1.00           
(8) Deal Size 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.08 -0.06 0.03 0.06 1.00          
(9) Public Target -0.080 0.14* 0.11 -0.00 -0.07 -0.02 0.04 0.03 1.00         
(10) All_Cash Deal 0.12 -0.12 -0.09 -0.05 0.06 0.03 -0.08 -0.07 0.01 1.00        
(11) All Stock Deal -0.06 0.08 0.06 0.04 -0.09 -0.07 0.14* 0.09 -0.01 -0.71*** 1.00       
(12) Common Law -0.07 -0.13 -0.10 0.07 -0.43*** 0.50*** -0.07 0.00 0.05 -0.00 -0.07 1.00      
(13) ROA 0.08 -0.12 -0.08 -0.09 -0.11 0.10 -0.03 -0.05 -0.00 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 1.00     
(14) Leverage 0.00 0.19** 0.14* -0.05 0.07 -0.08 0.17* 0.13 -0.04 -0.10 0.02 -0.07 -0.36*** 1.00    
(15) Firm Size 0.03 0.23*** 0.20** -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.09 -0.02 0.08 -0.07 -0.18* 0.54*** 1.00   
(16) Tobin’s q 0.04 -0.09 -0.03 0.05 -0.08 0.10 -0.07 -0.13 0.03 0.07 -0.05 0.07 0.41*** -0.39*** -0.29*** 1.00  




Table 6: The Effect of Political Influence on Becoming Acquisitive  
Results of a panel logit regression analysis for Chinese acquiring and non- acquiring POEs between 2007 
and 2016. Chinese acquiring POEs are defined as those with at least one cross-border M&A transaction 
within the sample period. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the POE completes 
a cross-border M&A deal in a given year, and 0 otherwise. See equation (1) for details. Column (1) 
reports the results using Connection as a proxy for political connections; column (2) uses the PC Index 
as a measure for political connections. We report coefficient estimates with p-values in parentheses below. 
Industry and Year Fixed Effects are included in both regressions. In the last two rows, we report the 
maximum and mean variance inflation factors (VIF). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) 
Connection 1.474***  
 (0.000)  
PC Index  0.557*** 
  (0.008) 
Gov Index 0.029 0.027 
 (0.624) (0.651) 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 9,946 9,946 
Max VIF 1.46 1.46 





Table 7: Propensity Score Matching 
This table reports the results of a propensity score matching (PSM) routine for acquiring and non- 
acquiring Chinese POEs from 2007 to 2016. We match firms using a nearest neighbor propensity score 
matching algorithm and an array of firm-specific characteristics (ROA, Leverage, Firm Size, Tobin’s q, 
Tangibility) in the year the POE completes its cross-border deal. Panel A reports the univariate balanced 
test results for pairs of treatment and control firms after matching. Panel B reports parameter estimates 
for the probit model used in estimating the propensity scores of the treated and control groups (where the 
treatment is a cross-border acquisition). We match firms in the year before completing a cross-border 
M&A deal with non-acquiring POEs. The “Pre-Match” column contains the parameter estimates of the 
probit model estimated using the sample prior to matching. These estimates are then used to generate the 
propensity scores for matching acquiring and non-acquiring POEs. The “Post-Match” column contains 
the parameter estimates of the probit model estimated using the subsample of matched treatment-control 
pairs after matching. We match firms using a one-to-one nearest neighbor propensity score matching, 
without replacement. Definitions for all variables are provided in Panel A of Table 1. Industry and Year 
Fixed Effects are included in both regressions in Panel B. We report coefficient estimates with p-values 
in parentheses below. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A Control Treatment Diff. p-value 
ROA 0.059 0.056 0.003 0.407 
Leverage 0.393 0.390 0.003 0.839 
Firm Size 21.799 21.770 0.029 0.697 
Tobin’s q 3.028 2.879 0.149 0.332 
Tangibility 0.205 0.208 -0.003 0.790 
  
Panel B Pre-Match Post-Match 
ROA 0.783 -0.545 
 (0.170) (0.592) 
Leverage -0.356** -0.027 
 (0.030) (0.929) 
Firm Size 0.303*** -0.022 
 (0.000) (0.711) 
Tobin’s q 0.033* -0.022 
 (0.059) (0.417) 
Tangibility 0.234 -0.025 
 (0.244) (0.947) 
Constant -8.125*** 0.583 
 (0.000) (0.649) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 8,360 770 
Pseudo R2 0.047 0.007 
P-value of χ2 <0.001 1.000 
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Table 8: The Effect of Political Influence on Becoming Acquisitive—A Cross-
sectional Analysis 
This table reports the results of a post-matching logit regression analysis for Chinese acquiring and non-
acquiring POEs between 2007 and 2016. Acquiring POEs are defined as those with at least one cross-
border M&A transaction within the sample period. Non-acquiring companies are the one-to-one nearest 
neighbors as defined in Table 6. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the POE 
completes a cross-border M&A deal in a given year, and 0 otherwise. See equation (1) for details. 
Columns (1) and (2) report the post-matching results using all cross-border deals; columns (3) and (4) 
report the post-matching results considering only the first cross-border deals for each acquiring POE. We 
report coefficient estimates with p-values in parentheses below. p-values are calculated using the 
clustered standard errors at the firm level for Columns (1) and (2). p-values are based on robust standard 
errors for columns (3) and (4). Industry and Year Fixed Effects are included in all regressions. In the last 
two rows, we report the maximum and mean variance inflation factors (VIF). ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Connection 0.472**  0.432**  
 (0.016)  (0.021)  
PC Index  0.185**  0.188** 
  (0.026)  (0.018) 
Gov Index 0.125* 0.121* 0.144** 0.142* 
 (0.067) (0.075) (0.048) (0.051) 
Constant 0.946 0.942 -0.508 -0.457 
 (0.696) (0.698) (0.840) (0.855) 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 770 770 576 576 
Pseudo R2 0.018 0.017 0.032 0.032 
Max VIF 1.61 1.61 1.56 1.56 





Table 9: Propensity Score Matching—A Quasi Experiment 
This table reports the result of propensity score matching (PSM) for Chinese acquiring and non-acquiring 
POEs from 2007 to 2016. We match firms using a nearest neighbor propensity score matching algorithm 
and an array of firm-specific characteristics (ROA, Leverage, Firm Size, Tobin’s q, Tangibility) plus the 
PC Index in the year before the acquiring POE completes its first cross-border merger. Panel A reports 
the univariate balanced test results for pairs of treatment and control firms after matching. Panel B reports 
parameter estimates for the probit model used in estimating the propensity scores of the treated and 
control groups (where the treatment is a cross-border M&A). We match firms in the year before 
completing a cross-border M&A transaction with non-acquiring POEs. The “Pre-Match” column 
contains the parameter estimates of the probit model estimated using the sample prior to matching. These 
estimates are then used to generate the propensity scores for matching acquiring and non-acquiring POEs. 
The “Post-Match” column contains the parameter estimates of the probit model estimated using the 
subsample of matched treatment-control pairs after matching. We match firms using a one-to-one nearest 
neighbor propensity score matching, without replacement. Definitions for all variables are provided in 
Panel A of Table 1. Industry and Year Fixed Effects are included in both regressions in Panel B. We 
report coefficient estimates with p-values in parentheses below. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A Control Treatment Diff. p-value 
PC Index 0.889 0.872 0.017 0.860 
ROA 0.057 0.058 -0.001 0.858 
Leverage 0.374 0.374 0.000 0.983 
Firm Size 21.601 21.601 0.000 0.995 
Tobin’s q 2.791 2.958 -0.167 0.346 
Tangibility 0.210 0.205 0.005 0.674 
  
Panel B Pre-Match Post-Match 
PC Index 0.067*** 0.003 
 (0.006) (0.943) 
ROA 1.087* -0.104 
 (0.086) (0.929) 
Leverage -0.338* 0.082 
 (0.062) (0.822) 
Firm Size 0.197*** -0.009 
 (0.000) (0.907) 
Tobin’s q 0.028 0.012 
 (0.137) (0.711) 
Tangibility 0.167 -0.017 
 (0.449) (0.970) 
Constant -5.895*** 0.081 
 (0.000) (0.574) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 8,141 576 
Pseudo R2 0.035 0.020 
P-value of χ2 <0.001 0.967 
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Table 10: The Effect of Political Influence on Becoming Acquisitive—A Quasi 
Experiment 
This table reports the results of a logit regression analysis for acquiring and non-acquiring Chinese POEs 
between 2007 and 2016 after a top management turnover. The dependent variable is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the POE completes a cross-border M&A transaction three years after the top management 
turnover, and 0 otherwise. Chinese non-acquiring companies are the one-to-one nearest neighbors from 
Table 8. See equation (3) for details. We report coefficient estimates and p-values that are calculated 
using robust standard errors. Industry and Year Fixed Effects are included in both regressions. In the last 
two rows, we report the maximum and mean variance inflation factors (VIF). ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) 
Political Turnover 1.059** 
 (0.029) 
Connection  -0.111 
 (0.552) 




Firm Characteristics Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
Observations 576 
Pseudo R2 0.030 
Max VIF 1.54 





Table 11: Announcement Returns of Cross-border M&A Announcements by 
Chinese POEs 
Panel A of this table reports the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) around the 
announcement date of a cross-border M&A transaction by a Chinese POE for the event windows (-1, 1), 
(0, 1), (-2, 2), and (-3, 3). The CAARs are calculated using a one-factor market model (employing the 
value-weighted Shanghai and Shenzhen Composite Index as the market factor). The estimation period 
spans from 240 to 21 days before the announcement date (see, Du and Boateng, 2015). t-statistics and p-
values are calculated using robust standard errors. Panel B shows the average difference in the cumulative 
abnormal returns for the event window (-1, 1) between politically connected and non-connected POEs. 







All Cross-border M&A Difference in Means 
Connected – Non-Connected -0.016** (0.014) 
Observations 226  
   
First Cross-border M&A Only Difference in Means 
Connected – Non-Connected -0.019** (0.012) 
Observations 176  
 
  
Event Window CAARs  t-statistic p-value 
(-1, 1) 0.012*** 3.760 0.000 
(0, 1) 0.010*** 3.560 0.000 
(-2, 2) 0.016*** 4.150 0.000 
(-3, 3) 0.019*** 3.780 0.000 
Observations 226   
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Table 12: Announcement Returns Around Cross-border M&A  
This table reports the results for OLS regressions of market reactions (i.e. the stock price returns of 
acquiring Chinese POEs) in response to cross-border M&A announcements (see equation (4)). The 
dependent variable is the CAR (Cumulative Abnormal Return) calculated using a one-factor market 
model (employing the value-weighted Shanghai and Shenzhen Composite Index as the market factor) 
over the event window (-1, 1). Specification (1) includes Connection and all control variables and 
specification (2) includes PC Index and all control variables; both models are for all cross-border M&A 
announcements. Specifications (1)’ and (2)’ are based on subsamples of the data and include only the 
CAR of the first cross-border M&A announcement for each POE. Therefore, the variable Multi Acquirer 
is not included in the model. The variable All Stock Deal is also not included, because there was no 
cross-border M&A transaction that was financed only with stocks within the subsample for first cross-
border M&A announcement for each POE.  All variables are defined in Table 1. We report coefficient 
estimates with p-values in parentheses below. p-values are calculated using clustered standard errors at 
the firm level. Industry and Year Fixed Effects are included in all regressions. In the last two rows, we 
report the maximum and mean variance inflation factors (VIF). ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (1)’ (2)’ 
Connection -0.016**  -0.016*  
 (0.017)  (0.054)  
PC Index  -0.007**  -0.007** 
  (0.029)  (0.045) 
Gov Index -0.000 -0.000 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.892) (0.973) (0.335) (0.352) 
Culture Distance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.608) (0.534) (0.607) (0.547) 
Hofstede -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.871) (0.893) (0.272) (0.271) 
Multi Acquirer 0.006 0.006 - - 
 (0.443) (0.496)   
Deal Size 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.727) (0.663) (0.655) (0.596) 
Public Target -0.014 -0.016 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.230) (0.145) (0.817) (0.741) 
All Cash Deal 0.042*** 0.046*** 0.032* 0.036** 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.076) (0.036) 
All Stock Deal -0.013 -0.012 - - 
 (0.548) (0.582)   
Common Law -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.118) (0.126) (0.167) (0.171) 
Constant 0.078 0.069 0.125 0.119 
 (0.388) (0.439) (0.228) (0.242) 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 226 226 176 176 
R2 0.183 0.182 0.222 0.226 
Max VIF 2.14 2.14 2.14 2.01 




Table 13: The Financial Performance of POEs after Cross-border M&A 
Transactions 
This table shows the effect of political connections on financial performance (as measured by ROE) and 
demonstrates how this relationship is affected by a cross-border M&A within the three years after deal 
completion. The dependent variable is the return on equity (ROE) of Chinese POEs. See equation (5) for 
details. We report coefficient estimates with p-values in parentheses below. Industry and Year Fixed 
Effects are included in the regression. In the last two rows, we report the maximum and mean variance 







Post CBMA 0.075** 
 (0.031) 
Post CBMA × Connection -0.198*** 
 (0.000) 
Gov Index -0.005 
 (0.340) 




Firm Characteristics Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
Observations 9,946 
R2 0.069 
Max VIF 1.68 















Table 14: Variable Definitions 





Variables Definition Source 
Connection Dummy variable that equals 1 if the chairman or CEO is 
currently working (or has worked) in a central or local 
government department, the military, the People's Congress 
(PC), the People's Court and Procuratorate, or the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), and 0 
otherwise. 
http://www.stockstar.com/ 
PC Index Political connection measure that equals 3 if the politically-
connected chairman or CEO is the head of a central or local 
government department or the head or the standing member of 
the PC or CPPCC; 2 if (s)he is a member of the PC or CPPCC; 
1 if (s)he is an officer of a local government department or a 




Percentage of ownership for the largest politically-connected 
blockholder in a POE, if said ownership is at least 10%. The 
blockholder is considered to be politically connected if (s)he is 
currently working (or has worked) in a central or local 
government department, the military, the People’s Congress 
(PC), the People’s Court and Procuratorate, or the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). The 
blockholder is also considered politically connected if it is a 
state entity. In addition, this blockholder cannot be the 
chairman/CEO at the same time. Otherwise, the variable is 0.  
http://www.stockstar.com/ 





Dummy variable that equals 1 if more than one blockholder is 
politically connected, and 0 otherwise. In addition, these 
blockholders cannot be the chairman/CEO at the same time. 
http://www.stockstar.com/ 
CSMAR: China Listed Firms’ 
Corporate Governance 
Research Database 
ROA Net income over total assets. CSMAR: China Stock Market 
Financial Statements Database 
Leverage Book value of total liabilities over the book value of total assets. CSMAR: China Stock Market 
Financial Statements Database 
Firm size Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. CSMAR: China Stock Market 
Financial Statements Database 
Tax Income taxes paid over the book value of total assets. CSMAR: China Stock Market 
Financial Statements Database 
Tobin’s q Sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt 
over the sum of the book value of equity and the book value of 
debt. 
CSMAR: China Stock Market 
Financial Statements Database 
Tangibility Net fixed assets over total assets. CSMAR: China Stock Market 






Risk free Interest rate of a one-year lump sum deposit, which is 
commonly accepted to be a proxy for the risk-free rate. 
CSMAR: China Bond Market 
Research Database 
Altman Z Weighted average of four financial ratios: asset liability, return 
on total assets, working capital, and retained earnings. 
Zhang et al. (2007) 
Coupon Periodic interest payment that the bondholder receives from the 
issuer during the time between when the bond is issued and 
when it matures. 
CSMAR: China Bond Market 
Research Database 
Volume Bond issuing volume (in CNY millions). CSMAR: China Bond Market 
Research Database 
PD Probability of default of a corporate bond. Calculated by 
converting the credit rating of a corporate bond based on 
Standard & Poor’s corporate bond default table. 
CSMAR: China Bond Market 
Research Database and 
http://www.spratings.com/ 
Maturity Time from the bond issuing date to the date when the principal 
and interest of a bond are paid off, using years as a unit. 
CSMAR: China Bond Market 
Research Database 
CAAR Cumulative average abnormal return calculated using a one-
factor market model (with the value-weighted Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Composite Index as the market factor) over the event 
window (0, 1). 
CSMAR: China Stock Market 
Trading Database 
CAR Cumulative abnormal return calculated using a one-factor 
market model (with the value-weighted Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Composite Index as the market factor) over the event window 
(0, 1). 
CSMAR: China Stock Market 
Trading Database 
Multi Issuer Dummy variable that equals 1 if a POE issues more than one 
corporate bond, and 0 otherwise. 




Panel B: The Corporate Governance Index 
The Corporate Governance Index is constructed as in Schweizer, Walker, and Zhang (2016) and reflects the sum of 
the nine governance mechanisms described below. 
 
Gov Indexi,t = ∑ 𝐆𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞 𝐌𝐞𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐧𝐢𝐬𝐦𝟗𝐣=𝟏 j 
Governance 
Mechanism 
Definition Measurement and Supporting Literature 
Chairman age Age of the company’s chairman Equals 1 if the age of the chairman of firm i in fiscal 
year t is less than the mean value of the sample in 
fiscal year t, and 0 otherwise (Waelchli and Zeller, 
2013; Jiang and Kim, 2015).42 
Chairman tenure Number of years the company’s 
chairman has been in office 
Equals 1 if the tenure of the chairman of firm i in 
fiscal year t is less than the mean value of the sample 
in fiscal year t, and 0 otherwise (Berger, Ofek, and 
Yermack, 1997; Jiang and Kim, 2015). 
Board size Number of directors on the board 
of directors 
Equals 1 if the board size of firm i in fiscal year t is 
less than the mean value of the sample in fiscal year 
t, and 0 otherwise (Yermack, 1996; Conyon and 
Peck, 1998; Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999). 
Board independence Number of independent directors 
on the board of directors 
 
Equals 1 if the number of independent directors on 
the board of firm i in fiscal year t is greater than the 
mean value of the sample in fiscal year t, and 0 
otherwise (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Kim, 
Kitsabunnarat-Chatjuthamard, and Nofsinger, 2007). 
Board meeting Number of annual meetings of 
the board of directors 
Equals 1 if the number of annual meetings of the 
board of directors of firm i in fiscal year t is less than 
the mean value of the sample in fiscal year t, and 0 
otherwise (Vafeas, 1999; Yi, Yu, and Jiang, 2011). 
Supervisory board 
size 
Number of supervisors on the 
supervisory board 
Equals 1 if the number of supervisors on the 
supervisory board of firm i in fiscal year t is greater 
than the mean value of the sample in fiscal year t, 
and 0 otherwise (Firth et al., 2007; Ding et al., 2010; 
Jia et al., 2009). 
Ownership 
concentration 
Percentage of shares held by the 
company’s largest shareholder 
Equals 1 if the percentage of shares held by the 
company’s largest shareholder of firm i in fiscal year 
t is greater than the mean value of the sample in 
fiscal year t, and 0 otherwise (Stiglitz, 1985; Rediker 
and Seth, 1995; Voulgaris, Stathopoulos, and 
Walker, 2010; Huang et al., 2011). 
Foreign auditor Hiring of a foreign auditor Equals 1 if firm i hires a foreign auditor in fiscal year 
t, and 0 otherwise (Gao and Kling, 2008; Peng, Wei, 
and Yang, 2011). 
State shares State shares account for at least 
5% of the firm’s total shares  
Equals 0 if the state holds more than 5% of the 
shares in firm i in fiscal year t, and 1 otherwise 
(Bloom et al., 2012; Jiang, Huang, and Kim, 2013). 
                                                     
42 As Jiang and Kim (2015, pp 209) point out, using chairman age and tenure for constructing the corporate governance 
index for Chinese companies is appropriate because “the actual person who is actively in charge of the business is not 
the CEO. It is the board chairperson who actively controls and runs the firm. In China, this is common knowledge. 
However, based on the academic literature, it seems that many scholars are unaware of this.” 
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Table 15: Corporate Borrowing Activities 
This table reports the annual number of corporate bond issues (Panel A) and bank loans (Panel B) by Chinese POEs 
between January 2007 and June 2016, together with distributional percentages. Security issue data for bonds and bank 
loans come from the CSMAR database. 
 
Issue Year Number of Issues Percentage 
Panel A: Bond Issues   
2007 3 1.22% 
2008 4 1.63% 
2009 16 6.50% 
2010 5 2.03% 
2011 25 10.16% 
2012 64 26.02% 
2013 47 19.11% 
2014 28 11.38% 
2015 26 10.57% 
2016 (Jan. – Jun.) 28 11.38% 
Total  246 100.00% 
Panel B: Bank Loans   
2007 14 2.29% 
2008 17 2.78% 
2009 47 7.69% 
2010 34 5.56% 
2011 36 5.89% 
2012 78 12.77% 
2013 103 16.86% 
2014 123 20.13% 
2015 152 24.88% 
2016 (Jan. – Jun.) 7 1.15% 




Table 16: Summary Statistics for POEs with and without Corporate Bond Issues 
This table reports the summary statistics (i.e., the mean, median, standard deviation, 25% and 75% quantile, and the 
number of data points) for all sample variables. We differentiate between firm-year observations (N) without (Panel 
A) and with (Panel B) a corporate bond issue. Panels D and E provide summary statistics for firm-year observations 
without and with political connections. Our sample period ranges from January 2007 to June 2016. Variable definitions 
are provided in Panel A of Table 1. Panel C reports the pairwise differences in means (t-test) and medians (Wilcoxon 
test) of the variables between subgroups with and without corporate bond issues. Panel F reports the pairwise 
differences in means (t-test) and medians (Wilcoxon test) of the variables between subgroups with and without political 
connections. Related p-values are shown to the right in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75% N 
Panel A: POEs without Bonds       
Connection 0.243 0.000 0.429 0.000 0.000 8,195 
PC Index 0.530 0.000 0.992 0.000 0.000 8,195 
Gov Index 3.954 4.000 1.175 3.000 5.000 8,195 
ROA 0.042 0.042 0.055 0.015 0.070 8,195 
Leverage 0.376 0.354 0.213 0.198 0.531 8,195 
Firm size 21.249 21.165 0.861 20.634 21.794 8,195 
Tax 0.009 0.007 0.013 0.002 0.014 8,195 
Tobin’s q 3.025 2.443 1.854 1.735 3.743 8,195 
Tangibility 0.207 0.180 0.149 0.095 0.290 8,195 
Panel B: POEs with Bonds       
Connection 0.504 1.000 0.501 0.000 1.000 246 
PC Index 1.126 1.000 1.200 0.000 2.000 246 
Gov Index 3.744 4.000 1.247 3.000 5.000 246 
ROA 0.053 0.049 0.035 0.028 0.073 246 
Leverage 0.466 0.466 0.176 0.333 0.590 246 
Firm size 22.365 22.202 1.053 21.635 22.877 246 
Tax 0.008 0.006 0.013 0.001 0.014 246 
Tobin’s q 2.174 1.724 1.162 1.333 2.660 246 
Tangibility 0.201 0.162 0.146 0.095 0.286 246 
Panel C: Equality Tests Differences in Means Differences in Medians   
Connection -0.261*** (0.000) -1.000*** (0.000)   
PC Index -0.596*** (0.000) -1.000*** (0.000)   
Gov Index 0.210*** (0.006) 0.000*** (0.000)   
ROA -0.012*** (0.001) -0.007*** (0.000)   
Leverage -0.090*** (0.000) -0.112*** (0.000)   
Firm size -1.115*** (0.000) -1.037*** (0.000)   
Tax 0.001 (0.272) 0.001 (0.570)   
Tobin’s q 0.851*** (0.000) 0.719*** (0.000)   





 Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75% N 
Panel D: Connection=0       
Gov Index 3.032 3.000 1.169 2.000 4.000 7,048 
ROA 0.042 0.043 0.069 0.016 0.071 7,048 
Leverage 0.389 0.374 0.230 0.209 0.544 7,048 
Firm size 21.329 21.229 0.947 20.654 21.903 7,048 
Tax 0.010 0.007 0.015 0.002 0.015 7,048 
Tobin’s q 3.007 2.410 1.887 1.709 3.722 7,048 
Tangibility 0.204 0.176 0.150 0.088 0.290 7,048 
Panel E: Connection=1       
Gov Index 2.958 3.000 1.222 2.000 4.000 2,831 
ROA 0.047 0.046 0.054 0.019 0.074 2,831 
Leverage 0.415 0.412 0.209 0.255 0.570 2,831 
Firm size 21.600 21.475 1.029 20.855 22.299 2,831 
Tax 0.008 0.006 0.013 0.002 0.013 2,831 
Tobin’s q 2.761 2.196 2.852 1.566 3.283 2,831 
Tangibility 0.218 0.192 0.148 0.108 0.304 2,831 
Panel F: Equality Tests Differences in Means Differences in Medians   
Gov Index 0.074*** (0.005) 0.000*** (0.006)   
ROA -0.005*** (0.002) -0.003*** (0.001)   
Leverage -0.026*** (0.000) -0.038*** (0.000)   
Firm size -0.271*** (0.000) -0.246*** (0.000)   
Tax 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000)   
Tobin’s q 0.246*** (0.000) 0.214*** (0.000)   





Table 17: Correlation Matrix 
This table reports the correlation matrix for the main sample. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) Bond 1          
(2) Connection 0.101*** 1         
(3) PC Index 0.100*** 0.941*** 1        
(4) Gov Index -0.030** -0.013 0.002 1       
(5) ROA 0.035** 0.026* 0.045*** 0.067*** 1      
(6) Leverage 0.072*** 0.025* 0.01 -0.058*** -0.390*** 1     
(7) Firm size 0.211*** 0.087*** 0.081*** -0.083*** 0.050*** 0.361*** 1    
(8) Tax -0.012 -0.043*** -0.040*** -0.016 0.161*** 0.088*** -0.018 1   
(9) Tobin’s q -0.078*** -0.063*** -0.057*** -0.01 0.238*** -0.291*** -0.318*** 0.167*** 1  




Table 18: Propensity Score Matching 
This table reports the results for our propensity score matching routine for Chinese POEs with and without corporate 
bond issues between January 2007 and June 2016. We match firms using a nearest neighbor PSM algorithm on an 
array of firm-specific characteristics. Panel A reports the univariate balanced test results for pairs of treatment and 
control firms after matching. Panel B reports parameter estimates from the probit model used in estimating the 
propensity scores for the treatment and control groups (the treatment is corporate bond issuance). The dependent 
variable in the probit model is a corporate bond issuance dummy. The “Pre-Match” column contains the parameter 
estimates of the probit model estimated using the sample prior to matching. These estimates are then used to generate 
the propensity scores for matching POEs with and without corporate bond issuance. The “Post-Match” column contains 
the parameter estimates of the probit model estimated using the subsample of matched treatment-control pairs (we 
match firms using one-to-one nearest neighbor PSM every year, without replacement). Definitions for all variables are 
provided in Panel A of Table 1. Industry and year fixed effects are included. Coefficient estimates are reported and p-
values are displayed in parentheses below. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A Control Treatment Diff. P-value 
ROA 0.053 0.053 -0.000 0.926 
Leverage 0.450 0.466 -0.016 0.384 
Firm size 22.233 22.364 -0.131 0.127 
Tax 0.006 0.008 -0.002 0.140 
Tobin’s q 2.160 2.174 -0.014 0.903 
Tangibility 0.201 0.201 -0.000 0.974 
 
Panel B Pre-Match Post-Match 
ROA 2.292** 0.552 
 (0.016) (0.790) 
Leverage -0.039 0.143 
 (0.863) (0.745) 
Firm size 0.667*** 0.058 
 (0.000) (0.488) 
Tax -1.888 6.377 
 (0.485) (0.201) 
Tobin’s q -0.003 -0.014 
 (0.933) (0.843) 
Tangibility 0.139 0.174 
 (0.584) (0.706) 
Constant -16.719*** -1.128 
 (0.000) (0.543) 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 8,441 492 
Pseudo R2 0.209 0.017 




Table 19: Determining the Effect of Political Influence on Bond Issuance 
Panel A of this table reports the results of a logit regression analysis for Chinese POEs with and without corporate 
bond issues between January 2007 and June 2016. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 for bond-
issuing firms in the issuing year, and 0 otherwise. Columns (1) and (2) report the results of a post-matching cross-
sectional analysis using the variables Connection and PC Index, respectively, and columns (1’) and (2’) report the 
fixed effects panel logit analysis using the entire sample. We report coefficient estimates with p-values in parentheses 
below. p-values are calculated using standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel B reports results after addressing the potential endogeneity and selection bias that may be associated with 
political connections. Columns (1) and (2) report the results of the second stage estimation from a two-stage probit 
instrumental variable (IV) estimation to address the potential endogeneity of political connections. The instrumental 
variable for political connections in the first stage estimation is the natural logarithm of one plus the geo-distance 
between a POE’s headquarter and the provincial capital city where the POE is located. The dependent variable is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 for bond-issuing firms in the issuing year, and 0 otherwise. Column (1) reports the results 
for the post-matching sample and Column (2) reports the results for the entire panel. Column (3) reports the results for 
a regression model that controls for the selection biases using the Heckman selection model for the entire pre-match 
sample. The inverse Mills ratio is included in the estimation. We report coefficient estimates with p-values in 
parentheses below. p-values are calculated using standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A (1) (2) (1’) (2’) 
 post-match post-match panel panel 
Connection 0.722***  0.654***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  
PC Index  0.299***  0.253*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Gov Index -0.138* -0.143* -0.170*** -0.172** 
 (0.086) (0.076) (0.003) (0.002) 
Constant -2.737 -2.403   
 (0.366) (0.433)   
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Maximum VIF 2.00 2.00 1.53 1.53 
Mean VIF 1.41 1.41 1.21 1.21 
Observations 492 492 9,879 9,879 






Panel B (1) (2) (3) 
 IV-post-match IV-panel Heckman 
Connection 0.955*** 0.612*** 0.652*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.000) 
Gov Index -0.040 -0.072*** -0.158*** 
 (0.448) (0.005) (0.003) 
Inverse Mills Ratio   -21.858** 
   (0.024) 
Constant -2.855* -11.508*** 55.409 
 (0.071) (0.000) (0.119) 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Maximum VIF 2.03 7.77 1.81 
Mean VIF 1.42 2.53 1.36 
Observations 492 9,879 9,879 
Stock-Yogo Test 61.28*** 748.39***  





Table 20: Propensity Score Matching (Endogeneity Check) 
This table reports the results for our propensity score matching routine for Chinese POEs with and without corporate 
bond issues between January 2007 and June 2016. The bond-issuing firms fulfil the criterion of a political turnover. 
We match firms using a nearest neighbor PSM algorithm on the key variable PC Index and an array of firm-specific 
characteristics. Panel A reports the univariate balanced test results for pairs of treatment and control firms after 
matching. Panel B reports parameter estimates for the probit model used in estimating the propensity scores of the 
treatment and control groups (the treatment is bond issuance). The dependent variable in the probit model is the bond 
issuance dummy. The “Pre-Match” column contains the parameter estimates of the probit model estimated using the 
sample prior to matching. These estimates are then used to generate the propensity scores for matching POEs with and 
without corporate bond issues. The “Post-Match” column contains the parameter estimates of the probit model 
estimated using the subsample of matched treatment-control pairs (we match firms using a one-to-one nearest neighbor 
PSM every year, without replacement). Definitions for all variables are provided in Panel A of Table 1. Industry and 
year fixed effects are included in both models in Panel A. We report coefficient estimates with p-values in parentheses 
below. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A Control Treatment Diff. P-value 
PC Index 1.134 1.130 0.004 0.970 
ROA 0.054 0.053 0.001 0.819 
Leverage 0.460 0.466 -0.006 0.748 
Firm size 22.308 22.365 -0.057 0.513 
Tax 0.007 0.008 -0.001 0.248 
Tobin’s q 2.072 2.174 0.010 0.327 
Tangibility 0.209 0.201 0.008 0.575 
 
Panel B Pre-Match Post-Match 
PC Index 0.184*** -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.975) 
ROA 2.223*** -1.785 
 (0.006) (0.321) 
Leverage 0.001*** -0.084 
 (0.998) (0.852) 
Firm size 0.648*** 0.065 
 (0.000) (0.438) 
Tax -1.362 4.948 
 (0.644) (0.342) 
Tobin’s q -0.000 0.083 
 (0.992) (0.212) 
Tangibility 0.157 -0.038 
 (0.610) (0.937) 
Constant -16.612*** -1.525 
 (0.000) (0.399) 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 8,441 492 
Pseudo R2 0.228 0.006 




Table 21: Determining the Effect of Political Influence on Bond Issuance (Endogeneity 
Check) 
This table reports the results of a post-matching logit regression analysis for Chinese POEs with and without corporate 
bond issues between January 2007 and June 2016. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
firm issues a corporate bond during the fiscal year, and 0 otherwise (see Equation (2) for details). We report coefficient 
estimates with p-values in parentheses below. p-values are calculated using standard errors clustered at firm level. ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) 
Political Turnover 0.520* 
 (0.077) 
Connection  -0.046 
 (0.834) 




Firm Characteristics Yes 
Industry FE Yes 
Year FE Yes 
Maximum VIF 2.03 
Mean VIF 1.42 
Observations 492 





Table 22: Corporate Governance and Bond Issuance 
This table reports the results of an ordered logit regression analysis for Chinese POEs with and without corporate bond 
issues between January 2007 and June 2016. The dependent variable is an ordinal index variable (Gov Index) that 
measures the overall quality of a POE’s corporate governance. Columns (1) and (2) report the results of a post-matching 
cross-sectional analysis using the variables Connection and PC Index, respectively, and columns (3) and (4) report the 
results for a panel ordered logit analysis using the entire sample. Column (5) and (6) reports the empirical analysis of 
corporate governance for bond issuing POEs only. We report coefficient estimates with p-values in parentheses below. 
p-values are calculated using standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Bond -0.327** -0.330** -0.261** -0.259**   
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.014) (0.014)   
Connection -0.555***  -0.825***  -0.537**  
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.025)  
PC Index  -0.214***  -0.289***  -0.211** 
  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.031) 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Maximum VIF 2.02 2.02 1.80 1.70 2.46 2.47 
Mean VIF 1.36 1.35 1.33 1.31 1.51 1.51 
Observations 492 492 9,879 9,879 246 246 





Table 23: Multinomial Logit Regression Analysis for the Choice of Debt Instrument 
This table reports the results of a multinomial logit regression analysis for the debt-financing choice of Chinese POEs 
between January 2007 and June 2016. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 2 if the firm has a 
corporate bond issue, 1 if the firm takes out a bank loan, and 0 if the firm does not engage in any type of debt financing. 
Industry and year fixed effects are included in both models. We report coefficient estimates with p-values in 
parentheses below. p-values are calculated using clustered standard errors at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 


















Connection  0.685*** 0.991***   1.048*** 1.121** 
 (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
PC Index   0.273*** 0.382***   
   (0.000) (0.000)   
Gov Index -0.213*** -0.144** -0.214*** -0.145** -0.210*** -0.142* 
 (0.001) (0.048) (0.001) (0.046) (0.001) (0.074) 
Altman Z -1.589*** -0.554*** -1.577*** -0.540*** -1.549*** -0.550*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Altman Z × 
Connection 




Constant -25.562*** -18.920*** -25.546*** -18.907*** -25.978*** -19.314*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm 
Characteristics 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Maximum VIF 3.52 3.52 3.52 3.52 3.53 3.53 
Mean VIF 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 2.04 2.04 
Observations 9,456 9,456 9,456 9,456 9,456 9,456 





Table 24: Financing Cost Analysis 
This table reports the results of a two-stage regression analysis designed to predict a firm’s coupon rate. The sample 
size reduces to 218 observations because of missing information about the coupon rate of 28 corporate bonds. Column 
(1) shows the results of a tobit regression analysis of the determinants of a corporate bond’s coupon rate. Column (2) 
reports the results of the second stage estimation of a two-stage tobit instrumental variable (IV) estimation to address 
the potential endogeneity of political connections. The instrument variable for political connections in the first stage 
estimation is the natural logarithm of one plus the geo-distance between a POE’s headquarter and the provincial capital 
city where the POE is located. Industry and year fixed effects are included in both stages. We report coefficient 
estimates with p-values in parentheses below. p-values are calculated using standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 tobit IV-tobit 
Connection  -0.781** -0.877*** 
 (0.013) (0.004) 
Gov Index 0.093* 0.045 
 (0.081) (0.379) 
Risk free 40.711** 87.406*** 
 (0.01) (0.000) 
PDpredicted  379.546*** 251.045
*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Volume  -0.015 -0.381*** 
 (0.177) (0.002) 
Maturity  -0.007 -0.376 
 (0.917) (0.275) 
Constant -20.941** -12.952* 
 (0.037) (0.052) 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Maximum VIF 5.25 4.02 
Mean VIF 2.08 1.76 
Observations 218 218 
Stock-Yogo Test  33.57*** 





Table 25: Announcement Returns around Corporate Bond Issuance Announcements 
This table reports the average difference in the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) around the 
announcement date of a bond issue by a Chinese POE for the event window (0, 1). The CAARs are calculated using a 
one factor market model (with the equal-weighted and value-weighted Shanghai and Shenzhen Composite Index as 
the market factor), a Fama-French three factor model, and a Fama-French five factor model, respectively. The 
estimation period spans from 300 to 46 days before the announcement date (see Dutordoir, Strong, and Ziegan, 2014). 
T-statistics and p-values are calculated using robust standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 




Connected – Non-Connected Differences in Means 
Equal-Weighted  0.011**     (0.035) 
Value-Weighted  0.012**     (0.033) 
Fama-French 3 Factor  0.011**     (0.044) 
Fama-French 5 Factor  0.010*     (0.058) 




Table 26: Explaining the Announcement Returns around Corporate Bond Issuance  
This table reports the results of an OLS regression analysis in which we regress the stock price returns of bond-issuing POEs in response to their bond issue 
announcements against a series of explanatory factors (see Equation (4)). The dependent variable is each firm’s cumulative abnormal return (CAR). In Columns 
(1) to (2), CARs are calculated using a one factor market model (with the equal-weighted (EW) and the value-weighted (VW) Shanghai and Shenzhen Composite 
Index as the market factor); In Column (3), we employ a Fama-French three factor model (FF3); and in Column (4), we use a Fama-French five factor model (FF5), 
each over the event window (0, 1). Column (5)-(8) reports the results of the second stage estimation of a two-stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental variable 
estimation to address the potential endogeneity of political connections. The instrumental variable for political connections in the first stage estimation is the natural 
logarithm of one plus the geo-distance between a POE’s headquarter and the provincial capital city where the POE is located.Definitions for all variables are 
provided in Panel A of Table 1. We report coefficient estimates with p-values in parentheses below. p-values are calculated using standard errors clustered at the 
firm level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 EW VW FF3 FF5 IV-EW IV-VW IV-FF3 IV-FF5 
Connection 0.013** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 0.037*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.042*** 
 (0.020) (0.031) (0.029) (0.037) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) 
Gov Index -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.811) (0.594) (0.889) (0.827) (0.871) (0.599) (0.963) (0.903) 
Multi Issuer -0.012 -0.012 -0.015 -0.017 -0.011 -0.010 -0.013 -0.015 
 (0.244) (0.269) (0.184) (0.134) (0.274) (0.328) (0.215) (0.161) 
PD 0.456 1.110 0.603 0.536 0.081 0.669 0.175 0.074 
 (0.475) (0.106) (0.357) (0.397) (0.904) (0.338) (0.800) (0.914) 
Volume 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.610) (0.903) (0.515) (0.436) (0.390) (0.860) (0.288) (0.215) 
Maturity -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.713) (0.844) (0.986) (0.905) (0.731) (0.855) (0.970) (0.890) 
Coupon 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.001 
 (0.132) (0.143) (0.221) (0.353) (0.237) (0.354) (0.417) (0.685) 
Constant 0.030 -0.062 0.049 0.059 0.069 -0.017 0.093 0.107 
 (0.849) (0.699) (0.758) (0.696) (0.657) (0.914) (0.558) (0.491) 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Max VIF 4.18 4.18 4.18 4.18 4.21 4.21 4.21 4.21 
Mean VIF 1.76 1.76 1.76 1.76 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 
Observations 161 161 161 161 161 161 161 161 
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.056 0.035 0.020 0.057 0.080 0.118 0.155 
Stock-Yogo Test     25.72*** 25.72*** 25.72*** 25.72*** 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test     2.81* 3.61* 3.55* 4.17** 
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Variable Definition  Unit 
Spread Monthly trading yield spread between a “Chengtou” (POE) bond 
and its maturity-matched treasury bond 
Basis points 
Implicit  Dummy variable that equals 1 if the bond is a “Chengtou” bond 
and 0 if the bond is a POE bond 
N/A 
ROA Net income over total assets % 
LEV Book value of total liabilities over the book value of total assets % 
Firm size The value of total assets Billion Yuan (CNY) 
Issue size Bond issuing volume  Billion Yuan (CNY) 
Maturity Remaining time to maturity, using one year as one unit Year 
Liquidity The difference between the highest and lowest monthly price Yuan (CNY) 
Rating Bond issuer’s credit rating without credit enhancement, which is 
rated on a four-point scale of AAA, AA+, AA, and AA-. We 
assign 4, 3, 2, and 1 to the four ratings, respectively. 
N/A 
Northeast Dummy variable that equals 1 if the bond issuer is located in a 
province that belongs to the Northeast region of China and 0 if the 
bond issuer is located in another province 
N/A 
Level Indicator variable that ranges from 1 to 4 according to the local 
government’s administrative level (prefecture-level, city-level, 
sub-provincial-level, provincial-level) 
N/A 
Explicit  Dummy variable that equals 1 if the bond prospectus specifies an 
explicit guarantor and 0 otherwise 
N/A 
GDP growth Year-over-year GDP growth rate in a given quarter, using the 
same quarter in the last year as the base 
% 
Risk free rate Yearly rate of return of the one-year treasury bill of China % 
Yield curve slope The difference in the yearly rate of return between ten-year and 
two-year treasury bonds 
% 
M2 growth Monthly growth rate in the money supply (M2) % 
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Table 28: Summary Statistics for LGFVs (Chengtou Bond Issuers) and POEs 
This table provides summary statistics (i.e., the mean, median, standard deviation, 25% and 75% quantile) for all 
sample variables, where N is the number of firm-month observations. We differentiate between corporate bonds issued 
by LGFVs (Panel A) and by POEs (Panel B). Our sample period ranges from January 2010 to December 2017. 
Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. Panel C provides summary statistics for a series of macroeconomic 
control variables. Panel D reports the pairwise differences in means (t-test) and medians (Wilcoxon test) of the 
variables between the two subgroups (LGFVs and POEs). Related p-values are shown to the right in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75% N 
Panel A: Chengtou Bonds       
Spread 220.41 216.87 102.35 147.19 289.25 115,320 
ROA 2.25 1.87 1.69 1.20 2.88 114,950 
LEV 50.30 50.89 14.72 39.65 61.12 114,926 
Firm size 26.61 15.81 39.19 9.73 27.08 108,494 
Issue size 1.23 1.00 0.66 0.80 1.50 115,320 
Maturity 4.75 4.80 2.04 3.41 6.06 115,320 
Liquidity 1.33 0.26 3.20 0.00 1.64 115,320 
Rating 2.03 2.00 0.75 2.00 2.00 115,320 
Northeast 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.00 115,320 
Explicit 0.41 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 115,320 
Panel B: POE Bonds       
Spread 287.57 283.54 122.03 197.33 377.28 23,920 
ROA 6.36 5.38 4.81 3.64 8.05 23,544 
LEV 60.12 61.79 15.32 49.32 70.52 23,544 
Firm size 19.78 9.25 31.18 4.66 20.78 23,286 
Issue size 1.13 0.80 1.20 0.50 1.20 23,920 
Maturity 3.30 3.36 1.52 2.18 4.39 23,920 
Liquidity 1.16 0.45 1.90 0.00 1.55 23,920 
Rating 2.12 2.00 0.69 2.00 2.00 23,920 
Northeast 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 23,920 
Explicit 0.30 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 23,920 
Panel C: Macroeconomic 
Variables 
      
GDP growth 7.21 6.90 0.79 6.80 7.40 139,240 
Risk free rate 2.90 2.86 0.60 2.31 3.45 139,240 
Yield curve slope 0.43 0.40 0.26 0.25 0.52 139,240 
M2 growth 12.07 11.80 2.18 10.60 13.40 139,240 
Panel D: Equality Tests Difference in Means Difference in Medians   
Spread -67.20*** (0.000) -66.60*** (0.000)   
ROA -4.11
*** (0.000) -3.51*** (0.000)   
LEV -9.82** (0.000) -10.09*** (0.000)   
Firm size 6.83*** (0.000) 6.56*** (0.000)   
Issue size 0.10*** (0.000) 0.20*** (0.000)   
Maturity 1.45*** (0.000) 1.44*** (0.000)   
Liquidity 0.17*** (0.000) -0.19*** (0.000)   
Rating -0.09*** (0.000) 0.00*** (0.000)   
Northeast 0.02*** (0.000) 0.00*** (0.000)   
Explicit  0.11*** (0.000) 0.00*** (0.000)   
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Table 29: Univariate Analysis of Yield Spreads  
This table reports the results of a univariate analysis of both Chengtou and POE bonds based on specific characteristics. 
Panel A classifies Chengtou and POE bonds based on the bond issuer’s credit rating. Panel B classifies bonds based 
on the bond issuer’s location: Northeast China versus other regions. We report the pairwise differences in means (t-
test) and medians (Wilcoxon test) of the yield spreads between Chengtou and POE bonds within each classification. 
Related p-values are shown to the right in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Classification by Bond Issuer Credit Rating 
 
Chengtou POE Difference in 
means 
Difference 
in medians Issues Mean Median Issues Mean Median 


























Panel B: Classification by Bond Issuer Location 
 
 





Issues Mean Median Issues Mean Median 


















Table 30: Correlation Matrix 
This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for all variable pairs, computed using the entire sample. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) Spread 1               
(2) Implicit -0.23*** 1              
(3) ROA 0.09*** -0.52*** 1             
(4) LEV -0.10*** -0.24*** -0.01*** 1            
(5) Firm size -0.19*** 0.07*** -0.10*** 0.22*** 1           
(6) Issue size -0.15*** 0.05*** -0.09*** 0.15*** 0.54*** 1          
(7) Maturity 0.12*** 0.270*** -0.09*** -0.17*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 1         
(8) Liquidity 0.06*** 0.02*** -0.02*** -0.05*** -0.03*** 0.01*** 0.00 1        
(9) Rating -0.34*** -0.05*** 0.04*** 0.31*** 0.49*** 0.43*** 0.14*** -0.05*** 1       
(10) Northeast 0.08*** 0.04*** -0.05*** -0.15*** 0.02*** 0.02*** -0.00 0.01*** -0.06*** 1      
(11) GDP growth 0.28*** 0.08*** 0.05*** -0.02*** -0.06*** 0.05*** 0.28*** 0.03*** -0.10*** -0.00 1     
(12) Risk free rate 0.09*** -0.02*** 0.02*** -0.01*** 0.00 -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.00 0.13*** 1    
(13) Yield curve slope 0.16*** 0.07*** -0.01* -0.04*** -0.04*** 0.02*** 0.17*** 0.02*** -0.06*** 0.00 0.32*** -0.64*** 1   
(14) M2 growth 0.24*** 0.10*** 0.03*** -0.08*** -0.07*** 0.04*** 0.30*** 0.04*** -0.11*** 0.00 0.68*** -0.25*** 0.49*** 1  





Table 31: The Effect of Implicit Government Guarantees on Bond Yield Spreads 
This table reports the results of a panel regression (random effects) analysis of the yield spreads of publicly traded corporate bonds between 2010 and 2017. 
The dependent variable is the monthly trading yield spread between corporate bonds and their maturity-matched treasury bonds. Implicit government 
guarantee is measured by a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bond is a Chengtou bond and 0 if the bond is a POE bond. Columns (1) and (2) report the 
results obtained by using the entire sample. Columns (3) to (6) report results for subsamples with credit ratings of AAA, AA+, AA, and AA-, respectively. 
Year fixed-effects are included in all specifications. We report coefficient estimates with p-values in parentheses below. p-values are calculated using 
clustered standard errors at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full Sample Full Sample AAA AA+ AA AA- 
Implicit  -163.58*** -190.35*** -75.39*** -127.38*** -169.25*** -166.85*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Rating -53.40*** -64.18***     
 (0.000) (0.000)     
Implicit x Rating  12.33**     
  (0.046)     
ROA -5.45*** -5.45*** -1.46 -5.03*** -6.36*** -2.54 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.482) (0.000) (0.000) (0.102) 
LEV 0.12 0.11 1.38*** 0.20 0.42*** -0.62** 
 (0.265) (0.293) (0.001) (0.358) (0.002) (0.032) 
Ln (Firm size) -2.81 -2.47 8.85 10.16** 0.98 -15.44** 
 (0.214) (0.275) (0.146) (0.014) (0.749) (0.028) 
Issue size -5.00** -4.06 6.20* -3.27 -19.34*** -7.15 
 (0.045) (0.109) (0.056) (0.407) (0.000) (0.609) 
Maturity 11.65*** 11.63*** 9.92*** 2.03 10.44*** 24.66*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.151) (0.000) (0.000) 
Liquidity 2.61*** 2.61*** 1.69 1.27** 2.09*** 4.53*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.155) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth 47.04*** 47.02*** 14.20 20.00*** 53.13*** 52.05*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.418) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) 
Risk free rate -1.21 -1.24 -1.44 -7.88 4.68 -13.10 
 (0.772) (0.768) (0.921) (0.250) (0.363) (0.280) 
Yield curve slope 18.54*** 18.50*** 0.04 13.76 32.36*** -17.40 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.999) (0.224) (0.000) (0.386) 
M2 growth -5.60*** -5.61*** 3.91 -2.19 -5.27*** -9.58*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.239) (0.168) (0.000) (0.001) 
Explicit -21.93*** -22.14*** -9.27 -12.18 -25.16*** -26.16* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.715) (0.224) (0.000) (0.069) 
Constant 71.53 93.89* -297.30 99.54 -101.60 68.01 
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 (0.177) (0.083) (0.143) (0.244) (0.143) (0.616) 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 134,526 134,526 7,147 19,238 81,669 26,472 
R2 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.19 0.17 
p-value of χ2 test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 32: The Effect of Geography (Regions) on Bond Yield Spreads 
This table reports the results of a panel regression (random effects) analysis of the yield spreads of publicly 
traded corporate bonds between 2010 and 2017. The dependent variable is the monthly trading yield spread 
between corporate bonds and maturity-matched treasury bonds. Implicit government guarantee is measured 
by a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bond is a Chengtou bond and 0 if the bond is a POE bond. Northeast 
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a bond issuer is located in Northeast China and 0 otherwise. Year fixed-
effects are included in all specifications. We report coefficient estimates with p-values in parentheses below. 
p-values are calculated using clustered standard errors at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 (1) (2) 
 Full Sample Full Sample 
Implicit -191.95*** -192.12*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Rating -64.22*** -64.01*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Northeast 33.80*** 21.68 
 (0.000) (0.268) 
Northeast × Implicit  14.41 
  (0.500) 
Implicit x Rating  13.19** 13.03** 
 (0.033) (0.035) 
ROA -5.40*** -5.39*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
LEV 0.17 0.17 
 (0.118) (0.114) 
Ln (Firm size) -3.07 -3.11 
 (0.175) (0.170) 
Issue size -4.22* -4.17* 
 (0.094) (0.098) 
Maturity 11.70*** 11.71*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Liquidity 2.61*** 2.61*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth 46.97*** 46.97*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Risk free rate -1.23 -1.23 
 (0.768) (0.768) 
Yield curve slope 18.48*** 18.48*** 




M2 growth -5.62*** -5.62*** 




















 (0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
Constant 90.30* 90.07* 
 (0.095) (0.096) 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes 
Observations 134,526 134,526 
R2 0.27 0.27 
p-value of χ2 test 0.000 0.000 
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Table 33: The Effect of Policy Changes on Bond Yield Spreads 
This table reports the results of a difference-in-difference (DID) regression analysis of the yield spreads 
between 2010 and 2017. For each model specification (1, 2, and 3), we only include observations for the 
five months before the issuance of the document under investigation and the five months thereafter. The 
dependent variable is the monthly trading yield spread between publicly traded corporate bonds and their 
maturity-matched treasury bonds. Implicit government guarantee is measured by a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the bond is a Chengtou bond and 0 if the bond is a POE bond. Year fixed-effects are included 
in all specifications. We report coefficient estimates with p-values in parentheses below. p-values are 
calculated using clustered standard errors at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Document 43 Document 88 Document 50 
Implicit  -123.78*** -335.54*** -280.80*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rating -71.05*** -69.14** -72.76** 
 (0.000) (0.032) (0.033) 
Northeast -28.62 1.00 43.36 
 (0.683) (0.992) (0.668) 
Implicit × Rating 42.99** 41.79 42.62 
 (0.031) (0.195) (0.214) 
Implicit × Northeast 40.48 -0.41 -210.37* 
 (0.576) (0.997) (0.061) 
Post43 -128.71
***   
 (0.000)   
Post88  -70.75
***  
  (0.000)  
Post50   -43.51
*** 
   (0.000) 
Implicit× Post43 -19.68
***   
 (0.001)   
Implicit × Post88  17.34
**  
  (0.036)  
Implicit × Post50   21.71
*** 
   (0.002) 
ROA -2.24** -0.26 -0.44 
 (0.023) (0.848) (0.742) 
LEV -0.04 0.58 0.80* 
 (0.866) (0.196) (0.077) 
Ln (Firm size) -12.06** -23.98** -26.81** 
 (0.036) (0.019) (0.011) 
Issue size 0.23 -15.04 -1.32 
 (0.976) (0.239) (0.923) 
Maturity -2.94 26.31*** 37.79*** 
 (0.202) (0.000) (0.000) 
Liquidity -1.18** 4.02*** 3.13*** 
 (0.034) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth -412.98*** -36.44 -44.77 
 (0.000) (0.839) (0.728) 
Risk free rate 39.00*** 115.08** 80.77** 
 




Yield curve slope 2.59 23.22 48.99 
 (0.881) (0.744) (0.311) 
M2 growth 3.51* -4.60 -1.02 
 (0.059) (0.329) (0.832) 
Explicit -1.92 -73.36*** -67.32*** 
 (0.837) (0.001) (0.004) 
Constant 3491.89*** 511.71 448.15 
 (0.000) (0.642) (0.548) 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,589 30,150 31,644 
R2 0.07 0.05 0.05 





Table 34: The Local Government’s Administrative Level and Bond Yield 
Spreads 
This table reports the results of a panel regression (random effects) analysis of the yield spreads of 
publicly traded corporate bonds between 2010 and 2017. The dependent variable is the monthly trading 
yield spread between corporate bonds and their maturity-matched treasury bonds. Implicit government 
guarantee is measured by a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bond is a Chengtou bond and 0 if the 
bond is a POE bond. Level is an indicator variable measuring the local government’s administrative level. 
Year fixed-effects are included in all specifications. We report coefficient estimates with p-values in 
parentheses below. p-values are calculated using clustered standard errors at the firm level. ***, **, and 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) 
 Full Sample Full Sample 
Implicit -200.7
*** -236.0*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Rating  -63.78
*** -62.79*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Level -13.95*** -24.97*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Implicit × Rating     16.03*** 13.40** 
 (0.010) (0.032) 
Implicit × Level     16.06*** 
  (0.004) 
ROA       -5.417
*** -5.428*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
LEV      0.179
* 0.150 
 (0.100) (0.168) 
Ln (Firm size)  -2.403 -2.575 
 (0.287) (0.254) 
Issue size      -3.216 -2.928 
 (0.203) (0.246) 
Maturity      11.40
*** 11.48*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Liquidity     2.598
*** 2.597*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth   47.14
*** 47.12*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Risk free rate -1.248 -1.230 
 (0.766) (0.769) 
Yield curve slope 18.57
*** 18.58*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 







Explicit     -21.92
*** -22.22*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 124.9** 152.9*** 
 (0.022) (0.006) 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes 
Observations 134,526 134,526 
R2 0.27 0.28 





Table 35: The Effect of Policy Changes on Bond Yield Spreads (with 
Administrative Level) 
This table reports the results of a difference-in-differences (DID) regression analysis of yield spreads 
around three policy changes (the so-called Documents 43, 88, and 50) between 2010 and 2017. For each 
model specification (1, 2, and 3), we only include observations for the five months before the issuance 
of the document under investigation and the five months thereafter. The dependent variable is the 
monthly trading yield spread between publicly traded corporate bonds and their maturity-matched 
treasury bonds. Implicit government guarantee is measured by a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bond 
is a Chengtou bond and 0 if the bond is a POE bond. Year fixed-effects are included in all specifications. 
We report coefficient estimates with p-values in parentheses below. p-values are calculated using 
clustered standard errors at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Document 43 Document 88 Document 50 
Implicit -140.0** -475.5*** -315.1*** 
 (0.013) (0.000) (0.002) 
Rating -70.63*** -64.66** -71.56** 
 (0.000) (0.045) (0.037) 
Northeast -29.05 2.627 43.68 
 (0.679) (0.979) (0.666) 
Level -2.344 -67.72*** -35.78 
 (0.885) (0.004) (0.145) 
Implicit × Rating 40.81** 40.11 51.09 
 (0.043) (0.222) (0.144) 
Implicit × Northeast  40.77 -1.868 -209.9* 
 (0.573) (0.986) (0.061) 
Implicit × Level 8.430 54.43* 3.239 
 (0.633) (0.057) (0.915) 
Post43 -128.8***   
 (0.000)   
Post88  -70.60***  
  (0.000)  
Post50   -43.31*** 
   (0.000) 
Implicit× Post43 -19.61***   
 (0.001)   
Implicit × Post88  17.26**  
  (0.037)  
Implicit × Post50   21.64*** 
   (0.002) 
ROA -2.238** -0.185 -0.420 
 (0.023) (0.891) (0.755) 
LEV -0.0830 0.597 0.858* 
 (0.737) (0.182) (0.059) 
Ln (Firm size) -12.11** -24.13** -26.89** 
 (0.036) (0.018) (0.010) 
Issue size 0.00935 -11.97 1.099 
 (0.999) (0.351) (0.936) 
Maturity -2.921 26.41*** 37.40*** 
 (0.206) (0.000) (0.000) 
Liquidity -1.179** 4.012*** 3.127*** 
 (0.034) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth -413.0*** -35.66 -46.30 
 (0.000) (0.842) (0.719) 
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Risk free rate 39.00*** 114.9** 80.75** 
 (0.002) (0.018) (0.038) 
Yield curve slope 2.574 22.97 48.94 
 (0.881) (0.747) (0.312) 
M2 growth 3.508* -4.594 -0.930 
 (0.059) (0.329) (0.846) 
Explicit -2.041 -74.51*** -67.11*** 
 (0.826) (0.001) (0.004) 
Constant 3500.1*** 667.6 543.2 
 (0.000) (0.545) (0.468) 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,589 30,150 31,644 
R2 0.07 0.06 0.04 
p-value of χ2 test 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
